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 Introduction
This book was written as a response to the Panama Papers. It 
is not, however, a direct commentary upon those disclosures; 
nor does it draw upon them in any great detail. Instead, it 
offers an explanation as to why, almost twenty years after the 
world’s major nation-states began to take action against tax 
havens, and after a decade or more of civil-society campaign-
ing on this issue, tax havens appear still to be prospering.
In my view, tax havens have three fundamental purposes: to 
undermine the rule of law for the benefit of an elite in society; 
to prevent democratically elected governments from deliver-
ing policies that their electorates might expect of them; and to 
increase the concentration of both income and wealth around 
the world. In all cases, these processes are undertaken behind 
a veil of secrecy that has been deliberately designed to prevent 
what is happening becoming apparent, while denying to those 
who need it – whether within governments or markets – the 
data required to make informed decisions. 
In light of this, the reasons why we still have tax havens 
are fairly obvious. Firstly, governments and campaigners have 
been too focused on the issue of taxation, when the challenges 
that tax havens pose range over a much broader range of 
issues than that. Secondly, many politicians in major states 
have been unwilling to close down the abusive activities under-
taken in tax havens when so many of those activities seem 
to be favoured by their sponsors, and can often be found, in 
varying degrees, within their own jurisdictions. Finally, politi-
cians have not understood the scale of the threat tax havens 
represent to the way in which we live. 
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The consequences of that lack of political nous on their 
part are telling: the wave of political populism aimed at eco-
nomic and political elites that is now sweeping through many 
countries is at least partly based on an awareness that tax 
havens threaten the well-being of most ‘ordinary’ people, and 
that not enough is being done to stop the abuses they permit. 
It seems timely to ask why so many understand this fact, while 
politicians have remained neither willing nor able to do so. 
Some of the abuse that tax havens permit is reflected in vast 
amounts of uncollected tax. Precisely how much it amounts to 
remains unknown, because far too many countries refuse to 
calculate their tax gaps, which are a measure of how much tax 
they do not collect, and why. Even if it is not the whole story 
of tax havens, the issue of uncollected tax is important: tax 
abuse has left too many developing countries dependent upon 
aid when they should have the right to set their own priorities, 
which they would be able to do if they collected the tax that 
is rightfully theirs. 
In developed countries, that shortage of revenue has been 
used as an excuse to impose austerity that has blighted the 
lives of millions of people, leaving them in poverty while elites 
have seen their wealth soar, partly because they holds at least 
some of it offshore, and thus free of taxation. When even the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD), none of which is considered a hotbed of socialism, 
recognise the threat to economic growth, popular well-being 
and political stability represented by this growing inequality, 
the pressing need for major reform of tax practices to collect 
the missing billions is clear.
The issue is bigger than this, though. In a world where 
almost every economy can be described as mixed – the state 
and private sectors combining in various ways to meet the 
needs of a domestic population – it is important for every-
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one that markets should work as well as they can. As every 
economist should know, there are some important conditions 
that must be met if this is to happen. These include the provi-
sion of as much data as possible to market participants, so 
that decision-makers – whether they be businesses, investors, 
employees, regulators, governments or others – can make the 
best possible decisions on how resources are used. They also 
include a requirement that there be a level playing field on 
which people have equal access to capital, so that those with 
good ideas can bring them to market. By deliberately creat-
ing opacity and concentrating the ownership of wealth, tax 
havens undermine these two conditions, thus inhibiting fair 
competition and growth. It is not by chance, then, that the 
world’s economy is stagnating: the growth of tax havens in 
the last three decades has made this outcome almost inevi-
table. If markets are to contribute to our well-being as they 
should, then they must be saved from the curse of tax havens.
Democracy, too, stands in need of salvation. A close 
examination of tax havens reveals their role in the deliber-
ate promotion of regulations that are of little or no benefit to 
their own populations. Instead, such measures are designed 
to undermine the ability of other governments to impose the 
regulations they have created in response to the mandate con-
ferred on them by their electorates. Tax law is one type of such 
regulation, but others are also undermined. These include 
competition law, environmental regulation, accounting rules, 
employment law, gambling regulation, laws on inheritance 
and property ownership, and a great deal more. 
Those who use tax havens – and the professionals who 
help them – want to live in a world where the law does not 
apply to them, but constrains the actions of everyone else. The 
clear success they have had in achieving this aim has damaged 
confidence in the ability of governments to deliver on their 
promises, leading to a decline in voter participation and 
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increasing calls for alternative, extra-parliamentary solutions 
to political problems. This process is massively destabilising 
for what most consider the normal way of life across large 
parts of the world. But such in instability is far from acciden-
tal: tax havens and their clients intend this outcome, and far 
too little is being done to address it.
As I suggest in this book, the measures taken to tackle 
tax haven abuse – mainly through coordinated action by the 
OECD, but also by the European Union, the IMF and indi-
vidual governments – have so far been inadequate. In too 
many cases, it appears as if the option of failure was from the 
outset built in to the measures supposedly intended to tackle 
abuse. The result has been a combination of great political 
heat with relatively little real change how tax havens have 
operated. This might represent an argument for pessimism, 
and even a belief that reform is not possible. I do not share 
that view. One of my primary purposes in writing this book is 
to outline viable reforms that could shake tax havens to their 
foundations. 
This book is thus optimistic in tone. I do not underesti-
mate the threat tax havens still pose to our tax revenues, 
our markets, and therefore our economy and well-being – 
and ultimately to our democracies. In each case, the threat 
is enormous. But it is my belief that politicians who want 
to reconnect effectively with their electorates, while simulta-
neously proving that they are both responsible managers of 
public finances and supporters of competitive marketplaces, 
can do so by tackling tax havens. If they enact measures 
that will shatter the secrecy created by lawyers, accountants, 
bankers and wealth managers operating from tax havens 
on behalf of their wealthy clients, whose sole aim is to deny 
opportunity to the rest of the world, then those politicians may 
really claim to be moving the world to a safer, fairer, and more 
prosperous place. 
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Others have offered comprehensive histories and case 
studies of the activities of particular tax haven, but that was 
never my goal. I did not, for example, set out to compete 
with Nicholas Shaxson’s stunning Treasure Islands: Tax 
Havens and the Men Who Stole the World (2011); or Brooke 
Harrington’s new study of wealth managers, Capital Without 
Borders: Wealth Managers and the One Percent (2016), which 
I recommend highly; or even to update my own book on the 
history of tax havens, written with Ronen Palan and Christian 
Chavagneux: Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works 
(2011). Similarly, there are several books already available 
on the Panama Papers. My distinctive aim here is to explain 
why there is still a need for urgent action on the issue of tax 
havens, to suggest what such action might consist of, and to 
outline the benefits that might arise as a result. 
Tackling tax havens will not solve all of the taxation-related 
problems in the world’s economies, with their increasingly 
failing markets and threatened democracies. Nonetheless, 
putting them out of action is a necessary step towards a system 
in which states and markets operate for the benefit of all. This 
book sets out a plan to achieve that goal.
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chapter 1
The Story of Tax Havens
The existence of tax havens does not add to overall global 
wealth or well-being; they serve no useful economic purpose. 
Whilst these jurisdictions undoubtedly benefit some rich 
individuals and multinational corporations, this benefit is at 
the expense of others, and they therefore serve to increase  
inequality.
Three hundred economists including  
Jeffrey Sachs, Thomas Piketty, Angus Deaton  
and the author of this book, May 2016
In April 2016 the Panama Papers burst into the news media. 
The leak of 11.5 million documents bearing the news of the 
creation of a vast number of offshore companies, more than 
100,000 of them in the British Virgin Islands alone, proved a 
claim that tax justice activists had been making for some time, 
which was that tax abuse via tax havens was being under-
taken on an industrial scale.1
The Panama Papers rightly garnered a lot of media atten-
tion. A few weeks later, the Anti-Corruption Summit held in 
London, and chaired by the British prime minister, received 
much less publicity. Firstly, this was because many people 
believe that nothing can really be done to stop such abuse. 
Secondly, despite the appearance given by that summit, there is 
a deep-seated belief that there is no real political will to tackle 
the issue: there was a palpable sense among the media and 
others at the summit that this was an event whose outcome 
amounted to less than the sum of its parts.2 
These issues, in combination, form the backbone of this 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   7 18/10/2016   16:09:35
8dirty secrets
book, in which I will suggest that something really can be 
done to stop tax haven abuse, and that the political will to 
drive the necessary changes can indeed be generated.
Just as important, though, is my third argument, which is 
that, because many politicians have only a faint understand-
ing of what financial offshoring is all about, they are currently 
proposing solutions to what is, at best, a small part of the 
problem that it poses for the world. This opinion is based on 
my experience as a chartered accountant, tax campaigner, and 
professor of political economy. What I offer here is an expla-
nation of what tax havens really are, and what we should do 
about them.
Of these three issues the last matters to me the most, because 
I think it is the real obstacle to progress. It is not as if the 
tax haven problem is new, after all. There is good reason to 
argue that the first place to undertake what looks like modern 
tax haven practice was the US state of Delaware, which in 
1898 created a statute deliberately intended to undermine the 
regulations of its neighbours New Jersey and New York. The 
trouble is that the Monte Carlo casino in tax-free Monaco, 
which had abolished all forms of tax by 1869, is the much 
simpler model of tax haven behaviour that most politicians 
use as a point of reference.3 
The Panama Papers scandal fits the model of Monaco, 
not Delaware. This is because they are quite explicitly about 
tax. In some ways this is unfortunate, because it reinforces 
the political stereotype that the tax haven problem is about 
straightforward tax abuse undertaken in what appear to be 
exotic locations. My argument here is that, until we realise 
that tax abuse is just one of a range of activities undertaken 
in the space called ‘offshore’ that are recorded in, but do not 
actually take place in, locations that have been called tax 
havens, there are three important advances we cannot make 
– namely, understanding the risk that these activities pose to 
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the world’s governments, to capitalism as our default way of 
organising an economy, and to democracy – and therefore to 
our whole way of life.
What is surprising is that a more general awareness of these 
three issues has not yet emerged, despite the fact that tax 
havens have been under almost unremitting attack for some 
time. The first official report to note the potential harm that 
tax havens represented was produced in the United States in 
1981, but crackdowns on tax haven activity only really began 
with the issue of the European Union’s Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation in 1997, and the OECD’s publication of its 
report on Harmful Tax Competition in 1998.4 The European 
Union Savings Tax Directive, introduced in 2005, was the 
next big milestone: it was the first attempt to secure infor-
mation from tax havens on a systematic and comprehensive 
basis. But the most important development occurred in 2008.
The global financial crisis that erupted in that year made tax 
revenue the commodity in shortest supply to the governments 
of most of the western world, with the consequence that many 
plunged deeply into financial deficit. The immediate reaction 
of many of those governments was to seek someone to blame 
for what had happened. Moreover, they urgently needed to be 
seen to be taking action on the crisis, and they wanted that 
action to be swift. Taking on tax havens met politicians’ need 
on all three counts.
As banks in the UK, the United States and continental 
Europe failed in quick succession, the option of blaming 
the darker, tax-haven side of the financial services sector 
for everything that had gone wrong had the merit of being 
both popular and at least partly justifiable.5 That sentiment 
underpinned the April 2009 G20 summit in London, which 
I attended. The closing communiqué read: ‘We have today … 
issued a Declaration, ‘Strengthening the Financial System’. In 
particular we agree … to take action against non-cooperative 
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jurisdictions, including tax havens. We stand ready to deploy 
sanctions to protect our public finances and financial systems. 
The era of banking secrecy is over.’6 
This was a bold claim, suggesting that tax havens stood 
outside the mainstream of the financial system and did not 
cooperate with other nation-states in the areas of regulation 
and the management of financial risk; it made clear that, in 
the view of the governments issuing the statement, secrecy 
was at the heart of the problem; and it suggested that targeted 
sanctions could address the issues arising.
Each idea was interesting, but the proposed solution that 
emerged from that summit was fundamentally wrong. In fact, 
it can almost be claimed as one of the successes of tax haven 
secrecy that the way in which tax havens work has been so 
misunderstood that, when the world turned its attention to 
the abuses they permitted, it had no idea how to specify the 
problems they created – or, therefore, how to address them.
This book will argue that, while secretive banking is a 
feature of some tax havens, it is a not a universal characteris-
tic and does not need to be, since there are many other ways 
in which tax haven secrecy has been, and continues to be, 
delivered. 
What is more, as I argued in Tax Havens along with my 
co-authors Ronen Palan and Christian Chavagneux in 2010, 
tax havens are not distinct,or separate part of the global finan-
cial system, but are integral to it. The supposed separateness 
of tax havens from the rest of the world’s financial commu-
nity, implied by the 2009 G20 communiqué, was therefore 
a fiction. The reality was, and remains, that tax havens are 
totally integrated into our current global financial architec-
ture. It is just that, for their own reasons, those who designed 
that system wanted to make sure that parts of it were well and 
truly hidden from view. Thus, to imagine that direct bilateral 
sanctions against a particular tax haven would create a state 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   10 18/10/2016   16:09:35
The Story of Tax Havens
11
of compliance that would signal the end of the tax haven era 
seriously misunderstood how the tax haven world operated in 
2009 – and continues to operate today. 
Unfortunately, these misunderstandings continue to be 
widely circulated as if they were fact. So, for example, the 
Anti-Corruption Summit held in London in May 2016 focused 
its attention on the role of tax havens in facilitating a very nar-
rowly defined form of corruption, largely relating to personal 
tax evasion and the theft of public property by public officials, 
whether in developed or developing countries. Meanwhile, it 
ignored the fact that the impacts of tax havens go way beyond 
those areas, incurring much larger societal costs.
Since this misunderstanding is a recurring theme of this 
book, it is vital from the outset to understand the exact activi-
ties and nature of tax havens – which is probably best achieved 
by tracing the development of current thinking on this issue. 
Nearly twenty years ago, in the view of the OECD, the 
problem created by tax havens was what it called ‘harmful 
tax competition’.7 This was associated with what the OECD 
called ‘preferential tax regimes’. The motive for this judge-
ment was clear from its 1998 report on the subject:
Countries face public spending obligations and constraints 
because they have to finance outlays on, for example, national 
defence, education, social security, and other public services. 
Investors in tax havens, imposing zero or nominal taxation, 
who are residents of non-haven countries may be able to utilise 
in various ways those tax haven jurisdictions to reduce their 
domestic tax liability. Such taxpayers are in effect ‘free riders’ 
who benefit from public spending in their home country and 
yet avoid contributing to its financing.8
In other words, it tax havens facilitated cheating, and the 
states who were losing out as a result were not happy about 
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that. Those states made it clear where they placed the blame: 
‘In a still broader sense, governments and residents of tax 
havens can be “free riders” of general public goods created by 
the non-haven country.’9 The focus of attention was therefore 
not the investor in the tax haven: the blame was to be chiefly 
attached to the government and population of tax haven. 
The OECD was equally unambitious about what the key 
issue was:
Tax havens or harmful preferential tax regimes that drive the 
effective tax rate levied on income from the mobile activities 
significantly below rates in other countries have the potential 
to cause harm by: 
• distorting financial and, indirectly, real investment flows; 
• undermining the integrity and fairness of tax structures; 
• discouraging compliance by all taxpayers;
• re-shaping the desired level and mix of taxes and public 
spending; 
• causing undesired shifts of part of the tax burden to less 
mobile tax bases, such as labour, property and consumption; 
and
• increasing the administrative costs and compliance 
burdens on tax authorities and taxpayers.10
The OECD identified those states purveying such pernicious 
practices by reference to the presence of:
a)  No or only nominal taxes. 
b) Lack of effective exchange of information [because] busi-
nesses and individuals can benefit from strict secrecy rules 
and other protections against scrutiny by tax authorities 
c) A lack of transparency in the operation of … legislative, 
legal or administrative provisions
d) No substantial activities [in the tax haven that] would 
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suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract 
investment or transactions that are purely tax driven.
This approach contrasts with that of the European 
Commission, whose Code of Conduct on Business Taxation, 
issued the previous year (1997), was a ‘package to tackle 
harmful tax competition in the European Union’.11 The simi-
larity in language, both texts making reference to harmful tax 
competition, is obvious. But the EU’s suggestion of what iden-
tified this behaviour differed slightly from the OECD’s view, 
partly because the focus of the former was solely on business 
taxation. The characteristics of harmful tax practices, in the 
EU’s opinion, included:
• an effective level of taxation for the abusive practice 
which is significantly lower than the general level of taxa-
tion in the country concerned;
• tax benefits reserved for non-residents;
• tax incentives for activities which are isolated from the 
domestic economy and therefore have no impact on the 
national tax base;
• granting of tax advantages even in the absence of any 
real economic activity;
• the basis of profit determination for companies in a multi-
national group depart[ing] from internationally accepted 
rules, in particular those approved by the OECD;
• lack of transparency.
Picking solely on these two, near-simultaneous reports, does 
not, of course, provide a comprehensive review of official 
opinion on tax haven behaviour at the time. Nevertheless, 
their publication established a benchmark on the understand-
ing of the harmful consequences of tax haven practices where 
none had existed before.
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The 1990s consensus view was then that a tax haven could 
be identified by four characteristics: low tax rates available to 
those unlikely to be resident in the jurisdiction that offered 
them; those same low rates concerning an activity that had 
little or no relationship to the place where it was recorded; the 
existence of arrangements enabling such taxation structures 
that were very unlikely to accord with international standards 
of accounting or administrative conduct; and the conceal-
ment from view of such arrangements by local secrecy laws 
intended to throw off the scent any tax authority investigating 
clients’ use of such facilities. The benchmark represented by 
this analysis was potentially powerful, but largely failed soon 
after its creation, as it continues to fail today. 
The first failure arose with the close of the Clinton era in the 
United States. In May 2001, President George W. Bush’s new 
finance minister, Paul O’Neil, deemed the OECD approach to 
harmful tax competition ‘too broad and … not in line with 
this Administration’s tax and economic priorities’, adding: 
‘The United States does not support efforts to dictate to any 
country what its own tax rates or tax system should be, and 
will not participate in any initiative to harmonize world tax 
systems.’12 For all practical purposes, this statement killed off 
the 1998 OECD initiative and signalled a US withdrawal from 
the effort to tackle all but one aspect of tax haven abuse for 
the next eight years. The exception was with regard to terror-
ist financing. 
This had an impact, in turn, on the EU Code of Conduct on 
Business Taxation, where progress was also slow, and often 
ambiguous in its outcomes (harmful regimes were brought 
to an end, but usually replaced with something that looked 
remarkably similar). But there were two notable exceptions 
in the case if this EU initiative. The first related to the UK’s 
tax havens. As a result of the UK’s admission to the EU in 
1973, each of its Crown Dependencies (Guernsey, Jersey and 
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the Isle of Man) and Overseas Territories13 (such as Cayman 
and the British Virgin Islands) had entered into agreements 
with the EU, and the UK was now expected to impose the 
requirements of the EU’s Code of Conduct upon them. For the 
Overseas Territories this had little impact: most had no corpo-
ration tax, to which the Code largely applied. But the Crown 
Dependencies did have such taxes, and they were riddled with 
the very loopholes that the EU was seeking to close. Over 
years of negotiation, these places were required to transform 
their tax systems to meet EU demands – a process in which I 
played a role.
The second exception to a generally slow rate of prog-
ress was the introduction of the European Union Savings 
Tax Directive in 2005. As the first really effective attempt to 
enforce information exchange between tax havens and the 
governments of the countries where their users resided, this 
was an agreement that applied right across the EU, includ-
ing the UK’s tax havens. Nothing like it had existed before. 
That said, the scheme, as introduced, was deeply flawed. For 
example, it only applied to interest paid to individuals, which 
meant that dividends paid by companies were outside its 
scope. So too were bank accounts owned by companies and 
trusts. All an individual had to do to circumvent the Directive, 
therefore, was to move their bank account into the name of a 
company, and the whole disclosure regime no longer applied 
to them: it was really that easy. It was as if those designing the 
arrangement had deliberately designed some barn doors into 
it, so that any tax evader with the slightest intent of staying 
beyond the reach of the law could successfully do so. 
***[Q: Not multilateral?] [replace with an]***
In addition, because of opposition from many of the EU’s 
tax havens, such as Luxembourg, Austria and Belgium, they 
were given an opt-out from exchanging information on the 
interest paid by banks resident in their territories to the tax 
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authorities of those EU countries where the beneficiaries of 
those payments resided. Instead they were permitted, if the 
recipient of the interest requested it, to withhold tax from 
the payment of the interest as an alternative to information 
exchange, with 75 per cent of the tax deducted being remit-
ted to the country to whom it was likely to be due and 25 
per cent being kept by the tax haven jurisdiction for having 
to make the deduction. This option was also made available 
to the UK’s tax havens. 
This tax withholding was at 15 per cent in 2005, but 
reached 35 per cent in 2011. In the face of this increasing tax-
withholding rate, the states that offered this scheme gradually 
withdrew from it, starting with Belgium. Austria would have 
been the last to concede, in 2017. It took the fall of Jean-
Claude Juncker in Luxembourg to provoke that country’s 
change of heart in 2013. 
In the UK’s tax havens, pragmatism dictated the pace of 
change. In the aftermath of the 2008 crash, cash poured 
out of these islands, despite the option of a withholding tax 
being available to depositors. In Jersey, cash on deposit fell 
from £212 billion in 2007 to £126 billion in 2015. Over 
the same period, the number of banks in the island fell by a 
third. As the realisation dawned that complying with the EU’s 
full requirements on information exchange would become 
inevitable at some point, each of the UK havens gave up the 
tax-withholding scheme before being forced to do so.
The European Union Savings Tax Directive did have a sig-
nificant impact in that case, but again it skirted around the real 
problem in tax havens. It implied that tax was the only issue 
of concern, and that if only a direct relationship was created 
by information exchange between the tax authorities of the 
tax haven and the tax authority of the state where the account 
holder lived, then all tax haven problems would be solved. 
This was not true, but even achieving this limited outcome 
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required the deployment of enormous political effort. And 
when the United States finally returned to the tax haven issue, 
as it inevitably did when Barack Obama came to power, its 
response was to replicate the demand for automatic informa-
tion exchange. 
This was the goal of the US Foreign Accounts Tax 
Compliance Act (FATCA) of 2010: it sought to procure data 
on the sums held by, and interest and other income paid on, 
the overseas accounts of US residents. Washington adopted a 
draconian approach (which it alone could do) to secure this 
information. FATCA decreed that any bank wanting to under-
take any business with US residents had to deliver data on 
the accounts they maintained for all US tax residents, wher-
ever those accounts might be, or else all of that bank’s income 
earned in the United States (which, almost by definition, just 
about every bank has) would be subject to a tax withhold-
ing before being paid to that bank – which would represent a 
massive commercial penalty. 
FATCA has worked. Banks around the world have had no 
choice but to comply with its demands. But, just like the EU 
Savings Tax Directive, FATCA is massively flawed. In this 
case, by far the biggest problem is that FATCA agreements 
with the United States are not reciprocal. Data is required by 
the United States, but none is supplied in return. This is hardly 
surprising because, in practice, the United States has almost 
none of the necessary arrangements in place to collect the data 
they demand from other countries. The consequence is that, as 
will be explored later in this book, the United States is now 
becoming one of the two most important tax havens in the 
world, rivalling the UK for this title.
At least FATCA worked, though – which is more than can 
be said of the OECD initiatives developed in the wake of the 
2009 London G20 summit. There were two of them. The first 
was the creation of a tax haven blacklisting scheme that was 
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meant to identify non-cooperative regimes (embracing in the 
process the flaw of blacklisting that was inherited from the 
earlier initiatives of the 1990s, noted above). A non-cooperative 
regime was identified as one that had signed twelve or fewer 
OECD-approved Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
(TIEAs). These were bilateral agreements of somewhat more 
limited scope than OECD Double Tax Agreements, intended 
to permit one party to the agreement to make request of the 
other for information on the activity of one of its tax residents 
in that second location, if (and this point is critical) they could 
prove that the person in question had an activity in the second 
location (which was invariably a tax haven) and they had no 
other way of obtaining the information they needed.
If ever a sanction was designed to be ineffective from the 
outset, then this was it. Firstly, no one could explain why only 
twelve TIEAs were required to meet a state of international 
compliance when there were, for example, more than twenty 
countries in the G20 group of nations, twenty-eight in the 
European Union, thirty-four in the OECD and well over a 
hundred worldwide, that would likely seek the information 
in question. 
Secondly, it was also impossible to explain why TIEAs with 
places like Greenland and the Faroe Islands ranked equally 
with those with France, Spain, India and other populous 
nations. Given that the Nordic countries, including the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, tended to sign these agreements as a 
group, and were keen to do so, these tiny countries featured, 
quite bizarrely, in the qualifying total for many tax havens. I 
understand from reliable sources that Greenland never used 
the agreements it signed, which is hardly surprising.
Thirdly, there was again no explanation as to why a TIEA 
between two tax havens also qualified a nation as coopera-
tive. The chance that the San Marino–Andorra TIEA, signed in 
September 2009, would ever be used was remote in the extreme. 
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But even if these issues had not provided such an obviously 
farcical element, there would have remained the problem that 
those TIEAs signed between countries that wished for infor-
mation, such as the UK, and places that had it to supply, such 
as Jersey, were almost entirely inoperable. It was a prerequisite 
of making a request for information that the tax authority 
in the country making it could prove that one of their tax 
residents did in fact have an identifiable account in the tax 
haven jurisdiction; but the whole point of tax haven secrecy 
was to ensure that this information was not available to that 
tax authority. The entire TIEA process was thus doomed from 
the outset, because an information exchange request was only 
possible if, in practice, the requesting country had the infor-
mation it required in its own possession before asking the tax 
haven to confirm that it existed. It would be hard to conceive 
of an arrangement so doomed to failure as this one, but for 
the fact that it was not only suggested but actually promoted 
as a solution to the tax haven problem, as major countries 
understood it in 2009.
TIEAs were thus a complete waste of time at the time they 
were introduced. After a flurry of activity in 2008, 2009 and 
2010, as tax havens tried to prove themselves compliant, the 
futility of the process became readily apparent, and the last 
TIEA was signed in 2012.
At first, the other OECD scheme resulting from the 2009 
G20 Summit fared little better. This was the so-called Global 
Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for 
Tax Purposes. According to the OECD, this ‘is the multi-
lateral framework within which work on transparency and 
exchange of information for tax purposes has been carried out 
by both OECD and non-OECD economies since 2000. Since 
its restructuring in 2009, the Global Forum has become the 
key international body working on the implementation of the 
international standards on tax transparency.’14
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The 2009 restructuring was important, and necessary: 
the imposed lethargy of the George W. Bush era had to be 
swept away. But this body at first proved toothless, content-
ing itself for a long time with so-called peer reviews of each 
country’s legislation and capacity to supply information to 
other countries on request (subject to the constraints within 
TIEA agreements, noted above), without actually asking until 
long after the process had begun whether much (or any) useful 
information had in fact been exchanged. The reality was that 
very little such data changed hands as a result – which suited 
the tax havens perfectly. 
Indeed, tax havens found this whole OECD based process 
enormously beneficial for a while, because it provided them 
with the most extraordinary political cover for their contin-
ued support for near-total secrecy. They took part more than 
willingly in peer reviews, Jersey even supplying a vice-chair of 
the process overseeing the whole scheme. The reviews showed 
they had put in place all the required legislation to meet the 
OECD’s demands, and could supposedly secure the infor-
mation that was necessary for exchange purposes if they so 
wished – all on the condition that a requesting nation could 
prove it had the right to ask for it, knowing full well that, in 
practice, this was a nearly insurmountable hurdle. As a result, 
many tax havens claimed for several years that they were 
among the best-regulated regimes in the world. What on earth 
was anybody now complaining about, they then asked, far 
from innocently?15 
The complaint – that all of this activity had missed the point 
– came from an improbable but, in relation to tax havens, 
powerful source: civil society. When the OECD tax haven ini-
tiative of the late 1990s was halted by George W. Bush, there 
was good reason to think that his administration’s view on 
tax havens was dogmatic and heavily influenced by right-wing 
think tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Center 
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for Freedom and Prosperity, which heavily defended tax haven 
activity, as they continue to do. They were assisted by the fact 
that there were then no equivalent civil society organisations 
taking issue with their view. This changed with the creation 
of the Tax Justice Network, launched at a meeting in the UK’s 
House of Commons in 2003, which I chaired. 
The Tax Justice Network arose out of the concerns of a 
number of academic and activist thinkers. Sol Picciotto had 
written a seminal work on international business taxation 
that had criticised tax haven practices in 1992.16 Prem Sikka 
of Essex University, with John Christensen, who, between 
1987 and 1998, had been the senior economic adviser to 
the States of Jersey, had been working through an organisa-
tion called the Association for Accountancy and Business 
Affairs.17 They had set it up to highlight the abuses they felt 
Jersey, in particular, had been permitting. In another part of 
academia, Ronen Palan, then at the University of Sussex and 
now at City University, London, had written a book entitled 
The Offshore World: Sovereign Markets, Virtual Places, and 
Nomad Millionaires. 
The Tax Justice Network owed its origins to more than 
these four people, but, given that its role was to bring together 
experts to create new thinking on issues around tax, and tax 
havens in particular, their role was vital. Palan’s thinking had 
particular impact. He argued that a literal interpretation of 
‘offshore’, implicit in both the OECD and European Union 
harmful tax competition initiatives, made no sense. He said 
it could not be, for example, that Cayman was the fifth- 
largest centre in the world,18 or that Liberia was at the time 
the biggest shipping nation in the world. This, he argued was 
all a fiction – or, as he put it, ‘side by side with the state system, 
there [had] emerge[d] a virtual world of make-believe, driven 
by a modified form of sovereignty’.19
The idea of a ‘virtual world’ gained ground over the years 
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that followed, fuelled partly by the continued frustration that 
those working in this field had with defining just what a tax 
haven was. But it was not until 2009, with the launch by the 
Tax Justice Network of its first Financial Secrecy Index (which 
I directed that year), that a significant focus on secrecy came 
to the fore in the identification of those places commonly 
called tax havens. 
A number of new features were included in this work, 
which can fairly be said to have changed the approach to tax 
havens since it was first published. Firstly, a deliberate effort 
was made to expand understanding of the tax haven phenom-
enon. This was achieved by through submission from the Tax 
Justice Network to the UK’s House of Commons Treasury 
Select Committee in June 2008, in which it was argued:
What it is important to stress is that secrecy is key to most tax 
haven operations. Without it many of those using tax haven 
structures would not do so. This is either because, in the case of 
those using them for criminal purpose, including tax evasion, 
they fear they would be too easily identified and so pay for the 
consequences of their crime, or in the case of those using them 
for regulatory avoidance (which may be legitimate, but is often 
ethically questionable) because of the damage that discovery 
would do to their reputations.20
This theme was expanded in 2009, in another paper issued 
in anticipation of the launch of the Financial Secrecy Index, 
which deliberately defined a new term in the language of off-
shore. This was the rebranding of many tax havens as ‘secrecy 
jurisdictions’ – a term that has since come into common 
usage.21 
The phrase had been used before – for example, by US 
Senator Carl Levin – but had remained as ill-defined as the 
term ‘tax haven’ itself, and thus of little more use. The term as 
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defined in 2009 suggested there were two characteristics that 
identified a place as a secrecy jurisdiction. Firstly, it was argued 
that secrecy jurisdictions created regulation that they knew to 
be of primary benefit and use to those not resident in their 
geographical domain. Secondly, it was suggested that secrecy 
jurisdictions also created a deliberate, and legally backed, veil 
of secrecy that ensured that those from outside the secrecy 
jurisdiction making use of its regulations could not be identi-
fied as doing so. The presence of these two characteristics, it 
was suggested at the time, identified a secrecy jurisdiction. 
In 2009 the use of this terminology permitted three things. 
Firstly, it enabled campaigners to change the focus of atten-
tion from tax to secrecy. Although the OECD and European 
Union had both recognised the importance of secrecy in the 
1990s, they had in fact focused the vast majority of their atten-
tion on particular tax regimes offered by specific jurisdictions 
since that time, and the bigger-picture issue of secrecy had as 
a result fallen by the wayside. 
Secondly, the change made it clear that the use of secrecy 
jurisdictions was about much more than tax abuse. Ronen 
Palan had suggested that what tax havens really offered was 
something much more pernicious: an escape from a much 
broader range of regulation, permitting the user to escape their 
obligations not just to tax authorities but to other regulators, 
as well as to their competitors, creditors and shareholders, 
and (not least) their spouses and children, none of whom 
could hope to know what was going on in a secrecy jurisdic-
tion. It so happened that the secrecy that permitted all these 
other potential abuses also permitted tax evasion and avoid-
ance; but it was fundamentally to misunderstand the role of 
tax havens to think that tax was the only reason someone 
might choose to record an activity in such a place.
Thirdly, in 2009 I made it clear that secrecy jurisdictions 
did not operate in isolation from each other. Instead, they 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   23 18/10/2016   16:09:35
24
dirty secrets
are used in combination to create what has been termed a 
‘secrecy space’: the result of the common practice of secrecy 
jurisdiction practitioners who, to put it mildly, spread their 
clients’ activities around. What this means is that they might 
incorporate a company for a client in one secrecy jurisdiction, 
and then put the directors of that company in one (or more) 
other secrecy jurisdiction(s), while its banking may well be 
provided from a third. The ownership of the company will be 
recorded in a trust, but that will not be in the same place as 
the company, while having the trustees of that trust in more 
than one country spreads the risk. Being willing to change the 
mix of trustees over time only adds to the difficulty of locat-
ing anything. Of course, the real activity of the company that 
has been created will, almost certainly, be in none of these 
places – it will be ‘elsewhere’ (a term that will occur frequently 
throughout this book). Quite possibly, none of the people 
involved in managing the trusts, or maybe even the company, 
will know where that ‘elsewhere’ really is: the British Virgin 
Islands, for example, has created a special form of trust (the 
VISTA trust), in which the trustees have no right to ask the 
directors of the companies they own about the trades they 
undertake. 
This way of working does, however, mean that the OECD 
and EU initiatives’ assumption that there is a direct relation-
ship between a tax payer and a tax haven’s activity is only 
true of the simplest of offshore arrangements. This is not to 
deny that such structures have existed, and may still do so. 
While banking secrecy existed, it was possible for a resident 
of a country like the United States, France, Australia or the 
UK – all of which require that their tax-resident population 
pay tax on their worldwide income – to hold their money in a 
bank account in a location like Jersey, Cayman or Singapore, 
and leave their tax authority with no chance of finding out 
about it. But it is now the case that only the most naive of tax 
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haven users will bank in this way, because the introduction 
of various automatic information-exchange regimes, some of 
which have already been discussed, has made it increasingly 
likely that such accounts will now be discovered. 
As a result, the layering of tier upon tier of secrecy in the 
way I have described has become ever more commonplace in 
the tax haven (or secrecy jurisdiction) world, which is pre-
cisely what the Panama Papers revealed: the vast majority of 
those introducing work to Mossack Fonseca (the firm whose 
files were leaked) were themselves located in other tax havens 
or secrecy jurisdictions.
The focus on secrecy changed the official, if not the politi-
cal, attitude to tax havens. After 2012, tackling secrecy 
became the key issue, and pure tax initiatives such as the 
TIEA scheme faded. Other events also influenced this change. 
In particular, from 2010 onwards, the Occupy movement 
in the United States and the UK Uncut movement in Britain 
attracted attention, using remarkably limited resources, to the 
role of multinational corporations in international tax abuse. 
This phenomenon was particularly notable in the UK, where 
the campaign used data produced by the Tax Justice Network, 
the UK’s Trade Union Congress, the Public and Commercial 
Services Union, and Private Eye magazine.22
What these public protests did was make clear that concern 
about the use of tax havens was not limited to tax evaders, 
or to banking, but also embraced their use by large multina-
tional corporations. This concern was driven partly by data 
published from 2008 onwards. In one particularly powerful 
2011 report, ActionAid showed that ninety-eight of the FTSE 
100 companies in the UK had tax haven subsidiaries.23 I have 
since been told that very few of those companies enjoyed the 
publicity that this revelation secured them.
Work I published in 2010 also showed that the big four 
accountancy firms – PWC, Deloitte, EY and KPMG – which 
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between them act as auditors to all the FTSE 100 companies, 
were present in most of the world’s major tax havens – often, 
all of them simultaneously.24 Other research, which I under-
took for the UK’s TUC in 2008, estimated that the UK’s largest 
companies might, between them, have been avoiding £12 
billion of tax per year at that time – a loss that sets Vodafone’s 
claimed tax avoidance of maybe £6 billion in context. 
Crucially, these reports changed the focus of the media. 
Without ignoring tax evasion, the attention of much of the 
press shifted to the tax-avoiding activities of multinational 
companies. Companies like Google, whose tax affairs had 
been put in the public domain as early as 2009, though it 
had attracted little attention at the time, were now subject 
to renewed scrutiny from 2010, placing them at the centre of 
a global furore.25 Stories about Amazon and Starbucks soon 
followed. These three companies became the face of corpo-
rate tax avoidance when summoned before the UK House of 
Commons Public Accounts Committee in November 2012.26 
Two direct consequences flowed from this. The first was 
the attention that David Cameron, as UK prime minister, then 
gave to the issue, making it the priority for his presidency of 
the G8 summit in Lough Erne, Northern Ireland, in June 2013. 
Second, the OECD took the issue on, desperate to find its own 
way forward, as its post-2008 initiatives were by then so obvi-
ously failing. Consequently, the issue of corporate tax abuse 
was put very firmly on the G20 agenda in November 2012. 
The first OECD report on what was to become well known as 
Base Erosion and Profits Shifting (BEPS) was issued in February 
2013.27 David Cameron then massively increased the atten-
tion given to this issue. He also widened the basis of political 
interest in it by deliberately citing the concerns of develop-
ing countries – and, for the first time, building in an explicit 
commitment to the introduction of what is called country-by-
country reporting as one way of addressing this issue.28
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This was a significant change: country-by-country report-
ing, which was a concept I created in 2003, had become the 
totemic demand of many tax campaigners, including the UK 
development NGOs that had undoubtedly captured David 
Cameron’s attention prior to the 2013 summit.29 Country-
by-country reporting demands that every large multinational 
company should put on public record a profit-and-loss 
account for each country in which it operates during a given 
period, without exception, showing not only its trade with 
genuine third-party customers, but also those activities that 
took place with other companies within the same group. This 
data, together with some additional information noted later 
in this book, is designed to show exactly where the substance 
of a group of companies’ real trading is located (this being 
where its customers are located, its people employed, and 
its assets engaged) – as opposed to the locations in which it 
declares its profits and pays – or fails to pay – its taxes. This 
disclosure includes any activity in tax havens, which would 
be revealed by this process. For the first time, secrecy had 
become the real battleground in this debate. The opacity of 
tax havens, combined with the opacity that existing account-
ing rules for multinational corporations permitted, had been 
highlighted as the point of civil society concern about secrecy 
jurisdictions.
This was, for the time being, a tax haven campaigning high 
point. Every action by every authority that has been engaged 
with the tax haven issue since then has stepped back from 
the issue of transparency in every possible way. For example, 
when the OECD finally came to deliver its recommendations 
on country-by-country reporting, as requested by the G8 in 
June 2013, the suggestion was that the information be kept 
absolutely secret, and be made available only to the tax admin-
istration of the parent company of a multinational group. The 
effect was to exclude very many developing countries from 
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receiving the information David Cameron had committed to 
supply to them. 
Likewise, the Anti-Corruption Summit of May 2016 dealt 
with the issue of tax haven abuse according to a very narrow 
definition of corruption that presumed that it related solely 
to the theft of public funds by public officials. The possibil-
ity of tax avoidance, potentially costing developing countries 
hundreds of billions of dollars a year,30 was almost ignored, 
the issue of country-by-country reporting being sidelined into 
a new, non-binding consultation process, to which only a very 
few countries committed.
In the summer of 2016, then, it is as if all the powers that 
might tackle tax haven abuse have signed up to a collective 
denial of the issue of secrecy. This means that, as yet, the battle 
against tax havens is nowhere near won. Important as tack-
ling tax evasion might be – as the Panama Papers proved – tax 
abuse is not the major product the tax havens supply; opacity 
is. The danger of that opacity has to be understood before 
any further progress can be made in discussing the nature 
and conduct of tax havens, and the measures needed to tackle 
them.
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chapter 2
The Problems of Secrecy
As we have seen, the real problem of tax havens is not tax 
abuse itself, important though that is, but the secrecy that 
permits that abuse and many others. It is this opacity that 
suggests tax havens might be better understood as secrecy 
jurisdictions.
The world was not meant to be like this. According to 
almost every introductory economics course, a number of con-
ditions must be met for markets to work to best effect. That 
list is not long, but one of the key points is that all buyers and 
sellers must have complete information about the products in 
a marketplace. This, of course, includes information on who is 
supplying the goods. A second point is that all firms must sell 
a clearly identifiable product to ensure a level playing field. 
Next, no firm should be so big that it can control prices in the 
market. And, finally, there must be freedom of market entry, 
which requires that anyone with the right ideas can access the 
capital they need to compete.
Economists teach these things knowing they will not hold 
true in reality. But, that said, in the vast majority of economic 
research, it is implicitly assumed that such market conditions 
do at least approximately prevail, and that markets therefore 
deliver optimal outcomes for everyone in a society. 
This has led major economies, like the United States and 
the UK, to put in place regulations intended to support the 
existence of markets that approximate to the conventional 
economists’ ideal. As the US Federal Trade Commission says 
on its website: 
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Free and open markets are the foundation of a vibrant economy. 
Aggressive competition among sellers in an open marketplace 
gives consumers – both individuals and businesses – the ben-
efits of lower prices, higher quality products and services, 
more choices, and greater innovation. The FTC’s competition 
mission is to enforce the rules of the competitive marketplace 
– the antitrust laws. These laws promote vigorous competition 
and protect consumers from anticompetitive mergers and busi-
ness practices. The FTC’s Bureau of Competition, working in 
tandem with the Bureau of Economics, enforces the antitrust 
laws for the benefit of consumers.1
This is a fantasy. What is astonishing is that the Federal 
Trading Commission, among others, do not acknowledge that 
fact. But it represents a powerful belief: one that forms the 
foundation for the whole doctrine of faith in markets that has 
underpinned the programmes of most political parties for the 
last forty years. But what this means politically is that anyone 
who suggests that markets work better than any other form 
of economic organisation has at least to aspire to create the 
conditions outlined above.
Perhaps it is unsurprising, therefore, that one finds few ref-
erences to tax havens in any introductory economics textbook 
aimed at undergraduates. Economists and politicians alike 
know that tax havens shatter all these myths that underpin 
their supposed faith in free markets. Sadly, they would rather 
ignore this obvious fact than face the truth. In short, in a 
world where tax havens are allowed to persist, they are all 
openly peddling the myth of market efficiency knowing that 
there is no chance that it can hold true in practice. 
This is a serious allegation to make, but here is the charge 
sheet.
Firstly, as noted above, neoclassical (or mainstream) econo-
mists’ description of efficient markets requires that there be 
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transparency for everyone in the marketplace: everyone has, 
in effect, to know everything about everyone else, what they 
have to offer, and at what price. And yet the whole point 
of tax havens is to supply opacity. That opacity comes in a 
number of forms. For example, in many cases we do not know 
who owns companies. As a result, we cannot tell how many 
players there are in a market: a number of apparent competi-
tors could, quite feasibly, be under common control, and no 
one would know. Indeed, they may be acting together to erect 
barriers to entry for newcomers: behind tax haven secrecy, 
markets can be rigged. 
Secondly, we cannot see the accounts of tax haven compa-
nies. This stops us knowing whether one product offered in 
the market is the same as another: an item bought from one 
company may not be the equivalent of a superficially similar 
item bought from another company whose accounts are on 
the public record. This is because the person buying from the 
latter company can find out whether or not the supplier can be 
trusted to deliver, can support a guarantee, and will be there 
to meet its consumer obligations. There is no way that this 
can be known of a tax haven competitor that has no accounts. 
This necessarily creates a playing field that is unlevel, biased in 
favour of the company protected by a tax haven. 
This bias continues when it comes to the issue of access 
to capital. A very large proportion of the capital now used 
by businesses of all sizes comes from retained profits. But, 
clearly, those companies that operate in tax havens can main-
tain and grow their retained profits faster than those located 
in countries where profits are taxed. As a result, such tax 
haven companies have greater access to capital, at a lower 
overall cost, skewing competitive advantage in their favour. 
The result is that, over time, market participants not making 
use of tax havens are more likely to fail. And that may mean 
that a reduced number of market participants may, in fact, be 
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able to control the price that is offered to consumers. The free 
market might even cease to exist under such conditions.
The key point on this charge sheet, however, is that none of 
this happens by chance. It is not an accident that tax havens 
supply the services that they do. They are very deliberately 
made available by bankers, accountants and lawyers, many of 
whom will be intimately familiar with the teaching of those 
economists who talk of ‘free markets’ because they were their 
tutors when they were at university or on MBA programmes. 
What these professions have done is to go out of their way to 
provide the exact opposite of the conditions they were taught 
should prevail if markets were to work to best effect. They 
have done this because they know that markets can be manip-
ulated if veils of secrecy exist. And they also know that such 
manoeuvres allow the number of companies in any market to 
be reduced, meaning that profits and share prices can go up 
while consumers are left to suffer.
Many in tax havens and elsewhere claim that they do not 
understand the basis of these objections. They argue that 
anyone is entitled to their privacy, even if economic theory 
quite clearly disputes that. This state of affairs raises a vital 
debate on the difference between secrecy and privacy. 
With the notable exception of Sweden, there is no country 
on earth that places the tax returns of its resident popula-
tion on public record. Sweden appears to have suffered no 
adverse economic impact from being the sole exception to this 
rule. The nation is widely recognised as having a very high 
standard of living, and fares well on all resident satisfaction 
indices. Nonetheless, it remains an aberration, and it is fair to 
assume that, for the time being, it will remain so. Clearly, the 
rest of the world attaches a higher value to a person’s privacy. 
The question is how far this should go. 
In practice, there are already some limits being established. 
The move towards the automatic exchange of data on the 
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accounts a person holds in tax havens has already put paid 
to an individual’s right to offshore privacy – at least in rela-
tion to their domestic tax authority. This is a most welcome 
initiative, but it only removes privacy as far as tax authori-
ties are concerned. For everyone else, the move leaves tax 
haven secrecy completely intact: the abuse of markets can 
therefore continue, despite this tax initiative and this means 
that the distinction between privacy and secrecy has to be 
explored. 
Privacy is not the same thing as secrecy. The difference is 
important, and requires explanation. Perhaps the most impor-
tant distinction is that privacy is personal. There is no one 
who has no issues that they would rather were not share. 
Usually, the resulting silence only saves us from embarrass-
ment. But there are very obvious occasions when, however 
much we might wish to avoid such embarrassment, disclosure 
of what we would wish to be private is very definitely neces-
sary for the protection of others. Sometimes that protection is, 
quite literally, a matter of security: there are good reasons why 
some offenders must be identified. However, much more often 
the reason for publicity has nothing to do with shame, but 
is rather a means of holding an individual to account. That 
is why we need to be able to identify who owns a property, 
while it is also important that people know that the owner 
of a vehicle can be traced. In addition, banks very obviously 
need to know who is making use of their services if the risk of 
financial crime is to be reduced. 
The extent of the privacy that we might enjoy, and the 
degree to which that is managed by intermediate agencies on 
our behalf, might vary; but the point is always the same: we 
are entitled to maintain our affairs in private but that privacy 
must not be considered more sacrosanct than the impera-
tive that we are all accountable for the consequences of our 
actions.
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One of the most important issues of accountability relates 
to our obligation to pay tax. Tax is collectively imposed by 
society, and as a result we must forgo our right to privacy in 
the face of the demands that our tax authority imposes upon 
us. To the extent that they need information to ensure that we 
settle the liability that we owe, they are entitled to receive it. 
And we are obliged to supply it precisely because others would 
be prejudiced if we did not do so. It is this risk of prejudice to 
others that defines the boundaries of acceptable privacy. 
Secrecy, on the other hand, differs from privacy, because 
it deliberately withholds the right to information even when 
others are likely to be prejudiced as a result. Most of the time it 
is now secrecy, and not privacy, that tax havens supply, which 
is precisely why I think they are best termed secrecy jurisdic-
tions. This is not a pejorative definition, but a description of 
the deliberate action of most of the actors in this scenario. Tax 
haven secrecy contravenes the ethics of privacy: it denies data 
to others who have a right to see it. 
This is not to deny that there can be a right to privacy in a 
tax haven. If a person has a bank account in a tax haven, and 
its existence and the income arising on it are fully disclosed 
to their domestic tax authority, there is no more reason why 
its details should be on pubic record than a similar account in 
a person’s home country should be. But this right to privacy 
changes as soon as the account holder ceases to transact 
in their own name, and instead uses an artificial construct 
created under statute law to undertake their transactions. 
Precisely because these artificial constructs provide privileges 
not available to an individual, whether it be limited liability 
for debts or a different tax regime than that which would 
other wise apply, they can be abused. In that case, anyone can 
be prejudiced by their existence, and as a consequence there 
is an obligation to be accountable for their use. This means 
that the right to privacy does not extend to the affairs of such 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   34 18/10/2016   16:09:35
The Problems of Secrecy
35
arrangements as companies and trusts. Providing secrecy for 
them is thus always a potential abuse of society at large. 
These artificial constructs come in a number of forms. The 
most obvious, and most common, is the limited company, 
which can now be incorporated with relative ease in the vast 
majority of countries in the world. The other obvious artifi-
cial construct is the trust, or its equivalent in non–common 
law countries, which are usually called foundations. Trusts 
and foundations come in various forms, including charitable 
and non-charitable varieties; some have limited liability, while 
others do not. 
It is important to note that these structures can be com-
bined so that, for example, a trust with unlimited liability 
could control a foundation with limited liability which, in 
turn, could own and control a limited-liability company that 
actually undertook the transactions that it was desired should 
be recorded in a tax haven. What is more, as has already been 
noted, there is no reason at all why each of these structures 
should be in the same country – there being many reasons 
(almost all related to secrecy) why they may be resident in dif-
ferent jurisdictions. This process of creating tiers of entities in 
different jurisdictions is appropriately called layering, because 
one layer of secrecy is laid upon another, and then another, 
until it is hoped that opacity has been achieved – which is 
indeed what happened, until the Panama Papers came along to 
prove that nothing was as secure as many people had believed. 
The use of these structures to undertake any form of busi-
ness should, in my opinion and that of many others, result 
in the forfeit of any right to privacy. There are a number 
of reasons for saying this. Most particularly, if the owner-
ship of any such entities is not known, then any third party 
who engages with them might be left vulnerable, for the very 
good reason that they may not know with which real, warm-
blooded person they are in fact dealing. 
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It is if course true that, when a person transacts with a 
large (and potentially well-known) company, they have little 
or no knowledge of who they are really dealing with. But 
the world has compensated for this by requiring governance 
and disclosure regimes around such large organisations. This 
means that, even if we cannot readily identify the owners 
or managers with whom we are transacting, in these cases 
this does not matter. We know we could either find this data 
out if we wanted to or consumer and other legal protections 
means that our rights are likely to be adequately protected in 
other ways. 
This, however, is simply not true when we deal with the 
vast majority of small companies, especially if they are in a 
different jurisdiction from the one where we usually reside. 
We may not be able to secure information in this case, and 
are left at risk of having no idea whom we are really dealing 
with – but can equally be quite sure that, if something goes 
wrong, limited liability will be available to the other party 
to the transaction, to protect them from any claim we might 
wish to make. 
This means that such structures create a situation that 
is entirely different from that which might exist if trading 
were instead to take place with the individual who owns or 
controls the tax haven entities. That is because an individ-
ual remains fully and personally liable for the consequences 
of their transactions, come what may, so long as we know 
who we are dealing with. This is not the case with a limited- 
liability entity. When dealing with them, we have no clue, 
without the enforced disclosure of both accounts and owner-
ship, of who we are really dealing with, or whether the 
company is solvent and thus able to complete any transaction 
into which we might enter with them. 
This means that, in the absence of such data, which is still 
denied by the secrecy laws of many jurisdictions, we cannot 
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know what risk we might face when trading with a company, 
trust or foundation located in a tax haven. This is the real 
reason why secrecy for such institutions is unacceptable: there 
is inbuilt moral hazard in any system when secrecy is granted 
to such entities, because that secrecy basically provides a 
licence to defraud that the unscrupulous can use with almost 
guaranteed impunity. 
Full disclosure of the accounts and beneficial ownership 
of these entities overcomes some of this risk. Such disclo-
sure does, in effect, recognise three things. The first is that 
society has granted a privilege to those using these structures. 
Accountability for the use of that privilege is the first price 
expected from those who benefit from it. 
Second, because that privilege does sometimes impose a cost 
on society (some limited companies fail, while others disap-
pear without trace), an economic exchange (call it a payment 
if you like) is expected as a consequence of the granting of the 
privilege of using a limited-liability entity. Some would argue 
that this is the annual fee for keeping an entity registered with 
its relevant national agency – but this is an arbitrary and very 
often quite small sum that is clearly not intended to cover 
anything other than the administrative costs involved in most 
cases, and so is an inadequate return to society. The additional 
payment that is usually expected is tax (odd exceptions, such 
as charities in most countries, aside). And that is why the 
disclosure of tax paid is also an essential part of this equation.
Third, business is based upon relationships of trust, and 
those involve real people, not legal entities. That is why it is 
essential that the real managers and owners of a company be 
known: How else can we be sure who we are dealing with in 
a fair and competitive marketplace?
In short, limited liability and the use of other structures, 
such as trusts and foundations, are privileges granted by 
law that carry with them an implicit, but real, obligation 
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to account for the risks that arise to the rest of society. In 
fairness, this has long been recognised in the case of limited 
companies; many countries, including the UK, have required 
that documentation on companies be on public record since 
the nineteenth century. This precedent was established for 
good reason: the concern of almost all early company law in 
the UK (which trail-blazed on this issue to fund its industrial 
revolution, and most particularly its zeal for railway building 
at home and overseas) was to protect shareholders, in the first 
instance, from the directors of a company. The intention was 
also to protect the interests of creditors, whose rights were 
seen as being more important, in the event of an insolvency, 
than those of its shareholders. 
We would be wise to take heed today of this nineteenth-
century thinking. It was always intended to protect those who 
trade with a company from the harm that the abuse of limited 
liability might cause. This is especially true in the current era: 
when the owners of most limited companies provide them 
with very little capital, which is the only sum that protects 
creditors from a potential insolvency, it is only the availabil-
ity of data on who owns and really manages a company and 
the publication of its accounts that can offer any protection 
from abuse to creditors and stakeholders such as employees, 
customers, tax authorities and society at large. 
I am not alone in taking this view. Adam Smith was 
massively concerned about the abuse of limited liability:
The directors of such companies, however, being the managers 
rather of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same 
anxious vigilance with which the partners in a private copart-
nery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a 
rich man, they are apt to consider attention to small matters as 
not for their master’s honour, and very easily give themselves a 
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dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, there-
fore, must always prevail, more or less, in the management of 
the affairs of such a company.2
Smith was eventually proved wrong with regard to limited 
liability. Its ability to permit the accumulation of private 
capital from a variety of sources proved to be a catalyst in the 
evolution of society, its economies, and the release of human 
potential for the common good. But he was also right that all 
this was accompanied by risks that still remain today. In fact, 
the secrecy that so many tax havens provide on the ownership, 
identity of management, and trading of companies delivers 
the precise scenario in which Adam Smith’s worst fears about 
the abuses that limited liability could give rise to might be 
realised. Only transparency and accountability can counter-
balance these risks and ensure that limited-liability companies 
can operate without significant cost to society.
What are these costs? And who bears them? The answers 
to both of these questions change from case to case – but 
such costs are always significant. Some are very specific. For 
example, in the case of insolvency, the suppliers, employees 
and pensioners of a company are at risk of not being paid 
what they are owed. History is littered with cases of failed 
and disappearing companies. Perhaps the most spectacular 
offshore failure ever was that of Enron, which failed in 2001. 
Its failure involved a fraud that simultaneously brought down 
its auditors, Arthur Andersen. The collapse of Italy’s milk- 
processing giant Parmalat, dubbed ‘Europe’s Enron’, was 
another major corporate failure with an obvious offshore link. 
More recently, questions have been asked about the offshore 
connections of the UK retailer BHS, which failed in 2016, 
creating risk for 11,000 employees, a considerable number 
of pensioners and, of course, trade creditors, some of whom 
will no doubt fail as a result. The failure of limited-liability 
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companies is thus not without cost to society, in addition to 
any loss to tax authorities. 
The scale of the financial costs involved is addressed 
in Chapter 5, where it will become apparent that the sums 
involved are subject to some dispute. The consequences of off-
shore secrecy mean that no one can be quite sure how much 
money is being illicitly held. James Henry, for the Tax Justice 
Network has suggested that the sum in question is not less 
than $21 trillion ($21,000,000,000,000), and may be as much 
as $35 trillion. His estimate is based on multiple sources, 
including wealth managers themselves, and multiple method-
ologies, but may still be wildly off-target. In contrast, Gabriel 
Zucman has suggested a somewhat lower figure of about $7.6 
trillion – but there are real problems with his work, including 
the fact that he does not define what a tax haven is, and only 
includes a very narrow group of assets in his estimates.3 
Henry has estimated annual losses at today’s very low rates 
of return on capital at between $190 billion and $280 billion; 
Zucman offers a figure only a little lower, at $200 billion. By 
any standard, such losses are substantial.
Whatever the sums in question might be, the consequential 
losses are likely to be considerably larger – and not by chance. 
The exponents of tax havens make clear that one reason for the 
enthusiasm for such places is that they can be used as launch 
pads for an assault on the tax systems and regulation of the 
world’s major democracies. For example, Philip Booth of the 
UK’s Adam Smith Institute has said, in reaction to debate on 
the Panama Papers, that ‘one of the advantages of tax havens 
is that they help hold governments to account. They make 
it possible for businesses to avoid the worst excesses of gov-
ernment largesse and crazy tax systems – including the 39 
per cent US corporation tax rate.’4 In the United States, Dan 
Mitchell, a well-known exponent of tax havens based at the 
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Center for Freedom and Prosperity, argues, ‘My main argu-
ment [i]s that we need tax havens to help control the greed of 
the political elite. Simply stated, politicians rarely think past 
the next election, so they’ll tax and spend until we suffer a 
catastrophic Greek-style fiscal collapse unless there’s some 
sort of external check and balance.’5 Comments such as these, 
which almost invariably come from a right-wing, libertar-
ian, and supposedly free-market background, are surprising. 
Advocates of free markets should know the basic conditions 
I have already explained that must hold true if such markets 
are to deliver optimal outcomes for society. Milton Friedman 
himself made it clear that market participants had to comply 
with the law, including the payment of tax: ‘There is one and 
only one social responsibility of business – to use its resources 
and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long 
as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages 
in open and free competition, without deception or fraud.’6
Proponents of tax havens seem to have forgotten this basic 
fact. Indeed, they go further. They make quite clear that, 
firstly, it is the job of the tax haven to assist users of its ser-
vices to avoid or evade the obligations of the state in which 
they reside. What they make clear is that, in doing so, they 
know that the laws of this latter state are thereby undermined. 
But they applaud that fact: it is their contention that this pre-
vents democratically elected governments from using the law 
to penalise those with wealth by imposing taxes and other 
regulatory burdens. As the UK-based Institute of Economic 
Affairs argues,
Simple majority rule results in a tyranny of the majority. 
Politicians auction taxes in order to buy votes, oppressing the 
productive and producing economic instability. But simple 
majority rule is inferior to the historic right to just government. 
Since taxpayers cannot be said to have consented to taxation 
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under simple majority rule, it represents unjust government. 
Therefore, the power to tax must be separated from the leg-
islature since it is elected by universal suffrage. Consent to 
taxation can only be obtained from the taxpayers casting one 
vote for every pound of tax they pay; you have more say, the 
more you pay.7
This defence of tax havens is anti-democratic to its core. The 
same arrangements that can be used to undermine taxation 
can, of course, also be used to defeat the best efforts of market 
regulators whose job it is to prevent consumer, environmental, 
competition and other abuse. More generally, this makes clear 
that tax havens are deliberately used to abuse the law of many 
countries from behind a deliberate veil of secrecy.
The significance of this cannot be ignored: the very same 
think tanks that promote tax havens also subscribe to the 
view that Milton Friedman had to offer about the role of gov-
ernment when he said that it
has three primary functions. It should provide for military 
defense of the nation. It should enforce contracts between 
individuals. It should protect citizens from crimes against 
themselves or their property. When government – in pursuit 
of good intentions – tries to rearrange the economy, legislate 
morality, or help special interests, the cost come[s] in ineffi-
ciency, lack of motivation, and loss of freedom. Government 
should be a referee, not an active player.8
Many will not agree with Friedman here; but, yet again, nor 
very obviously do those who claim to walk in his path. Tax 
havens deny governments the resources they need to defend 
a country, prevent information being available to citizens to 
enforce contracts, and permit crimes to be undertaken, pre-
cisely because the secrecy that tax havens supply enables 
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perpetrators to walk away from their actions. Those who 
support tax havens clearly do not understand the meaning of 
hypocrisy.
Tax Competition
Tax competition is ‘the process by which governments attempt 
to attract capital and labour to their country by offering low 
tax rates or other tax incentives’.9 The reality is that it is no 
such thing. It should instead be called a tax war. Tax competi-
tion is actually the deliberate attempt by one state to deny to 
another state the resources that are its rightful property. Wars 
have been fought over lesser issues: but for the fact that so 
many governments are ultimately complicit in a conspiracy of 
silence, it is likely that war would have been ignited on this 
issue in recent years. 
That conspiracy of silence is real. In the last thirty-five 
years, neoliberalism achieved near-hegemonic status in eco-
nomics faculties and government departments alike. The ideas 
implicit in it are treated as a revealed truth, rather than a con-
struct of a particular group with an ideological agenda. These 
ideas can be summarised as the components of what is known 
as the Washington Consensus:10
 
 1. Fiscal discipline, requiring strict criteria for limiting 
budget deficits;
 2. Setting public expenditure priorities that spend away 
from subsidies and administration towards previously 
neglected fields with high economic returns;
 3. Tax reform, embracing broadening of the tax base and 
cutting marginal tax rates;
 4. Financial liberalisation, particularly with regard to 
interest rates that should be market-determined;
 5. Exchange rates that promote exports;
 6. Trade liberalisation;
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   43 18/10/2016   16:09:35
44
dirty secrets
 7. Reduced barriers to foreign direct investment;
 8. Privatisation;
 9. Deregulation; 
10. The protection of intellectual property rights.
The whole agenda might be described as the promotion of a 
reduced role for the state in every sphere of life. And this phi-
losophy has provided cover for the promotion of tax haven 
activity. Emerging from this, secrecy jurisdictions have come 
to be seen as places from which an assault on the established 
hierarchies of power within states might be launched. 
This explains why economists have so far turned a blind eye 
to tax haven activity. While it is obvious that tax havens must, 
by definition, undermine the conditions in which so-called 
free markets can exist, most economists have been willing to 
compromise on this issue because they have viewed an assault 
on the state as a higher priority. And it is this inappropriate 
setting of priorities that has led to tax havens being ignored in 
most current economic theory. 
But the pervasiveness of this philosophy has had enormous 
spill-over effects. The world’s major economic institutions, 
such as the World Bank and IMF, have proved remarkably 
comfortable with the Washington Consensus. Their endorse-
ment has resulted in its ten-point policy prescription being 
forcibly imposed on a great many countries, including a 
number of developing nations that have consequently suf-
fered enormous losses of revenue and resources, as well as 
corruption. 
In addition, the Washington Consensus policy prescriptions 
have become the basis for the thinking of the vast major-
ity of mainstream political parties in many of the world’s 
democracies. This started with the Thatcher and Reagan 
administrations in the UK and United States. From there, the 
spread of such policies was not limited to parties of the right; it 
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is fair to suggest, for example, that the Clinton administration 
of 1992–2000 endorsed many of the same ideas. Indeed, its 
abolition of the Glass–Steagall Act, which deregulated much 
of the US banking sector, was influenced by the philosophy of 
the Washington Consensus. Tony Blair’s New Labour govern-
ments in the UK were equally neoliberal in their outlook. 
The results have been unsurprising. Over the recent period, 
social democracy has very largely ceased to be either social 
or democratic, under the influence of such economic think-
ing. Over time, it has become increasingly difficult for parties 
branded as something they are not to be elected, especially in 
Europe. Oppositional politics has begun to fail. If there are no 
longer opposing sides to a debate on how to run a country, 
there can be no democratic choice. The electorate has come to 
realise this, with surprising results. 
In every quarter of the West there has been a rise in political 
expression further removed from the political centre-ground. 
Donald Trump for the Republicans and Bernie Sanders for the 
Democrats offer evidence of this trend in the United States 
and it is notable that both came from outside their current 
parties to challenge the prevailing thinking of each of them. 
The Austrian presidential election run-off of 2016, which 
included no representative of either of the parties that had 
ruled that country, without interruption, since 1945, pro-
vides similar evidence for that country. Marine Le Pen’s Front 
Nationale, Nigel Farage’s UK Independence Party, and the 
Netherlands’ far-right Party for Freedom are all examples of the 
same trend.
A common theme among all these movements is a popular 
rejection of the notion of an unaccountable elite. That elite is 
widely believed to populate all the mainstream parties of the 
countries where these movements have arisen. There is good 
reason for people to think that: the only difference between 
the once opposing parties is in many cases one of emphasis. 
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At their core, many of the so-called left-of-centre parties in 
many countries look like the centre-right parties of three or 
four decades ago. 
This explains why so many of those parties, like the UK’s 
Labour Party, when it held power between 1997 and 2010, 
took so little action on tax havens. They bought into the same 
doctrine as the economists who promoted the notion that tol-
erating tax havens was useful so long as they provided the 
excuse for shrinking the role of the state, as demanded by the 
Washington Consensus. 
It is hardly surprising that candidates like Donald Trump 
have sought to establish popular appeal by promoting assaults 
on tax haven activities as part of their political agenda, 
however unlikely it might appear that they hold such posi-
tions sincerely. They can do so because, while the number of 
direct political casualties of the Panama Papers was perhaps 
surprisingly limited (one prime minister, in Iceland, and a few 
ministers elsewhere), there is clear complicity between main-
stream parties in many countries and the tax haven world. 
Nowhere is this better demonstrated than in the UK. Here, 
before the Brexit vote, Prime Minister David Cameron had, 
to the surprise of many, been keen to appear to be challeng-
ing tax haven secrecy. This began in 2012, when the issue of 
the tax affairs of Google, Amazon and Starbucks exploded 
on the UK political scene. The following year, at the Lough 
Erne G8 Summit in Northern Ireland, Cameron made much 
of the suggestion that he backed the use of country-by- 
country accounting for tax reporting purposes, articulating an 
intention that developing countries should benefit from this. I 
was at the summit, having been the first economist to develop 
these ideas, in 2003. As political economist Andrew Baker put 
it at the time, 
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Ultimately, G8 meetings are about setting agendas, priorities, 
creating political pressure and a political climate. Lough Erne 
has done this on Country By Country reporting and Automatic 
Information Exchange. It has signaled a new direction of travel 
on international tax policy. That is historic. It does not provide 
us with a detailed route map to get there and that is what 
remains up for grabs, but as I have told Richard Murphy, this 
is as good as it gets from a G8 meeting.11
But David Cameron and the G8 did not deliver on their 
promise. The OECD has announced that it expects multi-
national corporations to undertake country-by-country 
reporting, but only for the benefit of their tax inspectors: 
extraordinary steps are being taken to ensure that the data 
does not become available to the public. In the process, the 
OECD also made clear that the data in question only has to 
go to the tax authority of the country in which the parent 
company of a multinational corporation is located. In that 
case, those developing countries are now dependent, in far too 
many cases, upon the good will of the tax authority of parent-
company tax jurisdictions to ensure they get the data on the 
tax abuses likely to be undertaken within and from their own 
jurisdictions. This is quite contrary to the spirit of the Lough 
Erne announcement in 2013. It is also completely contrary 
to the intention of country-by-country reporting, one of the 
main purposes of which has always been to put the use of 
tax havens by multinational corporations on public record, 
precisely so that the many tax authorities (particularly in 
developing countries) that have had no other way of access-
ing this data quickly, cheaply, consistently and reliably should 
have the means to do so. The OECD’s inability to deliver this 
represents a major failure.
This is typical, however. In 2013 David Cameron promised 
that the UK would create a register of the beneficial owner-
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ship of companies registered in the UK. This was meant to be 
an exemplar of good practice for others, and most especially 
for the UK’s own tax havens in its Crown Dependencies and 
Overseas Territories. In June 2013 Cameron claimed he had 
secured the agreement of those tax havens to participate in 
that process. 
In the run-up to the 2016 London Anti-Corruption Summit, 
a popular demand was repeated that Cameron ensure that 
these tax havens would deliver on the promise, despite their 
clear desire to renege.12 Evidence made clear not only that the 
UK had the power to legislate for these places, but that they 
had already done so.13 This meant that Cameron was com-
pletely entitled to take action to end a significant amount of 
tax haven secrecy, but he decided not to. 
Instead, the havens offered what amounted to transparency 
in secret, by suggesting they collect the required data on ben-
eficial ownership of companies registered in their domains (no 
reference to accounts, however, was made) and supply it to the 
select few governments with which they might agree to share 
it. But, crucially, all this would take place out of public view. 
We would just have to take their word that, at least for the 
UK (and a very few other places), they were now transparent. 
Unsurprisingly, few were impressed by this offer: the fact 
that opacity remained an absolute reality was readily appar-
ent. The ensuing claim from some of the jurisdictions involved 
that they were no longer tax havens was risible. We will have 
no clue as to whether they ever supply meaningful data to 
those who need it. And the very fact that further agreements 
are continually required on such issues is the clearest possible 
signal that all previous, behind-closed-doors attempts to solve 
this problem, including the OECD’s 1998 and 2009 initiatives 
and the EU’s Savings Tax Directive, have failed to deliver. All 
such agreements have had loopholes built into them from the 
outset.14
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This, then, is the crisis at the heart of this book. Despite 
all efforts, tax haven secrecy is still very largely intact. Most 
countries have not seem many, if any, benefits from the mea-
sures taken against tax havens to date, and no one yet knows 
whether the data now promised will be exchanged under 
the new OECD Mutual Assistance Agreement. Candidly, I 
doubt it. 
Meantime, tax remains unpaid, while the assault on democ-
racy, the rule of law, free markets, fair competition, creditors, 
cheated spouses, employees and others continues. And the 
people of the world’s democracies are beginning to realise 
that the political will to challenge these arrangements does 
not really exist. The vast majority of the world’s so-called 
mainstream politicians cling to the corrupted philosophy that 
supports the world’s tax havens. This is now so deeply embed-
ded in their political DNA that they cannot even imagine how 
they could challenge the economic architecture of the world 
in which tax havens have become an implicitly accepted part 
of the economy.
I argue here that mounting such a challenge is not only pos-
sible, but urgent – though mounting it will involve rocking the 
world’s democratic polities to their core.
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chapter 3
What Is a Tax Haven?
‘Tax haven’, ‘secrecy jurisdiction’ and ‘offshore’ (the last of 
which has deliberately been little used so far in this book) 
are terms that can often be used interchangeably, but do have 
distinct meanings. 
Offshore
‘Offshore’ is in many ways the most important term used in 
this book. Its literal meanings in the context in which it is used 
here are ‘not here’ or ‘elsewhere’. But this is not a description 
of physical geography. Instead, what it means is that all the 
contractual parties to a transaction recorded in one place are 
located in other jurisdictions. 
For example, suppose that a Norwegian bank does a 
deal with a Spanish bank that is recorded in a third bank in 
London. Because the Norwegian and Spanish banks are ‘not 
here’ as far as the UK is concerned – because they are located 
in other countries – that transaction is considered to be ‘else-
where’ ‘offshore’ from the UK’s point of view. 
My colleague at City University, Ronen Palan, explains the 
origin of offshore in his book, The Offshore World.1 He sug-
gests that the idea originated in London following the Suez 
Canal debacle of 1956, which fundamentally challenged the 
UK’s self-perception as a world power. At the time, the pound 
sterling was under pressure in a system of fixed exchange 
rates. This was partly the result of the Marshall Plan, which 
had flooded Europe with US-originated currency, creating a 
so-called Eurodollar market. This, in turn, encouraged the cir-
culation of hot money in search of an unregulated safe haven.
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In September 1957, in the aftermath of the Suez crisis, the 
Bank of England decided that it would provide such a loca-
tion. In effect, it said that, if a UK bank recorded a transaction 
between two parties, neither of whom were in the UK, then 
that transaction was considered to have taken place ‘offshore’, 
and thus lay beyond the scope of UK regulation. At the stroke 
of a pen, a whole new world had been conjured. 
This world was not, of course, real; but its virtual existence 
must still be understood. These ‘offshore’ transactions were 
arranged and recorded by banks in the UK, and it was pure 
artifice to say that they took place ‘elsewhere’, in places whose 
location need not be noted for the purposes of regulation. A 
blind eye was turned, in a deliberate act of make-believe that 
was in truth based on nothing short of a blatant lie.
But the arrangement did work for the City of London, and 
for the UK government too. This is not the place to explore the 
complex relationship between these two distinct jurisdictions, 
each existing within the UK – not least because Nick Shaxson 
did that so well in his book Treasure Islands. Suffice to say that 
so difficult and complex is the relationship, which predates the 
creation of what might be called modern English history, that 
the British monarch has to seek permission to enter the Square 
Mile of the City of London, while the Lord Mayor of London 
(whose role is completely distinct from that of the Mayor of 
London) is afforded the diplomatic status of a senior cabinet 
minister when travelling abroad, despite holding no position 
in the UK government. The City of London is a state within 
a state, and because this separate authority is itself bound up 
within a history of ritual, folklore, and even legend, those who 
populated it in 1957 found it all too easy to believe that they 
could create a spurious location that was ‘elsewhere’, and for 
which they thus had no responsibility. 
This powerful idea, once created, was unlikely to go away. 
After Suez, as the UK entered the 1960s, its imperial era was 
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already in rapid decline, and the remnants of its former empire 
were divided into a number of different types of territory. One 
of these groups was the Crown Dependencies, which comprise 
the islands of Jersey, Guernsey (and its smaller off-islands) and 
the Isle of Man. These have a complex relationship with the 
rest of the UK. For example, the Isle of Man was at one time 
Norwegian territory, although for obvious reasons it had a 
strong tradition of self-government. It then bounced between 
Scottish and English control, before ending up with an alle-
giance to the British Crown. 
This concept of allegiance to the Crown already existed in 
Jersey and Guernsey, both of which appear to have been self-
governing since the thirteenth century, when the English crown 
ruled as much as half of France. The reality was that these 
offshore islands were almost certainly self-governing solely 
because they had proved difficult to govern. It was therefore 
convenient for the UK simultaneously to claim title to these 
territories and wash their hands – by permitting a veneer of 
self-government – of the illegal economy of the islands, much 
of which seemed to be based on piracy against French ship-
ping. Pretence, it might be noted, is at the core of the history 
of all these places. 
But self-government has been a convenient fiction that, for 
some, has been open to exploitation. While these places have 
legal systems that are undoubtedly not English (and not the 
same between islands – even within Guernsey’s archipelago), 
Jersey, in particular, found favour with some wealthy English 
families quite early in the twentieth century, when they began 
to encounter problems with the total lack of integration in 
international taxation that existed at that time. This became an 
issue as the era of the multinational company developed, and 
was a peculiarly British problem at the time, as UK investors 
looked for an ever-expanding range of economic opportuni-
ties for their capital beyond the boundaries of the empire. As 
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a result, Jersey, with its legal peculiarities and yet closeness to 
home, became known as a buffer in which funds earned in the 
empire could be recorded without having to pay the second 
round of taxes that would undoubtedly have been due under 
UK tax law as it then was, if the overseas earnings of British 
people that had already been taxed in their place of origin had 
been remitted to the UK at that time. The idea that places like 
Jersey might prevent double-taxation was thus born, and with 
it the notion of the tax ‘haven’.
Tax Havens
Tax havens are not the same as offshore. Tax havens are 
real places that we can identify, whereas ‘offshore’ is a vague 
description of ‘elsewhere’. The term tax haven has always been 
problematic but generally describes a place whose tax system 
provides an advantage to a person who is not resident in that 
place. For example, as I have noted, Jersey provided an advan-
tage to early UK investors who did not want to pay tax twice 
on their overseas earnings. Jersey permitted this by, firstly, 
letting them record their income there while, secondly, consid-
ering them not to be resident in the Island and, thirdly, having 
a tax regime that only sought to tax income arising within its 
jurisdiction. It is not at all clear whether Jersey intended this 
situation to arise or whether it was an accidental outcome, but 
the latter is more likely, since it is improbable that Jersey could 
have realistically taxed income arising outside the island at the 
time, even if it had wanted to do so.
There can be no doubt that some other arrangements that 
resulted in similar tax haven–style activities are just as acci-
dental. The UK’s domicile rule, often referred to as ‘non-dom 
rule’, has for two centuries, and largely for reasons related to 
its imperial past, meant that those tax resident in the UK but 
whose permanent home (their ‘place of origin’) is somewhere 
else in the world have had the tax advantage of only having 
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to pay tax on their income earned in the UK or brought into 
the country from elsewhere. What this has meant is that this 
particular group is not taxed on its worldwide income, unlike 
all other UK tax resident people. The consequence is that any 
income they can record elsewhere in the world falls outside the 
scope of UK tax. This was not designed as a lure for Russian 
oligarchs and other similarly wealthy people, but it has defi-
nitely worked as such. And it does as a result make the UK a 
tax haven for these people.
But some tax havens are anything but accidental. In fact, 
what most experts consider to be the very first tax havens 
were not accidental at all. In the 1880s the US state of New 
Jersey passed laws deliberately intended to undermine those of 
its neighbour, New York, with the sole intention of inducing 
corporate relocation between the states. It worked, and was 
noticed. In 1898 Delaware copied what New Jersey had done, 
passing even more aggressive incorporation laws intended to 
offer limited-liability protection at low cost.2 The growth in 
the trade was slow, but today more than half of all US corpo-
rations have their legal home in Delaware. 
This pattern of behaviour has been replicated time and 
again. So, for example, while it can correctly be argued 
that the Swiss practice of banking secrecy had its origins in 
1713, it was formalised only in 1934. Popular myth has it 
that the draconian measures protecting the anonymity of 
Swiss bank clients was created to protect Jewish depositors, 
but this is another of those convenient tax haven stories 
that has absolutely no foundation in truth. The reality was 
that, in 1932, the Basler Handelsbank was shown to be 
facilitating tax evasion by members of French high society, 
among them two bishops, several generals, and the owners 
of Le Figaro and Le Matin newspapers. Switzerland could 
have reacted to French demands to stop this practice and 
provide it with the names of those who had partaken in it. 
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Instead it chose to adopt banking secrecy laws to facilitate 
the trade.3
Deliberate intent can also be found in the design of the 
modern Irish corporate tax system which, until recently, com-
bined low tax rates, lax residence rules and an equally relaxed 
approach to tax enforcement on issues such as transfer pricing. 
All this was done with the intention of making the country a 
popular location for companies looking to locate sales opera-
tions and inward investment activities in the European Union. 
By legislating in a way that undermined the tax laws of other 
countries, Ireland found a competitive advantage of which its 
location on the periphery of Europe had otherwise deprived it. 
The spread of tax haven activity throughout the UK’s 
Overseas Territories also did not happen by chance. Cayman 
is, perhaps, the perfect example.4 Until 1959, Cayman was a 
mosquito-ridden dependency of Jamaica. What it had noticed, 
however, was that other locations, such as the Bahamas and 
Bermuda, were building a future on financial services. And 
so, in 1959, when the island gained independence, it started 
to move in two directions. First, it started a massive, British-
funded infrastructure programme to get rid of the mosquitoes 
and build an airport. And second, in 1966, it initiated a rash 
of new laws, most written by professional services firms, that 
provided the framework of the company, trust, and banking 
regulations required to become a fully fledged tax haven. 
The island embraced a zero tax rate, and surrounded it with 
extreme secrecy. All these innovations had to be – and were – 
approved by the UK. 
Some tax havens thus emerged accidentally, while others 
were intentional. Some offer advantages to only a few people; 
others, quite deliberately, have widespread appeal. The precise 
nature of the offering they provide varies enormously. Malta, 
for example, has deliberately created a corporate tax structure 
that is intended to charge profits flowing through it into the 
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European Union, most especially from developing countries, 
at very low effective rates of tax. In contrast, Mauritius has 
exploited provisions in its double tax treaties that few could 
have imagined would prove so pernicious at the time they 
were first negotiated. These have been exploited to undermine, 
in particular, the corporate tax system in India, especially in 
relation to capital gains. 
Another deliberate tax haven is the Netherlands. It has 
secured international notoriety by exploiting double tax 
agreements to let royalties on copyrights and patents, divi-
dends, and capital gains flow through it in a way that ensures 
tax charges are minimised. So successful has this been that the 
head offices of many US-owned European entities are located 
there, and tax abuse has been widely reported: Google, with 
its so called ‘Dutch Sandwich’, is the most obvious example. 
Luxembourg competes with the Netherlands for this business. 
Secrecy Jurisdictions
The very diversity of tax havens, however, has caused all sorts 
of problems for those trying to tackle the issues to which 
they give rise. This is why some tax havens have in recent 
years been re-categorised as secrecy jurisdictions (see Chapter 
2). This trend started in civil society but has now become 
widespread, and makes specific reference to those places 
that not only provide deliberately favourable tax regimes 
to those not usually resident in a place (such as Ireland the 
and Netherlands), but also, in various ways, provide a veil of 
secrecy to those making use of these tax arrangements. The 
tax havens that might be thought of in these terms are specifi-
cally identified in the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy 
Index, and include locations such as Switzerland, Cayman 
and Jersey. 
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What Do Tax Havens Do?
Only two things happen in tax havens. Firstly, transactions are 
recorded that have their real economic substance (or impact) 
in other places. Second, as much secrecy as possible is provided 
to those who record these transactions. That’s it: nothing is 
made when undertaking tax haven activity, and no identifiable 
value is added – and, therefore, they do not contribute to the 
real wealth of the world. In fact, because their activities tend 
to redistribute wealth to those who already enjoy a great deal 
of it, it can be argued that they reduce well-being, because 
there is overwhelming evidence that the resulting increase in 
inequality causes harm.5
Despite this, tax haven activity appears to remain signifi-
cant. For example, in March 2016 Jersey claimed to have 
£128.4 billion of cash deposits and £228.4 billion of other 
investments under management in the island.6 But it must be 
understood that these claims are not really true. If they were, 
then there would be £1.28 million on deposit for each person 
on the island, including all its children – but this is not the case. 
To suggest that this money is in Jersey is complete nonsense: it 
is not in a vault in St Helier, the island’s capital; nor are there 
bank managers in Jersey busily lending such amounts out to 
local people to fund their businesses or mortgages. There is 
no way that amount of cash could possibly be used in Jersey: 
there is simply not enough demand for it. The cash is, like its 
owners, ‘elsewhere’.
Where is that ‘elsewhere’ in this case? It will depend on the 
bank with which the cash is supposedly deposited and, pos-
sibly, on the currency in which it is denominated. However, by 
far the greatest likelihood is that the cash in question is really 
in London. Transfer of money between the two locations has 
always been easy: Jersey is so integrated into UK banking that 
it is actually part of the UK bank clearing system. In the era of 
digital money, funds deposited in Jersey one minute can be in 
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London the next, and that is exactly what will happen by the 
close of evening each day. 
The destination may be different in the case of other tax 
havens, but the principle will be the same. In each case, the 
offshore bank account is just a conduit. It offers a record of 
money in the tax haven that is not there. That money will have 
come from outside the tax haven in the first place, and will 
have departed for a major banking centre within hours of its 
arrival. The claim that the cash is in the tax haven is simply 
a sham: it is no more there than the owner of the account is. 
All the account does is provide what has been, at least to date, 
a secretive mechanism to obscure the ownership of money 
whose economic impact is most definitely felt elsewhere.
The situation is little different with other so-called tax haven 
investments. So, for example, shares registered in tax haven 
companies or funds are almost never those of local compa-
nies, but will be the shares of companies registered in New 
York, Hong Kong, Frankfurt or London. In that case these 
‘investments’ are no more in the tax haven than is the cash 
referred to above. All the tax haven does is record the owner-
ship of assets that are located in one place (which is not the 
tax haven) by a person who is themselves resident anywhere 
but the tax haven (which is, of course, what makes the trans-
action ‘offshore’).Nor are these investments usually managed 
from the tax haven in which their ownership is recorded. The 
decisions on where, and in what, the funds are ‘invested’ will, 
in all likelihood, be made by fund managers or share owners 
who are themselves almost certainly located ‘elsewhere’. The 
tax haven is thus, once again, only a conduit – or, as Ronen 
Palan calls it, a ‘booking location’.
Other than cash and shares, the most common assets 
recorded as held in tax havens are property, in the form of the 
title to land and buildings; shares in private companies; and 
other tangible assets, such as art, yachts and the like as well as 
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intangible assets such as patents and copyrights. In each case, 
it is very unlikely that the assets recorded as being owned in 
the tax haven will have ever had anything to do with it, or will 
ever (even in the case of some yachts) have been near it. All 
that the tax haven does is provide an opportunity to record 
the legal ownership of these assets. Yet again, the tax haven is 
a mere conduit at best – or, at worst, a front or sham.
Having noted this rather limited range of transactions that 
individuals undertake through tax havens, it is important to 
note their motives for doing so. Some are blatantly criminal. 
Terrorists, and criminals of all sorts – including money laun-
derers, drug and people traffickers, and tax evaders – will need 
to find ways of hiding the proceeds of their crime from view. 
All too often, tax havens have provided such mechanisms.
In this area of tackling crime, there has been a concerted and 
consistent effort to tackle such abuse. For example, the United 
States did not object to measures tackling tax havens after 
the events of 9/11. These actions are co-ordinated through an 
organisation called the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), 
based alongside the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in Paris. Its recommendations have been 
widely adopted. The laborious procedures involved in opening 
bank accounts all over the world are the result of the FATF’s 
work in ensuring that banks and other financial services insti-
tutions must positively identify those to whom they provide 
their services. The FATF also monitors money-laundering risk, 
which has been prevalent in tax havens, even among major 
banks. So, for example, in July 2016 it was reported that only 
the intervention of UK Chancellor George Osborne had pre-
vented the United States from prosecuting the UK-based bank 
HSBC on money-laundering charges.7 The bank instead paid 
a civil fine of $1.92 billion, such was the seriousness of the 
allegations made against it.
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Tax Avoidance
It is important, at this point, to note the difference between 
tax evasion and tax avoidance. Tax evasion is the process of 
deliberately deceiving a tax authority to reduce the amount of 
tax that a person owes. Tax avoidance involves the deliberate 
exploitation of the tax law of a place, or the exploitation of 
the differences in the tax laws between places, to produce a 
tax outcome that tax legislation in the place where the tax is 
due never intended to arise. To put it another way, it exploits 
the loopholes in tax law. 
Tax avoidance is thus quite emphatically not the process 
of claiming allowances and reliefs that the law intended that 
a person should enjoy. To make that point clear, it cannot be 
tax avoidance to claim legitimate business expenses on a tax 
return: the law says they are permitted. Similarly, if tax relief is 
available on a contribution to a pension fund, then reducing a 
tax bill by making that contribution cannot be tax avoidance: 
it is instead what is called tax compliance. This is defined as 
seeking to pay the right amount of tax (but no more) in the 
right place at the right, time where the word ‘right’ means 
that the economic substance of the transactions undertaken 
coincides with the place and form in which they are reported 
for taxation purposes. 
This definition of tax compliance is important in the 
context of tax havens. Tax havens are, of course, used to pay 
the wrong amount of tax, either by declaring income in the 
wrong place or deferring its recognition in the right place. 
And because no economic activity ever really happens in a tax 
haven, it can never be the case that the economic substance of 
the transactions recorded there accords with the way in which 
they are declared to tax authorities. To put it another way, it 
is very hard for anyone using a tax haven to be tax compliant. 
That said, the dividing line between tax avoidance and tax 
evasion is very often unclear in the case of tax havens. That 
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is because deception is a key component of all tax evasion, 
and the secrecy that tax havens supply means that their use 
always leads to the not unreasonable suspicion that tax 
evasion might be going on even when what is actually occur-
ring is the ethically unacceptable but legal alternative of tax 
avoidance.
What, then, is tax avoidance involving a tax haven? Such an 
arrangement might look like that exploited by the UK-based 
comedian Jimmy Carr, when he handed over his income to 
a Jersey-based company.8 The benefit of doing so was based 
on the fact that the company in question would not pay tax 
on that income because it arose outside that island, which 
only charges tax on income arising within it. In exchange for 
Jimmy Carr transferring his income to the company, it then 
paid him a small salary as a reward, and passed the remain-
der of the income on to the trust that was legally recorded as 
owning the company. That trust then in turn loaned the money 
it had received back to Jimmy Carr. It was then claimed that 
Carr had received a loan, and not income, and that the loan 
was not taxable upon receipt in the UK. The net outcome, if 
the scheme had worked, would have been Carr would have 
enjoyed the benefit of most of his income free of tax.
The scheme that Carr used was heavily marketed: it is 
thought that more than one thousand people partook in 
similar arrangements. The devil was, of course, in the detail. 
Those who designed it were well aware that H. M. Revenue 
and Customs had tried to block similar schemes in the past, 
but they hoped that, by careful wording, they could keep their 
clients out of tax and beyond the reach of the authorities on 
this occasion. They failed: when the scheme was uncovered, it 
was ruled that tax was due and the entire offshore arrange-
ment was ignored in calculating the sum owed. 
Three points stand out. First, the whole arrangement was 
entirely artificial: it is impossible to believe that anyone would 
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enter into such a deal other than to seek a tax advantage. 
Second, the person partaking in the scheme, in this case Jimmy 
Carr, could not have created it. He may be a very successful 
comedian, and is undoubtedly very clever, but he is not a tax 
lawyer. The entire structure was created and sold by tax advis-
ers seeking to profit from the arrangement by taking part of 
the tax savings that they hoped to create on behalf of their 
clients. Third, the scheme did not exploit the opacity of Jersey 
in the way a tax-evasion arrangement would have done. What 
it did seek to do, however, was to arbitrage tax arrangements 
across international boundaries. By doing so, it tried to re-
categorise income as a loan, and in seeking to do so exploited 
the fact that Jersey provided readily available companies and 
trusts while not seeking to tax them. In tax compliance terms, 
tax was going to be paid by the wrong person, at the wrong 
rate, in the wrong place, at the wrong time – and the economic 
substance of what was being declared was nothing like what 
was happening in reality. 
In addition to income tax avoidance, quite a number of 
offshore schemes try to avoid tax charges on capital gains, 
which are the profits arising when a person sells an asset they 
have owned. This could, of course, be land or buildings, but 
might also be investments, or even personal property such as 
artwork. The trick, in all these cases, is to pretend that the 
asset is not located in the country in which the beneficial 
owner is resident, and then claim that the gain is not their 
property, but that of a company they either happen to own 
or from which they could potentially benefit through a trust, 
which owns it in turn. In the process, the person who benefits 
from the use of the asset might also try to attribute the gain 
that has arisen to somebody other than themselves. This could 
be other members of their family, for example. And in that 
case the aim might not be to avoid tax altogether, but only to 
pay tax at a lower rate than would otherwise be due. 
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A variation on this theme includes schemes designed to 
avoid taxes arising on death or inheritance. Many jurisdic-
tions have such taxes, and they are often deeply unpopular 
among the wealthy. Some, as a result, try to hide some part of 
their wealth in a tax haven, which they then claim falls outside 
their estate when it comes to calculating the tax due.
In all these cases, a threefold trick is being played. First, 
before any tax might be due, the arrangement is put in place 
in a way that disguises, but does not completely obscure, the 
relationship between the asset and the owner. Second, the 
potential benefit that the beneficial owner might enjoy as a 
result of the offshore arrangement having legal ownership 
of the asset might be disguised. For example, where the asset 
involved is land and buildings, rent might be paid for the use 
of that property by the person who is already its real beneficial 
owner. They will not mind doing so if, as is likely, that rent 
can be received tax-free offshore. In that case there is no real 
cost to this pretence. A variation on this could arise if the asset 
in question is, for example, a yacht, where it might be sug-
gested that the offshore arrangement is a commercial venture 
in yacht-chartering, with the owner paying an apparent fee 
for the time that they use the vessel. Once again, though, their 
payment will end up in an entity they really own, and again 
tax-free, but with a commercial defence to the structure being 
used then being presented to a tax authority. 
Third, and perhaps as importantly, the beneficial owner 
stays as far away from the their assets as possible, for as long 
as possible, to prevent any claim being made that they are 
associated with them. This is not usually very hard: by defini-
tion, those who take part in these schemes are already wealthy, 
and can therefore usually live without accessing the relevant 
assets for a considerable time. 
Whether such schemes work depends upon the legislation 
of the countries involved, the willingness of tax authorities 
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to chase down information, the amount of disclosure that is 
really made, and the willingness of the beneficial owners to 
comply with the legal details of the scheme of arrangement 
that have been put in place by their tax advisers. Given that 
many of these details will, in practice, be quite onerous, to 
make sure that the law is not broken, this last point usually 
produces the biggest weakness in any arrangement: over time, 
the owners forget what they were meant to do, and frequently 
leave a trail that lets a tax authority find out what is going 
on, and then unwind the arrangement and impose the real 
tax owed. It was reported in 2016 that tax investigators had 
secured an invaluable but unwitting new ally in this task: the 
social media accounts of the children of the superrich. These 
now provide a steady source of information on where their 
parents are hiding their assets. The one group who will not 
object are the tax advisers who set up such schemes: they will 
have enjoyed their fees long before any arrangement comes 
to grief.
Avoiding inheritance taxes may be one reason for using an 
offshore arrangement, but so too can avoiding inheritance 
laws altogether. Very many countries dictate by law the way 
in which a person’s estate must be divided upon their death. 
So, for example, it might be provided that the firstborn gets 
more than anyone else, or that all children take a certain part 
of the estate and more distant relatives a smaller proportion. 
In some instances only males are allowed to inherit. Whatever 
the reason why these laws were put in place, there will be 
those who prefer another arrangement for family, social, 
ethical, religious or other reasons. This can be one reason why 
some people hide assets offshore: doing so lets them write a 
will in the offshore jurisdiction that ensures assets reach the 
people they really want to benefit.
These are not the only reasons why a family’s assets might 
be held in a tax haven. Many reports on divorce proceedings 
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reveal that spouses who might be responsible for mainte-
nance payments do, on occasion, try to hide their assets in tax 
havens to reduce the sum that they will have to pay.9 Some 
of the clients of Mossack Fonseca, the law firm that was the 
source of the Panama Papers, are reported to have sought out 
their services for just this reason.10
Spouses are not the only people that some will try to hide 
their assets from. Creditors are another group from whom 
some might seek protection, particularly if they think they are 
at risk of bankruptcy.11
Others follow this path because they do not want their fans 
to know where they live: this was the reason actress Emma 
Watson gave for owning her home through a company organ-
ised for her by Mossack Fonseca.12 As some noted in the UK, 
however, given the rules that now exist on such arrange-
ments, there were many cheaper ways in which she could 
have achieved this objective – though she may simply have 
been badly advised. If so, she would not have been the first: 
singer Katy Meluah offered this defence when caught in a tax 
scheme in 2014 (although it was not an offshore scheme).13 
The argument that tax havens protect privacy is one much 
beloved of their defenders. The US-based Center for Freedom 
and Prosperity, whose primary purpose appears to be the 
defence of tax havens, has long argued along the following 
lines: ‘Whether they are business owners from Venezuela, 
ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, Jews in France, or homosexuals 
in Saudi Arabia, there are people all around the world who are 
victimized by corrupt and/or despotic governments. Without 
the ability to protect their assets in so-called tax havens, these 
people would be at even greater danger.’14 Unfortunately for 
the Center, it has never actually been able to show quite how 
tax havens prevent these people from suffering persecution. 
No legal case where this set of circumstances has happened 
has ever been presented as evidence to support their claim. 
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But they persist with it nonetheless, as they also do with the 
claim that tax havens protect the children of the wealthy from 
the risk of kidnap. Again, it is hard to see how this is the case 
unless the wealthy person in question is also willing to forgo 
all the trappings of the lifestyle that might also indicate that 
they have wealth. I suspect that few do, and that all such con-
venient claims lack even a shred of evidence to support them.
Tax Havens for Corporations
While it is undoubtedly true that the principal reason for a 
multinational company to use a tax haven is to save tax, there 
are occasions when they have other motives for doing so.
The most common of these reasons is a desire for commer-
cial confidentiality. A tax haven company does not have to file 
its accounts on public record. As a result, its commercial com-
petitors do not know the scale of its activity, how profitable is, 
or what risk there might be in dealing with it; thus, they are 
unable to compete with it on a level playing field. This is, of 
course, to the commercial advantage of the company that is 
using the tax haven, and to the disadvantage of its competi-
tors. That advantage is sought for one reason: the user of the 
tax haven is trying to obtain an unfair competitive advantage 
over their competitors, and so make a profit that cannot be 
justified in normal commercial circumstances. It is that excess 
profit that pays for the additional costs that the tax haven 
structure creates.
It is important to understand that this situation can also 
exist because of the way in which multinational compa-
nies present their accounts. No large company is a single 
entity: it will be made up of maybe hundreds, or even thou-
sands, of separate companies. In 2011 the UK-based charity 
ActionAid undertook a survey of the 100 largest companies 
in the UK.15 The aim was to work out how many subsidiaries 
those organisations had in tax havens, but in the course of its 
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investigations ActionAid found that these 100 companies 
had a total of 34,216 subsidiaries and joint ventures between 
them, with an average of over 300 each. Of this total, 8,492 
were in tax havens, and just two of the 100 companies sur-
veyed had no tax haven subsidiaries.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that large corporations 
create subsidiary companies for all sorts of reasons, many 
of which will be entirely commercially valid. Some such 
subsidiaries might undertake significantly different types of 
commercial activity, and so require completely different man-
agement structures. Others will be locally incorporated to 
protect the group from legal claims in each country where it 
operates. Others are formed to undertake common activities 
for the group as a whole: they might provide some form of 
management service, or perform a particular function such 
as management of the group’s insurance arrangements. Thus, 
having a lot of subsidiary companies does not necessarily indi-
cate that a group is undertaking artificial tax planning. 
Nor is it true that being located in a tax haven is neces-
sarily artificial. When the world’s largest tax havens include 
places like the United States, Switzerland, Japan, Germany, 
the UK, and many other places where it is very obvious that 
a substantial amount of commercial activity is undertaken, 
then it cannot be assumed that being located in such places 
is obviously wrong. Only the provision of information on 
the activities of the subsidiary company can help determine 
whether or not it is motivated by a desire to circumvent 
regulation.
Is not even possible, in all cases, to determine that presence 
in some of the more well-known and commonly discussed tax 
havens is necessarily wrong. It is, after all, quite possible that 
a multinational company will actually trade in a tax haven: 
the people who live in those places do need retailers, banks, 
oil companies, and so on. There is nothing to stop a multi-
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national company genuinely undertaking activity in these 
locations to pursue its commercial goals by supplying services 
in this way. But it is still very hard to see why the UK’s 100 
largest companies – according to ActionAid – needed 600 sub-
sidiary companies between them in Jersey for this purpose in 
2011, when that figure exceeded the total number of subsid-
iaries they had between them in China at the time. But unless 
relevant information is provided on what individual subsid-
iaries are doing, deciding which of them – and even which 
groups – are exploiting a tax haven for tax avoidance and 
other nefarious purposes is always going to be hard. 
The fact that I have to refer to a 2011 report when present-
ing evidence on this situation is an indication of the fact that 
data is quite hard to obtain. While some countries, like the 
United States and Germany, have been quite good at enforc-
ing requirements that their multinational groups of companies 
must disclose where they have subsidiaries, other states, such 
as the UK, have passed laws that were intended to provide 
this information, but were, until recently, very badly enforced. 
Indeed, one point of the ActionAid report was to embarrass 
large companies into compliance with that law when work I 
had undertaken in previous years showed how few of them 
supplied the data required by law on which companies they 
owned. But even having such a list is only a first step: knowing 
where companies are does not tell you what they actually 
get up to.
The second reason why this problem exists is that the 
accounts of multinational companies are extremely opaque 
on this issue. That is because their accounts represents a very 
particular, and highly selective view of the trading of a multi-
national company, that combines the accounts of the subsidiary 
companies within the group into one set of accounts. However, 
what that means is that the glossy, published accounts for the 
multinational group do not in fact represent the real trading 
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of any one entity at all. In a sense, they can quite appropriately 
be described as a work of fiction because, in the process of cre-
ating this new, ‘consolidated’ set of accounts, the impacts of 
all the transactions that take place between group companies 
are cancelled out. What is left are just the transactions that 
take place between group companies and the rest of the world 
– or third parties, as accountants call them.
It cannot be denied that there is some merit to this approach. 
It is impossible to make profit by trading with yourself so 
what the consolidated accounts do show are those transac-
tions that add value for the shareholders of the company that 
controls the group as a whole. No one can say that this is not 
useful: this is, undoubtedly, the information that the world’s 
stock exchanges and the investors who use those places want 
from the companies in question. 
At the same time, however, it cannot be also denied that this 
particular process of accounting, which is not necessarily the 
only way in which those accounts might be prepared, does have 
some extraordinary benefits for the multinational company 
that wants to hide any aspect of its activities from view. This is 
particularly the case when this method of accounting is com-
bined with the secrecy that tax haven supply, including the 
fact that they do not require the accounts of multinational 
company subsidiaries to be put on public record. Given that 
much of the activity undertaken in the tax haven subsidiaries 
of a multinational company is solely for the benefit of other 
group companies, the result of the way in which published 
accounts of groups of companies are prepared is that none of 
that activity is reflected within them. And since information 
on tax haven activity is also unavailable from the tax havens 
where these groups operate, because the accounts in such 
places are secret the result is that the real extent and effects of 
such activity is, in many cases, utterly unknown. 
This has enormous potential tax significance. This secrecy 
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allows a multinational company to shift its profits from those 
places where tax would be due at higher rates to those were 
little or no tax is due. At the time of writing, notional corpora-
tion tax rates in the OECD – the club of the world’s wealthiest 
nations – vary from a potential 38.92 per cent in the United 
States to 12.5 per cent in Ireland16 – but none offer the zero 
per cent rate due on most such profits in places like Cayman, 
Jersey and even Singapore, if it can be shown that the profits 
did not arise in those places. 
The ways in which profit shifting takes place are numer-
ous, and can only be explained here in outline. Perhaps the 
most common is what is called transfer mispricing. Transfer 
pricing necessarily takes place in all groups of companies. A 
transfer price is what is charged when one company that is a 
member of a group sells goods or services to another company 
within the same group. It is called a transfer price simply to 
differentiate it from a market price, which is that which would 
be set between independent people trading in a marketplace. 
Transfer prices can be charged on anything, from manufac-
tured components to internal accounting services, interest 
charges, and the sums due for the use of intellectual property 
in the form of royalty and copyright fees.
Much of the world’s trade is subject to transfer pricing. 
It was estimated by the OECD in 2002 that around 60 per 
cent of world trade was undertaken on an intragroup basis, 
where transfer prices were charged.17 It is very likely, and 
openly speculated, that the proportion has risen since then. 
As globalisation has advanced and companies have diversi-
fied their activities over a large range of countries, the internal 
supply chains of many organisations have become very long. 
For example, in the case of the car, it is commonplace for the 
engines, interiors, electrical wiring looms and many other 
components all to be manufactured in different countries by 
different companies – all of which are owned by the same 
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group – before they are then assembled into the final car, 
which is then itself sold within the group of companies before 
it reaches its final destination, and a real customer. 
What is surprising in this case is that the way in which 
the world’s multinational companies present their accounts 
ensures that none of this trade is reflected within their own 
financial statements. Every single pound, euro, yen or dollar 
of that trade disappears from view in the published accounts 
of groups of companies, and if a significant part of that trade 
flows through tax havens, as seems likely given the number 
of tax haven subsidiaries that the largest companies in the 
UK have, then preparing any estimate of its scale is very dif-
ficult unless you have the resources that the OECD is able to 
command as an intergovernmental agency.
It is important to say that there are rules designed to prevent 
tax abuse governing how transfer prices can be set. Currently, 
multinational companies are meant to find what is called a 
‘comparable’ open market price for the goods or services they 
are supplying. So, for example, if the item being traded is an 
electric motor, the company should go out and find what, in 
the marketplace, they would have to pay for that product, 
and charge that same price when transferring an equivalent 
electric motor within their group. But there is an assumption 
implicit in this requirement, which is that comparable prices 
can be found for every single thing that might be traded, and 
that is very obviously not true: when most of the world’s trade 
is undertaken between companies in the same groups, estab-
lishing market prices is now very difficult in many cases.
The logic of transfer pricing assumes that each company 
within a group is entirely separate from all others within it, 
even though they are commonly owned – and that it trades 
with those others as if they are all participants in an open 
marketplace, when very obviously that is not true. This logic, 
which was established by the League of Nations in the 1920s, 
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completely denies the reality of what is going on. A group of 
companies is, almost invariably, managed by a central board 
reporting to one group of shareholders, with the object of 
making profit for the group as a whole. The subsidiaries only 
exist as matters of management or legal convenience, and in 
most cases the pretence that they are separate entities is simply 
a fiction. This is just another aspect of the extraordinary series 
of circumstances (which includes tax haven secrecy) that 
provide massive opportunity for multinational groups of com-
panies to exploit transfer pricing as a means of shifting profits 
to low-tax jurisdictions, in a process best described as transfer 
mispricing.
The attraction of this activity is increased by the fact that 
the odds of being found to have participated in it are low. As 
the UK’s House of Commons Public Accounts Committee said 
of the big four accounting firms (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte, EY and KPMG) operating in the country in 2013: 
‘They employ nearly 9,000 people just to provide tax advice 
to companies and wealthy individuals, much of which is 
aimed at minimizing the tax paid. Between them they boast 
250 transfer pricing specialists whereas HMRC has only 65 
people working in this area.’18 It has been reported that the 
number of transfer-pricing specialists employed by HMRC has 
increased since then, but the odds remain stacked in favour of 
the companies undertaking such trades. 
The whole of the OECD’s Base Erosion and Profits Shifting 
programme, developed between 2012 and 2015, was aimed 
at tackling the various forms in which this abuse arises; but 
whether it succeeds or not is open to question, for two reasons. 
The first is whether or not nation-states are really willing to 
act on the OECD’s recommendations. There are already wor-
rying signs that organisations as large as the European Union 
are watering them down.19 The second is that, as soon as one 
abuse is tackled, another seems to open up.20 This is because 
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of a process that is commonly termed ‘tax competition’. As 
has already been noted, like so much in taxation, tax compe-
tition is misnamed. It is not in fact a competitive process; it 
is more like ‘tax war’. It involves nation-states competing to 
provide tax incentives to encourage the world’s ‘hot money’ 
to locate within their jurisdictions. Some of this hot money 
is criminal, but it is fair to assume very few companies are 
involved in that. But the world’s largest corporations are even 
so major owners of hot money. In 2015 Bloomberg estimated 
that the largest US corporations, between them, held at least 
$2.1 trillion of funds outside the country.21 
There is a particular reason for them to do so: the US tax 
system is unique, and even perverse, in charging US corpora-
tions tax upon their worldwide income, but only when they 
bring their funds earned overseas back into the country. The 
obvious consequence is that there is every incentive for them 
to minimise their tax bills wherever they can in the world, and 
then to accumulate the resulting earnings in tax havens, but 
never relocate them to the United States. Bermuda appears to 
be the favourite place for such accumulation. 
According to Bloomberg, the giant US corporation GE tops 
the list of companies holding funds outside the country, with 
$119 billion in such expatriated hot money. Other very famil-
iar names were also on the list. Microsoft came second, with 
$92.9 billion. Apple reportedly held overall sums broadly 
similar to GE, but reckoned that only $69.7 billion of this 
was permanently outside the United States, while drugs giant 
Pfizer held $74 billion outside the country.
Because of differences between tax systems, no large com-
panies in any other country hold anything like the sums 
that US corporations do outside their country of permanent 
residence. But since the global financial crisis of 2008, the 
practice has become common among almost all large multina-
tional corporations of investing less and less in their business 
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activities, and holding increasingly large piles of cash. In 2015 
the Financial Times reported that it was estimated that UK 
non-financial corporations (in other words, those that are not 
banks, insurance companies and the like) were sitting on at 
least £139.5 billion in spare cash.22 
Just as US corporations’ hot money is located in tax havens, 
the same is true of the UK, where – quite perversely – in 2012 
the UK government introduced a special low rate of tax on 
profits made by the internal treasury functions of UK multi-
national companies if those treasury functions were located in 
tax havens. This produced a tax rate of 5.5 per cent on those 
profits at the time: by 2020, if changes to UK corporation 
tax proceed as planned, the tax charged on these hot-money 
operations will be just 4.25 per cent.
These rates are so low because of tax haven pressure: gov-
ernments have felt compelled to reduce tax rates. As a result, 
there has been a steady and substantial decline in the rates 
of corporation tax in almost all countries. Looking solely at 
headline rates of tax, international accountants KPMG esti-
mate that the average rate of corporation tax in the OECD 
fell from 27.67 per cent in 2006 to 24.85 per cent in 2016.23 
Similar figures in the EU show a decline from 24.83 per cent 
to 22.09 per cent. This will continue in the future: in the UK, 
the headline rate of tax for large companies of 28 per cent in 
2009 is scheduled to fall to 17 per cent in 2020 – 3 percentage 
points lower than the basic rate of income tax charged paid by 
those earning well below average amounts.
In addition, headline tax rates have become deeply mislead-
ing, because so many incentives, allowances and reliefs have 
been made available to large companies. In 2015 the Irish 
government reported that, although its headline rate of corpo-
ration tax was 12.5 per cent, the effective rate for US-owned 
companies located in that country could be as low as 2.2 per 
cent.24 In the United States, headline rates, including state-level 
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taxation, can be as high as almost 40 per cent, but a report 
by the think tank Citizens for Tax Justice found that, between 
2008 and 2012, the 288 Fortune 500 companies that had 
been consistently profitable in that period paid an effective 
federal income tax rate of just 19.4 per cent, while twenty-six 
of the corporations, including Boeing, General Electric and 
Verizon, paid no federal income tax at all, and a third of the 
corporations paid an effective tax rate of less than 10 per cent 
over that period.25
To exacerbate this trend, a plethora of new tax schemes 
have been promoted by governments. The most common over 
the last few years are the so-called ‘patent box’ schemes, which 
offer lower rates of tax to companies on income earned from 
exploiting patents they have developed. It has by no means 
been true that all of these were related to any real economic 
activity, and the OECD has already had to tackle the issue of 
the abuse they have given rise to. 
There is thus a twofold battle going on. Corporations have 
used tax havens in the way that many right-wing think tanks 
have suggested they should, which is to bring pressure on 
governments to reduce tax rates, shrink the size of the state, 
shift the burden of taxation from capital onto labour, and as 
a result pay a lower overall rate of tax. At the same time, gov-
ernments, sensing the threat that hot money has created, have 
reacted with a rash of investment incentives, not limited to 
cutting the corporation tax rates they offer. This leaves us in 
the unfortunate position of having no clear sign yet that anti–
tax abuse initiatives, like the OECD’s, are going to deliver 
when the same governments that promoted them are also 
major participants in the corporation tax race to the bottom. 
The benefits that tax havens have supplied to the world’s 
major corporations seem set to continue for the time being, 
unless some radical changes in the design of tax systems take 
place (see Chapter 6).
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Other regulatory relaxations also exist. For example, a sig-
nificant part of what is called the captive insurance market 
is located in tax havens. Captive insurance companies are 
owned by the same companies that they insure: if you are big 
enough you can, after all, insure your own risks. This means 
that some of the premiums paid to that captive insurance 
company might fall out of tax on receipt, but be subject to 
tax relief in the company that makes payment. Some countries 
have taken steps to attack this arrangement, but where this 
has not happened this is a classic group company tax abuse: 
if an insurance premium of, say, $1 million is paid from a 
country with an effective tax rate of 25 per cent to a captive 
insurance company located in the territory where there is no 
tax (Bermuda and Guernsey are popular for this purpose), 
then $250,000 of tax has been saved in the paying company, 
while no tax is due in the tax haven. The attraction of the 
arrangement to the multinational corporation is obvious.
But this is not the only regulation that is available for abuse. 
Most of the world’s shipping, and an increasing number of 
aircraft, are registered in tax havens, whose regulatory require-
ments tend to be lighter, and where the conditions attached 
to the operation of ships, in particular, is open to significant 
abuse. Staff may not be subject to the same conditions that 
would apply if the ships were registered in major economies, 
while environmental regulations may also be enforced very 
laxly. The Liberian shipping register, which is actually oper-
ated from the United States, is well known, but plays second 
fiddle to the largest of all, Panama, which is reported to have 
more registered vessels than the whole of the United States 
and China combined. The Marshall Islands come third, fol-
lowed by Hong Kong, Singapore, the Bahamas and Malta, in 
that order – all of them tax havens.
Gambling is another area in which tax havens provide 
light-touch regulation. Gibraltar is a particularly big player 
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in this market, and is the home, according to the Financial 
Times, of the online gambling operations of most major UK 
betting companies, and of thirty-four gambling companies in 
all.26 The attractions are low tax and light-touch regulation, 
which mainstream states have not been able to match when 
trying to secure internet gambling revenues, in which players 
have little concern where the company they are dealing with 
is located.
This issue of location has led to international tensions. The 
whole Google story, for example, derives from much the same 
issue. Google has claimed, with varying degrees of tax success, 
that it makes almost all its sales of advertising services to 
countries outside the United States, from its base in Ireland.27 
Investigations by the UK’s House of Commons Public Accounts 
Committee and others have shown that Google usually has 
fewer staff in Ireland servicing each international market than 
it has in each sales destination, and that, in a country like the 
UK, the locally based staff are paid more than their equivalent 
team members in Ireland – and yet it is still claimed by Google 
that it is the Irish staff who conclude contracts, not the locally 
based negotiators.28 This claim is supported by the suggestion 
that the contract between the customer and Google is finally 
concluded on its fileserver in Ireland: the ambiguity as to loca-
tion, which is a recurring feature of the tax haven story, has 
been exploited in this case to massively reduce the overall rate 
of tax paid by Google outside the United States.29
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chapter 4
The Tax Haven World
Tax Haven Products
Putting aside the legislation that imposes light-touch regula-
tion behind a veil of secrecy, tax havens really only offer three 
products. They are, in essence, companies, trusts and founda-
tions (which are a variation on trusts).
The important thing to note about offshore companies, trusts 
and foundations is that they are not much like the onshore 
varieties of the same thing. This is important. Whereas society 
has found companies, trusts and foundations – when subject 
to proper regulation, governance, taxation and accountability 
– can play a useful role in promoting a healthy economy, it is 
very hard to say the same of their offshore cousins.
Taking the actual role they play as a starting point, and 
companies in the first instance, most onshore companies will 
be created for a commercial purpose. Usually, they either own 
an asset that they lease or hire or engage in trade. In some 
instances, though they represent a small minority, they will 
own shares in other companies. It is fair to say that because 
they are so cheap to create in many locations (most especially 
the UK) some companies are formed ‘just in case’, or to protect 
a name that someone thinks they may want to use one day. 
What is rare onshore is the use of a company to manage assets, 
whether it be savings, shares or the family home; there are 
usually quite strong tax reasons for not doing that. There is 
also the matter of publicity. Onshore companies attract atten-
tion, and people do not always want to publicise their wealth.
Offshore the story is quite different. It is uncommon for 
an offshore company to trade. In fact, the most common use 
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for an offshore company is to manage a bank account. Such 
accounts are usually treated as the personal property of the 
companies’ real owners. They will access them using a debit 
or credit card. Everything will be done online. No statements 
will ever be sent. And the nominee directors, shareholders 
and registered office administrators technically responsible 
for company operations in law will in all likelihood know 
nothing about the transactions. Nor do such companies 
prepare accounts. After all, no one in any tax authority or 
company registry will ever ask for them, so why bother? And 
in the event someone does ask for that data, the company in 
question will either disappear from view and never respond to 
the request or be redomiciled, which means it will up-sticks 
and move its country of incorporation to another jurisdic-
tion that does not have the impertinence to ask what it might 
be doing.
With more sophisticated operations, the range of assets 
held by the offshore company may be more complex. It may 
own land and buildings or perhaps a portfolio of shares, but 
you can be sure the management is undertaken elsewhere and 
not by the directors. If legality is a more important issue, such 
companies may prepare accounts, but no one bar the real 
owners will be in any way interested in them. If the nominee 
directors sign them, the signature might well be supplied 
electronically.
In the case of those tax haven companies owned by multi-
national corporations, most of them fall into the category of 
‘special purpose vehicle’. As the name implies, these are often 
set up for a single specific purpose. This may be to own shares 
in other companies in a way that means no tax will be paid on 
their sale, or supposedly to manage a loan that provides the 
interest paid on it with favourable tax treatment in more than 
one country. To prevent too many questions being asked of 
any one company every time such a transaction is made a new 
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company may be set up. The aim of such entities is simply to 
throw dust in the eyes of the tax authorities.
Offshore companies do not frequently engage in trade. Of 
course, it is true that some in the British Virgin Islands run local 
shops, takeaways and other businesses, but they are the excep-
tion. The vast majority of such companies hold and manage 
investments but do not add value to the world economy 
in any way. That holds true even for those entities owned 
by multi national corporations; at most they will repackage 
intra-group management, marketing, insurance and financial 
services, the impact of which is unlikely to be in the tax haven 
where the activity is recorded. Not, of course, that we will 
know because the accounts and details of any tax the company 
pays will be hidden from view, in contrast to many onshore 
companies. 
Onshore and offshore companies are, then, fundamen-
tally different. Onshore companies make business happen. 
Offshore companies hide wealth from view.
This stark distinction between categories holds true with 
trusts as well. In fact, it is fair to say that if England set the 
benchmark for trust law, as the originator of the arrangement, 
then most offshore trusts are not really trusts at all. A little 
explanation is required.
In the modern onshore trust, a settlor is required, whose 
role is, in effect, to formulate the arrangement. This settlor 
(or donor, if you like) passes what is called the trust property 
(which can be just about anything from a $10 bill onwards) 
to a trustee (or more likely, trustees), who agrees to have legal 
ownership of those assets while ensuring that the benefits of 
ownership go to other people. There is invariably more than 
one beneficiary (or else the trust property would be that of the 
sole beneficiary, albeit held by nominees), and those multiple 
beneficiaries may well have very different interests in the trust 
property. So, for example, a spouse might enjoy the income 
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from the trust property, while the assets will pass to the 
children of the settlor on the event of her death, but just about 
any arrangement as possible. The key points are that a person 
(the settlor) has to give something (the trust property) away 
to be looked after by people (the trustees) who have an abso-
lute duty to pass it on to others one day. The trust cannot last 
forever, and the one person who must not benefit is the settlor 
who, once property has been given away, has no say in the 
matter anymore (unless the trust is charitable, in which case 
they can’t benefit from the trust). 
The trouble with trusts is that they are flexible. So, some 
trusts are very specific as to their intention: they say precisely 
who will benefit and how. Others, however, are discretionary. 
In these case the trustees are given the power to decide who 
will benefit and when. However, it is also commonplace for 
settlors to be explicit about their wishes, which are communi-
cated to the trustees in what is called a ‘side letter’, a document 
that is not binding but merely an expression of intent. These 
discretionary trusts have a particular benefit with regard to 
secrecy: even were the trust deed to be made available to some 
authority, the side letter would remain hidden, as may the 
identity of the trust’s beneficiaries. 
Other trusts, in contrast, have purely charitable purposes. 
All the income, gains and property of the trust are eventually 
made available to the named charities.
Offshore, however, such rules are felt to be somewhat 
onerous. Here, settlors do not want to give their property 
away as onshore trust laws require, but to continue to profit 
from those assets. And they want to lock up the assets so that 
no future generation can control them as they have done. 
Ironically, mistrust is at the very heart of the trust industry. In 
essence then, the offshore trust user wants to claim they have 
put their assets in a trust for tax and legal purposes but suffer 
none of the consequences of doing so.
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Over a period of about a decade, starting with the Caymans 
Islands’ STAR trust legislation of 1997 and spreading through 
the British Virgin Islands with its VISTA trusts and to Jersey, 
which rewrote its trust laws in 2006, the law of trusts for the 
offshore world changed radically. With slight variations from 
place to place, settlors could now retain control of their assets 
and appoint and sack trustees at will, meaning that their inde-
pendence disappeared. Settlors could also enjoy benefits from 
the trusts they had created. Most important, the rule that trust 
property had eventually to pass back to the ownership of a 
real-life, warm-blooded human being was swept aside; these 
trusts were deliberately designed to last forever. What is more, 
the beneficiaries of the trusts were given no right to challenge 
this. And if any challenge to a trust did arise for any reason, 
these trusts had built-in ‘flee clauses’, meaning they could 
head to a new location at a moment’s notice should the laws 
of their current residence become burdensome. 
In effect a person creating such a trust (and their equivalent 
forms of foundation) wants not just to have their cake and eat 
it, but do so unaccountably, even to their trustees, while at the 
same time exercising control over their assets long after their 
death. When Jersey introduced an arrangement of this sort I 
argued they were little better than a sham, and I have never 
found a reason to change my mind. 
These trusts, then, most of which seem to have been written 
under laws that members of the Society of Trusts and Estate 
Practitioners helped promote, are designed with three purposes 
in mind: to undermine the rule of law; to promote secrecy; 
and to concentrate the ownership of wealth in the hands of a 
few in perpetuity. It’s hard to envisage anything more harmful 
to democracy, tax justice or the future of capital, the last of 
which has always been dependent upon risk-taking by new 
entrepreneurs rather than the continuation of structures that 
have outlived their usefulness, structures these trusts help 
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preserve. And a whole offshore industry exists to assist in 
achieving these contemptible goals. 
The Offshore Service Industry
So who supplies tax haven products, and the services that go 
with them?
There are three answers to this question. The first group 
is the politicians in tax havens. The second is the lawyers, 
accountants, bankers and so-called wealth-management pro-
fessionals who populate them. And finally, there are those 
who refer services to these locations. Together, they form an 
integrated web that facilitates the offshore world where tax 
abuse takes place, as a result of the operations of the world’s 
secrecy jurisdictions.
It would be wholly inappropriate to ignore the role of poli-
tics and politicians in tax havens. They operate on two levels: 
within the tax havens themselves, and in the places that toler-
ate their existence. Since the overlap between tax havens and 
major states is now so strong, it is hard to distinguish between 
them.
The politics that permit tax haven activity have always been 
those of greed. The modern face of such greed can be found 
in the economic doctrine of neoliberalism, which promotes 
globalisation, the free movement of capital, the supremacy of 
markets, the power of the individual, and the need to remove 
obstacles to trade, including taxation. But most tax havens 
had their origins in the pre-neoliberal era. Many, such as the 
UK’s network of havens, were created after the Second World 
War as pragmatic means of funding postcolonial dependen-
cies, but really found their role only as neoliberalism began its 
ascent in the 1970s. Tax havens appeared to offer a political 
solution to the perceived problems of that age, partly through 
their use as places from which an assault on those problems 
could be conveniently launched. 
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Take, for example, the opinion of the UK-based Adam 
Smith Institute, expressed in April 2015:
Governments must be competitive with their tax rates, other-
wise more and more money will be stored in places with lower 
tax rates. Tax competition is a key driver of economic growth 
in the world, as this incentivises politicians to keep taxes on 
savings and investments low. When tax rates are excessive, 
there is less economic growth. Tax havens provide the neces-
sary competition to militate against this happening.1
These claims have been widely repeated for decades now. They 
suggest that democratic governments are not to be trusted to 
set tax rates: they need to be disciplined by markets, and tax 
havens are the market mechanism to do that. But, in advanc-
ing this claim, the Adam Smith Institute suggests that the only 
taxes that need to be reduced in this way are those on savings 
and investment. It would seem that the argument that tax 
havens make people better off only applies to those who are in 
the fortunate position of owning such assets – which the vast 
majority of people in most countries do not in any significant 
amount. What is more, they even get the economics wrong, 
because, as is now widely recognised, not least by the Bank 
of England, savings (which investments in the sense intended 
here are properly described as) are not the engine of economic 
growth: credit is what is necessary to create economic growth, 
and the availability of credit is entirely independent of the 
existence of savings.2
To put it another way, tax havens do not fuel growth; 
rather, they increase inequality, shift the burden of taxation 
from capital onto labour, and challenge democratic choice. In 
the process, they act as a vehicle undermining the credibility 
of the nation-state as the representative of its citizens. Despite 
these harsh realities, the beliefs espoused by the Adam Smith 
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Institute and others appear to command widespread political 
support.
This is certainly true within tax havens themselves. For 
example, in November 2015 Alden McLaughlin, the premier 
of the Cayman Islands, told its legislative assembly that he 
had turned down requests from the UK for access to corpo-
rate beneficial ownership data because ‘to do otherwise would 
place the Cayman Islands at a competitive disadvantage with 
other jurisdictions that do not permit unfettered access to 
beneficial ownership’.3 This only reinforces the impression 
that Cayman, rather than being a government with law- 
enforcement responsibilities, is instead a commercial entity 
engaged in regulatory competition.
The crossover between tax haven and mainstream think-
ing was also apparent in a report from Jersey Finance in 
2010, which referred to an event it had staged at the UK’s 
Conservative Party conference in which its chief executive, 
Geoff Cook, was reported as saying: ‘Jersey competes for busi-
ness on exactly the same basis as seventy other countries which 
offer some kind of benign tax-neutral regime – through a mix 
of business expertise, political and social stability, modern 
infrastructure, good communications and sound regulation.’4 
The language used here is interesting. ‘Tax-neutral’, of course, 
in fact means ‘tax-free’. And competition is the key word. The 
claim to be well-regulated is also misleading, because it only 
refers to the regulation of Jersey-registered companies, trusts 
and funds solely within the island, rather than within a larger 
international framework. Jersey quite deliberately accepts 
no responsibility whatsoever for what these entities do ‘else-
where’. And, since Jersey well knows that almost all these 
entities are created solely to operate ‘elsewhere’, the creation 
of a well-regulated environment within Jersey for these enti-
ties is extremely easy, and largely meaningless. 
Unfortunately, the deception implicit in language of this sort 
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is still too readily accepted by politicians. As a consequence, 
for example, in 2016 the UK failed to enforce the demand that 
its tax havens create publicly accessible registers of beneficial 
ownership in advance of the anti-corruption summit, held in 
London in May of that year.5 The political will to control tax 
haven activity does not yet exist.
But what, then, of the business expertise to which Geoff 
Cook of Jersey Finance refer? Who supplies it? The answer in 
this case is very easy to supply: it is delivered by accountants, 
lawyers, bankers and wealth managers. Professor Prem Sikka 
of Essex University has described these people as the ‘Pinstripe 
Mafia’.6 
The major participants within the financial services sector 
are also not hard to identify. When it comes to accountants, 
the pack is led by the big four firms of accountants that have 
dominated this sector worldwide for the last fifteen years: 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte, Ernst & Young (now EY) 
and KPMG, in approximate descending order of size. In 2010 
I undertook research on the location of these firms, and there 
is no reason to think anything has changed much since then.7 
What my research showed was that each of the big four firms 
were present in thirty-three of the sixty secrecy jurisdictions 
studied as the basis of the first Tax Justice Network’s Financial 
Secrecy Index; three were present in six more, four were 
present in two locations (meaning that forty-three locations 
had two or more of these firms present), and they were absent 
from just eight, which included some of the most remote and 
little-used, locations such as Vanuatu, Montserrat and Liberia. 
It is exceptionally difficult to see why these firms need to be 
in places as small as Cayman and the British Virgin Islands to 
service local need. Both have smaller populations than the Isle 
of Wight, located off the south coast of the UK, where no such 
firms are located. Nor do any of them seem to think it neces-
sary to have an office in rich America’s favourite playground, 
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Martha’s Vineyard, off Cape Cod in Massachusetts. The 
obvious conclusions to draw is that these firms are not in tax 
havens to service local people, but to assist in the recording of 
transactions that have all their economic impact ‘elsewhere’. 
Why is that necessary? Because the firms, which between 
them audit almost all the largest companies in the world, 
and consequently provide tax advice to many of the world’s 
wealthiest people, are the principle support mechanism on 
which tax havens are built. Without their presence, the local 
subsidiaries of all the major companies that locate their 
activities in these tax havens, including branches of the multi-
national banks that have operations in them, could not be 
audited – and without those audits tax havens could not func-
tion within the global international financial architecture. It is 
thus quite reasonable to argue that the presence of these big 
four firms of accountants in all the world’s major tax havens 
is the foundation upon which is built the secrecy that under-
mines the regulation that should make efficient markets and 
nation-states function. 
In their defence, the partners of these firms often argue that, 
although they appear to be unified multinational corpora-
tions, this is not the reality. For legal purposes these firms are 
loose associations of regional firms that do not have common 
ownership but,which, for commercial advantage, operate 
under common identities. When it suits them to be a single 
firm, as on their websites, they claim to offer a single approach 
available in well over a hundred countries in the world.8 If at 
the same time they wish to ring-fence themselves from some 
liability, then a partner from, say, London might argue that 
they have no connection in a legal sense with the similarly 
named firm that happens to operate in a place like Bermuda – 
and technically they are right. 
This, however, is simply a game, and they all know it. There 
is no shadow of a doubt that these firms exist in the way that 
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they do primarily for the purpose of making more profit than 
would otherwise be possible, and secondarily to refer work 
to each other in pursuit of this goal. The tax haven opera-
tions are critical to this, and as many tax partners in these 
firms will confirm, they make good fees from advising clients 
on which locations best suit their needs at a particular time. 
Precisely because they monitor this situation so accurately, 
these firms are also far from independent participants in the 
process. They all lobby to promote their clients’ needs, and 
in the process are active participants in the regulatory and 
economic race to the bottom that tax havens facilitate. As a 
result, it is almost impossible to see tax havens and these large 
accountancy firms as independent of one another.
Some lawyers have a roughly similar status – though it is 
unusual to find a major onshore firm of lawyers operating 
offshore. Instead, most of this business is operated by what is 
called the ‘magic circle’ of offshore law firms. There is some 
dispute as to which firms constitute this magic circle, and 
all have much more limited reach than the big four firms of 
accountants, although all of them tend to operate in a number 
of tax havens simultaneously. Many of these firms will secure 
their business by referral from lawyers onshore. The networks 
are more discreet, but the referral process is ultimately much 
the same as that which goes on inside the big accountancy 
firms. 
It is questionable, for example, whether Mossack Fonseca, 
the firm at the heart of the Panama Papers, was a member this 
elite group. What few would doubt is that Maples and Calder, 
the law firm whose offices in Cayman were referred to by 
Barak Obama during his 2008 presidential campaign, is one 
of them.9 Based in Cayman originally, but now operating in 
Dublin, London, Hong Kong, Singapore and Dubai, Maples 
and Calder is typical in acting in many major financial centres 
to manage the flows of the world’s fastest-moving money. 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   89 18/10/2016   16:09:36
90
dirty secrets
Then there are the banks. Nothing can happen in a tax 
haven without a bank, but there are very few banks based in 
tax havens. There is good reason for that: as the 2008 global 
financial crisis proved, banks are heavily dependent on the 
existence of very large governments to bail them out if some-
thing goes wrong. Tax haven governments do not have the 
capacity to do this. Many tax havens do not, for example, 
have truly independent currencies, and as a result could not 
have created the new funds needed to support banks in the 
way that the UK, the United States and other governments did 
in 2008. 
Consequently, tax haven banks are remarkably famil-
iar. A glance at the list of banks in Guernsey, for example, 
does reveal some names that will not be readily familiar to 
those outside the financial services sector, but also discloses 
the Bank of Cyprus (from another tax haven), Barclays, BNP 
Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Lloyds, RBS, 
Rothschild’s, SG Hambros, and Skipton International, which 
is a branch of a UK building society. The same pattern can be 
found in almost any tax haven. There is little point in thinking 
of these offshore banks as different operations: the reality is 
that they are, to a very great extent, one and the same thing as 
their onshore operations. 
The final component that makes up the offshore world is 
wealth managers. These are a much harder group to nail down 
than the others, because they are a more recent development – 
albeit one with a decidedly offshore flavour. An outgrowth 
of the old professional trustee class that once existed in 
London, New York and their satellites, wealth managers 
might be accountants or lawyers, and even bankers on occa-
sion, but always have a particular focus on the preservation 
of their clients’ wealth. As Brooke Harrington, a Copenhagen 
Business School academic, argues, perhaps the most consistent 
identifying feature of wealth managers is their membership 
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of an organisation called the Society of Trust and Estate 
Practitioners (STEP).10 This innocuous-sounding UK-based 
organisation says of itself,
STEP is the worldwide professional association for those 
advising families across generations. We promote best prac-
tice, professional integrity and education to our members. Our 
members help families plan for their futures: from drafting 
a will or advising family businesses, to helping international 
families and protecting vulnerable family members.
Today we have over 20,000 members across 95 countries. 
They include lawyers, accountants and other trust and estate 
specialists.11
Like so much that is said about offshore, this is undoubtedly 
true, but does not refer to everything we need to know. The 
list of STEP chapters in Latin America and the Caribbean 
provides a further indication of what the organisation does. 
It has branches in Anguilla, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, 
Bermuda, Brazil, the British Virgin Islands, Colombia, the 
Cayman Islands, Curaçao, Mexico, Nevis, Uruguay, St Lucia, 
Panama and the Turks and Caicos Islands. Thirteen of these 
sixteen locations might, quite reasonably, be considered tax 
havens. It is a pattern repeated elsewhere: its continental 
European branches include offices in Austria, Luxembourg, 
Cyprus, Gibraltar, Malta, Israel, Monaco and no less than 
four locations in Switzerland, which means that its tax haven 
locations significantly outnumber its operations in France, 
Germany, Hungary, Italy and Spain.
A heavy tax haven orientation does not, of course, prove 
that this is an organisation dedicated to the promotion of tax 
haven activity – but STEP’s own publicity materials do make 
this case. A May 2015 publicity brochure produced for its 
Cayman branch heavily promoted the attractions of the STAR 
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trust available at that location and which conform to almost 
none of the normally accepted legal principles of onshore 
trusts.12 
It is also widely thought that the rapid dissemination of 
such structures from one tax haven location to another has 
been greatly assisted by the presence of STEP members in so 
many tax haven locations. That they happen to compete with 
each other for business does not help: the promotion of tax 
competition could, quite fairly, be seen as one of the main 
business activities of the world’s wealth-management industry.
This tax competition has wider consequences, however. 
What we see here is the fight between the professional repre-
sentatives of the world’s wealth against the combined forces of 
the world’s democratic governments. Moreover, the effective 
capture of many tax havens by the financial services industry, 
to suit its own purposes, means that tax haven jurisdictions, 
rather than being independent states, have become beholden 
to the industry that so dominates their economies. In Jersey, 
for example, it is estimated that 44.1 per cent of all local 
income relates to the financial services industry.13
So large is this proportion of income related to this single 
industry that it has led to what the Tax Justice Network has 
called the ‘finance curse’.14 The sheer size of this sector means 
that the economy of the country is extremely dependent upon 
that industry for its well-being. Any degree of unpredict-
ability in the event of downturns (as occurs, for example, in 
the event of a major financial crisis) makes the provision of 
planned services for the benefit of the local population very 
hard. Furthermore, so influential is the sector, and so great its 
demands upon local services, that for the local government 
to consider any other activity is now almost impossible. For 
example, all local training and education has to be focused 
upon the needs of this one sector, and everything else is 
squeezed out of consideration. 
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Perhaps most worryingly, because the sector is so powerful 
within the economy, the risk to good local governance is very 
high indeed: saying no to an industry on whose fortunes you 
are dependent is very difficult for any local politician – and 
the risk of the capture of the state by its interests, if not of 
outright corruption, is very high. This was demonstrated in 
the case of the Turks and Caicos Islands, where the UK had to 
take direct control in 2009 as a result of the failure of the local 
government in the face of such pressure.
The paradox is that tax havens are, in many ways, a cre-
ation of tax competition. But that idea of tax competition has 
encouraged them to operate as if they were market players, 
not sovereign governments. The outcome has been the capture 
of their states by those dominant market players that they 
first set out to host. What happens in tax havens is maybe the 
truest indicator of the extent of global corruption today.
The Geography of Secrecy
A question that many have failed to answer is which places 
should be considered to be tax havens. As we have seen, there 
is good reason for that. In 2007 the Tax Justice Network 
received funding from the Ford Foundation to answer this 
question. I directed the resulting project, which led to the first 
ever Financial Secrecy Index, which has now been published 
four times.15 
Any process for assessing secrecy needed a starting point, 
and so I resorted to the classic academic approach of under-
taking a literature review to see what others had already 
concluded. The result was, in effect, a list of lists of those 
places that authoritative sources had described as tax havens 
at one time or another. (This list is in Appendix 1_. What this 
showed was remarkable agreement over a long period as to 
the tax haven status of some locations. Indeed, the Bahamas, 
Bermuda, Cayman, Guernsey, Jersey, Malta and Panama 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   93 18/10/2016   16:09:37
94
dirty secrets
appeared on every list over the period reviewed, and twenty-
two locations appear on at least eight lists.
The first Financial Secrecy Index was based on this list, 
with very minor changes. Every country appearing on at 
least two lists was considered worth investigating except for 
three: Tonga, South Africa and Niue, where it was thought 
any risk that had once existed had disappeared by 2007. Two 
countries were added to the list: Austria and Belgium, in each 
case because of their aggressive stance towards the European 
Union Savings Tax Directive, which was then the most effec-
tive weapon against tax haven abuse in existence. As a result, 
sixty countries were ranked. 
The Financial Secrecy Index has always focused on secrecy, 
and not on a jurisdiction’s tax rate, as the most important 
factor in its deliberations. There is very good reason for this. 
Many tax havens, such as Luxembourg, have significant appar-
ent tax rates. In Luxembourg, a rate of 29.6 per cent was in 
existence for many years.16 The charge was notional, however, 
because only a few, almost entirely domestic, companies were 
subject to it. The vast majority of companies locating activi-
ties in Luxembourg were international in their focus, and in 
their case rates as low as 0 per cent could be agreed with the 
tax authorities. 
This difference between a domestic and international rate 
was commonplace. For example, when the first Financial 
Secrecy Index was being prepared, Jersey, Guernsey and the 
Isle of Man all had what appeared to be corporate tax rates of 
20 per cent, but the effective rate of that tax for any company 
that earned its income outside the islands in question was 0 per 
cent. As a result, the vast majority of companies paid nothing. 
For this reason, tax rates were considered very poor indicators 
of whether or not a given jurisdiction was a tax haven. 
There were, however, plenty of other indicators available. 
In the first Financial Secrecy Index we used twelve indicators 
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of tax haven behaviour. This has changed subsequently as 
the index has developed, with one or two indicators being 
dropped and others being added. The fifteen now used are 
based on four key themes that are tested in a number of ways, 
as noted in Appendix 2. The more positive the answers that 
the jurisdiction secured the better its Financial Secrecy Index 
score. The scores are not arrived at arbitrarily: some are 
determined by direct survey enquiries to the jurisdictions in 
question, while many are based on data held by the OECD, the 
Financial Action Task Force that deals with money launder-
ing, and other such agencies. Because of the depth of the data, 
it is no surprise that each Index takes two years to prepare.
This data is not the sole determining factor in the score, 
important though it is. Obviously, some places that are deeply 
secretive, but in practice remain almost unused by anyone 
for tax abuse purposes because they are geographically or 
economically inaccessible. Montserrat might be a perfect 
example. A tiny island of just 4,900 people, it was devastated 
by a volcanic eruption in 1995, and while it has many of the 
secrecy indicators that might mark it out as a place of concern, 
the fact is that almost no money flows through it according 
to all available international indicators, most of which come 
from the IMF. 
This fact is taken into account in assessing the overall score 
in the Financial Secrecy Index. The secrecy score that a juris-
diction is awarded, where a score of 100 represents maximum 
secrecy, is weighted by a second measure that indicates the 
relative importance of that jurisdiction in the world’s interna-
tional financial flows. Because of the enormous difference in 
such flows, this factor has to be carefully calculated to make 
sure that everybody ends up on the same scale. But the effect 
is intentional: a place with maximum secrecy but very limited 
financial flows is not as important as a place with significant 
secrecy and large sums flowing through it, where the relative 
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resulting harm is bound to be greater even if the secrecy is 
not as bad. Ten jurisdictions (Bolivia, Dominican Republic, 
Gambia, Maldives, Montenegro, Paraguay, Taiwan, Tanzania, 
Venezuela and Nauru) are not scored on the index because of 
a lack of relevant data.
The Financial Secrecy Index is reproduced in its entirely in 
Appendix 3 to this book. Readers turning to the index will see 
territories highlighted in dark grey, which are UK Overseas 
Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs), where the 
British queen is head of state, powers to appoint key gov-
ernment officials rest with the British Crown, laws must be 
approved in London, and the UK government holds various 
other powers.17 Territories marked in light grey are British 
Commonwealth territories, which are not OTs or CDs but 
whose final court of appeal is the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council, in London.18 
If the global scale weights of just the OTs and CDs were 
added together (5.7 per cent of the global total, and 23.1 per 
cent with the United Kingdom included), and then combined 
either with their average secrecy score of 65.9 (63.62 with 
the UK) or their lowest-common-denominator score of 71.27 
(Turks and Caicos Islands), the United Kingdom, with its satel-
lite secrecy jurisdictions, would be ranked first in the Financial 
Secrecy Index by a large margin, with a score of 1,580 or 
2,221, respectively (compared to 1,466 for Switzerland). 
There is a very strong case for saying that London is the epi-
centre of the largest tax haven network in the world. 
What will surprise many are the trends that the data pre-
sented in the Financial Secrecy Index reveal. The table on page 
*** of Appendix 3 summarises the top twenty results for each 
of the FSIs produced to date. It also shows their placing in the 
summary of pre-2007 tax haven listings, noted above for the 
sake of comparison. The table forms the basis for the analysis 
that follows.
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First of all, there is a marked importance among larger 
countries, like the United States and the UK (which, as we 
have seen, would be much more significant if listed with all 
the tax havens it controls). There is a trend for the significance 
of larger countries not generally thought of as tax havens 
or secrecy jurisdictions to increase over time. This is very 
clearly indicated by those places that joined the top-twenty 
listing as the research developed. Very few people will think 
of Japan and Germany as secrecy jurisdictions, but the data 
very clearly shows that they are. Their secrecy scores are lower 
than those of places more conventionally thought of as tax 
havens, like the Cayman Islands, but are on a par with a place 
like Luxembourg, which few would dispute has justified this 
title over many years. They may be a little more open than 
the United States, but the fact is that these places do, like the 
United States, justify their inclusion in the list because they 
provide various aspects of secrecy to those who use the struc-
tures that they permit and this creates the risk that some of the 
very substantial financial flows through these locations might 
be illicit transactions, whether they relate to tax or other forms 
of abuse. It is for precisely this reason that, to the surprise of 
many, more major economies are now featuring in the higher 
echelons of the FSI, while more familiar tax havens, like the 
British Virgin Islands, do not now appear in the top twenty.
Germany offers a revealing example. Its secrecy score is 
56 for FSI purposes. This places it below what many regard 
as a critical threshold of between 60 and 65 in this ranking, 
which has long seemed to differentiate what might be thought 
of as the ‘conventional tax havens’ from the rest of the field. 
However, on the fifteen indicators the FSI uses, Germany only 
scores clear marks on two. These two show that it does fully 
participate in automatic information exchange for tax pur-
poses, and it does have a strong commitment to participating 
in double tax agreements with other nations.
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Germany has not so far tried to establish registers of trusts, 
although in the future it looks likely that the European Union 
will require it to do so. Nor does it require that company 
ownership records be readily available online, and the same 
problem exists with accounts: systems on this are fractured, 
and thus fail to meet expected standards. In addition, the state 
does not require that companies making payments to non-
residents, such as banks and companies paying dividends, 
automatically report this data to its tax authority so that it 
can be exchanged with other countries. Nor has the national 
tax authority yet adopted appropriate methods for identifying 
taxpayers, to help eliminate international tax abuse.
When these factors are combined, it become clear that there 
are problems in Germany relating to access to the data needed 
to make sure that tax abuse does not take place. As we now 
know, this requires that the owners of companies and trusts, 
as well as the recipients of payments, be readily identifiable. 
Germany is not as yet in a position to achieve these goals, and 
has a lot of reform to undertake. It is welcome that, in July 
2016, the EU announced measures that might force it to move 
in the right direction; but there is not yet any guarantee that 
Germany will act effectively on this issue. It is rightly identi-
fied as a problem by the Financial Secrecy Index.
The United States is another case worth noting, because it 
has consistently featured near the top of the Financial Secrecy 
Index and is, according to many in the more conventional tax 
havens, the most serious secrecy jurisdiction that exists in the 
world.19 In the latest FSI, the United States had a secrecy score 
of sixty, which is high for a country of any size. Like Germany, 
it managed just two good scores out of fifteen. Again, like 
Germany, it is obviously committed to bilateral tax agree-
ments, and so scored well in this area. In contrast to Germany, 
it is also very good at taxpayer identification within its tax 
administration; but thereafter, things are not so good.
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In particular, the United States got no marks at all in seven 
categories, and some of these are particularly worrying. So, for 
example, it simply makes no effort to identify who owns the 
millions of corporations that are located within it. Corporate 
registration is delegated to states, and the simple fact is that 
many of those states have competed with each other since the 
nineteenth century to provide secrecy to the owners of US 
companies. There may as a result be more secret corporations 
in the United States than in the rest of the world combined. 
The problems do not end there. The country is not good at 
requiring that the accounts of corporations be filed on public 
record, and appears to be vehemently opposed to the publi-
cation of country-by-country data, seen by many as best the 
way to tackle multinational corporation tax abuse. In addi-
tion, many US corporations – because of the variety of forms 
in which they are constituted and the way in which those 
forms can be used for tax purposes – represent almost perfect 
mechanisms for tax avoidance.
All of this is compounded by the fact that, while the United 
States demands significant data from every other country in 
the world on the income of its citizens in those other juris-
dictions, under the terms of what is called FATCA (Foreign 
Accounts Tax Compliance Act),20 it is completely unwilling 
to supply, in exchange, similar information on the income 
that a non-resident might earn within the United States to 
the country in which they are really tax resident. This makes 
the United States by far the largest country in the world not 
properly committed to the automatic information exchange 
of tax data: Panama is, curiously, now its nearest rival. As a 
result, the United States is, very appropriately, high on the list 
of countries causing considerable concern to those who want 
to stop tax haven abuse.
What these case studies demonstrate is that, while it is 
undoubtedly true that some of the more conventional tax 
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havens, like the Cayman Islands and Switzerland, continue to 
justify their inclusion at the top of the ranking, there has been 
a marked development in which these places have ceased to be 
the most important secrecy jurisdictions. Bermuda provides 
a clear indication of this direction of travel. It was in the top 
group in the pre-2007 lists, appearing on every single list of 
tax havens that was surveyed up to that date. Despite this, 
it has been ranked seventh, eleventh and then fourteenth in 
the FSI rankings of 2009, 2011 and 2013, respectively, before 
falling to thirty-fourth place in 2015. There are still significant 
secrecy problems in Bermuda: its secrecy score is higher than 
that of any of the major countries previously noted, at sixty-
six out of 100; but the point is that it, unlike many of the 
major countries, it is complying with international expecta-
tions that it will improve its systems – particularly in relation 
to information exchange, to which it has now committed. 
This does not mean there is no reason for concern about 
Bermuda: the secrecy provisions within the jurisdiction mean 
that, when it comes to actually exchanging the data it has 
committed to supply in future, it may encounter real prob-
lems in doing so. The current state of its administration of 
company and tax information suggests it may simply be 
unable to capture what is required for this purpose, but at 
least it is moving in the right direction.
The same cannot be said of all places. There are, for 
example, some very notable trends in the Middle East and 
Asia. Singapore has crept steadily up the rankings, from 
eighth in 2009 the fourth in 2015, and the trend in the case of 
Hong Kong has been even more marked, from tenth in 2009 
to second in 2015. Both are seriously committed to secrecy: 
Singapore has a secrecy score of sixty-nine, and Hong Kong’s 
is a highly significant seventy-two. This implies that secrecy is 
embedded in their economies, financial services systems and 
taxation culture. 
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The arrival of Macau and China in the 2015 FSI top-twenty, 
ranking at eleventh and twentieth respectively, indicates that 
secrecy may also now be becoming a systemic problem in 
China and its related jurisdictions. This needs to be put in 
its context: according to some reports, China has the biggest 
problem with international illicit financial flows – many of 
which will relate to tax evasion – in the world.21 Whether 
China is inadvertently promoting an activity that is already 
beyond its own control, or is in fact encouraging these flows, 
is an unresolved question.
The Middle East has shared in this trend of an increasing 
presence in the ranking of the world’s secrecy jurisdictions. 
Bahrain was ranked at thirty-second in the pre-2007 overall 
listing, but has moved from fourteenth to ninth in the FSI 
for the period between 2009 and 2015. Meanwhile, Dubai 
was fiftieth in the 2007 listing, and did not appear in the FSI 
top twenty in 2009, but has since then crept up from eigh-
teenth (2011) to sixteenth (2013), and is now tenth. The force 
of this development may not be quite as marked as those of 
Singapore and Hong Kong, but the trend is as clear.
What is apparent from this data is that a substantial change 
in tax haven activity is taking place, recently confirmed by 
the Panama Papers. As data produced by the International 
Consortium of Investigative Journalists has shown the firm 
at the centre of these disclosures significantly reduced its scale 
of operations after 2009. In 2005 Mossack Fonseca formed 
more than 13,000 offshore companies for its clients, repre-
senting its all-time peak level.22 The numbers hardly changed 
in 2006 and 2007, but then fell in 2009 to about 8,500, before 
falling again from 2013 onwards. With the incorporation of 
just 4,341 new companies in 2015, it had approached one-
third of its peak level.
In fact, Mossack Fonseca’s network of offshore companies 
peaked at 81,810 in 2009, and since then has fallen steadily. 
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In 2015 the number had reduced to 66,153. This remains sig-
nificant, of course, but what it clearly implies is that there has 
been a significant change in behaviour. This is clear from the 
fact that, in 2015, Mossack Fonseca closed 8,864 companies, 
which was more than twice the number it incorporated. The 
demand for its services was in decline even before the Panama 
Papers were disclosed.
The same trend can be seen elsewhere. The number of banks 
operating in Jersey fell from forty-six in 2009 to thirty-two in 
2016.23 Total funds under management in the Isle of Man in 
2015 amounted to $21.4 billion – a figure that had flat-lined 
since 2011, and which was far below their peak of $50 billion 
in 2007.24 The number of companies in Cayman increased 
from 74,905 in 2005 to 93,693 in 2008 – a leap of 25 per 
cent. By 2015, that number had increased to only 98,838, 
which in fact represented a fall from the previous year.25 
In contrast, there were 1,980,000 companies in the UK in 
2005, which increased to 2,423,000 in 2008 (an increase of 22 
per cent), but that number increased to 3,464,000 in 2015.26 
The growth in Cayman from 2008 to 2015 was 5.5 per cent; 
in the UK it was 43 per cent. The difference before and after 
2008 is significant. What is not clear, however, is whether the 
amount of wealth offshore has stalled. Gabiel Zucman, in The 
Hidden Wealth of Nations, suggests that in 1980 around 6 
per cent of world wealth was in tax havens, and that by 2013 
that figure had risen to 10 per cent, and continued to increase 
thereafter. If this is true, it is appropriate to speculate on what 
is happening.
The first thing to note is that Gordon Brown may have been 
right when he said, in 2009, that policies put into effect that 
year represented the beginning of the end of the tax havens, 
even if few believed it at the time. While many of the measures 
announced that year appeared to be almost inconsequential 
in the real fight against tax haven abuse, what does now seem 
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clear is that the apparent threat that they posed represented a 
real turning point in tackling one type of tax haven activity: 
personal tax evasion.
The explanation for this change must be behavioural: 
there was no real change in the risk of using tax havens as 
a consequence of the measures taken in 2009. The number 
of prosecutions on the basis of the very limited number of 
leaks from tax havens since then has been very low: 3,600 
UK residents were identified by the HMRC to be using bank 
accounts that might have sheltered illicit funds in the Swiss 
branch of HSBC, as a result of a leak of data from that bank, 
but only one person was prosecuted.27 Anyone could see that 
tax information exchange agreements were virtually useless; 
and yet, indisputably, the use of tax havens has declined. The 
only obvious reason that can be suggested for this is that some 
people – almost certainly those with the most to lose by being 
caught – realised that, while the 2009 measures against tax 
haven abuse were supine in the face of the real tax haven 
threat, they did represent the beginning of a process that 
would lead inevitably to greater transparency.
If this is the explanation – and it is hard to see any other –, 
then those who saw the writing on the wall were remarkably 
foresighted. What they may have realised was that the public 
mood on tax evasion had changed, and that, as tax haven use 
was seen as the most egregious form of this activity, being 
associated with such places carried a considerably higher risk 
than it had before that crisis erupted. If this was the case, then 
those who began to leave tax haven activity behind after 2008 
were ahead of both the regulators, who did not realise this 
was happening, and large corporations, which seemed much 
slower on the uptake in this matter than individuals.
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chapter 5
The Cost of Tax Havens
According to the Tax Justice Network, the scale of tax abuse 
is difficult to quantify: ‘Measuring the size of the offshore 
economy is an exercise in night vision. It is hard to define it; it 
is fragmented and messy, and it is swathed in secrecy. Official 
international efforts to measure the various aspects of the 
phenomenon have been inadequate.’1
As someone who has been involved in the work of the Tax 
Justice Network, as well as a number of other projects on 
estimating tax abuse more generally, I have to agree. Precisely 
because the whole intention of offshore activity is to provide 
secrecy, those hoping to estimate the costs that offshore impose 
upon the rest the world are left measuring shadows.
This may also explain why no one attempted any such 
exercise until 2000. In that year, the UK branch of Oxfam, 
the international development charity, published what was 
in hindsight a seminal, if largely unnoticed, report. Entitled 
‘Tax Havens: Releasing the Hidden Billions for Poverty 
Eradication’, this report set out to estimate the cost to devel-
oping countries resulting from the abuse of their economies by 
tax haven–located activity. As was noted in the introduction 
to the report,
Secrecy, electronic commerce and the growing mobility of 
capital have left all governments facing problems in revenue 
collection. The borderline between tax evasion and tax avoid-
ance is becoming increasingly blurred. But at a conservative 
estimate, tax havens have contributed to revenue losses for 
developing countries of at least US$50 billion a year. To put 
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this figure in context, it is roughly equivalent to annual aid 
flows to developing countries. We stress that the estimate is 
a conservative one. It is derived from the effects of tax com-
petition and the non-payment of tax on flight capital. It does 
not take into account outright tax evasion, corporate practices 
such as transfer pricing, or the use of havens to under-report 
profit.2
Those involved in preparing the report included John 
Christensen, later to become the founding director of the Tax 
Justice Network, and Sol Picciotto of Lancaster University, 
who is still very active in this field. Having had the oppor-
tunity to work with both of them, I am well aware that they 
thought the scale of the problem much bigger than what was 
reported in 2000 but did not think the world would believe 
that it was as significant as the then available data suggested. 
Caution was applied as a result. By and large, most estimates 
have seemed to apply the same notes of caution since then.
The importance of the Oxfam report was in the links that 
it made between different parts of the problem, and not in 
the numbers as such, which were little reported at the time. 
The connection, for example, made between the sum of tax 
lost as a result of tax haven abuse and the value of develop-
ment funding has been a recurring theme of all discussion ever 
since report was published. Indeed, when John Christensen 
and I were directing the Tax Justice Network in its very early 
days, we made a policy decision that we would expose the 
activities of large companies linked to developing countries 
that were using tax havens. This was perhaps the best decision 
we could have made, simply because it triggered a response in 
the public, press and political imagination, which clearly sug-
gested that the use of tax havens was not a victimless activity.
The next estimate of the cost of tax havens came from 
Raymond Baker, in his 2005 book Capitalism’s Achilles Heel. 
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His work, which is hampered by methodological problems, 
sought to be more all-encompassing than Oxfam’s. After 
taking into account corruption, criminal conduct, transfer 
mispricing and fake transactions, Baker estimated that cross-
border flows of global dirty money might stand anywhere 
between $1.1 trillion and 1.6 trillion annually. He suggested 
that about half of this sum flowed from developing and transi-
tional economies, and two-thirds of that related to commercial 
dirty money. In his estimation, only a very small proportion of 
the total – approximately $50 billion – related to corruption. 
Also in 2005, the Tax Justice Network published its first 
estimate of the cost of offshore, of which I was a co-author. 
Entitled The Price of Offshore, it used data from the Bank of 
International Settlements, wealth managers and commercial 
banks to estimate total wealth, as well as the likely profile 
of wealth portfolios and the proportion that might be off-
shore.3 Based on apparent similarities in the various sources, 
it calculated offshore wealth to be something between $10 
trillion and $12 trillion. Assuming then current rates of return 
on investment and, allowing for the fact that some tax might 
be paid at source on the returns in question, it estimated that 
$255 billion of tax might have been lost a year worldwide as 
a result of wealthy individuals holding assets offshore. The 
report explicitly omitted any reference to the costs of corpo-
rate tax abuse or of tax competition. 
Now considered outdated, and based on data sources that 
have since been improved upon, at the time the report had a 
significant impact. As in the Oxfam report that went before 
it, the intention in presenting estimates was to underestimate 
asset wealth, so that any error was likely to be weighted on 
the side of caution.
Other estimates followed. The OECD, for example, sug-
gested in 2008 that ‘developing countries are estimated to 
lose to tax havens almost three times what they get from 
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developed countries in aid’.4 Given that the OECD estimated 
total aid in 2008 at $125 billion, this suggested they thought 
the loss to be around $375 billion at the time: one of the 
highest estimates ever made.5 It is not at all clear how the 
OECD came up with the stated ratio of tax loss to develop-
ment aid.
There are other estimates from the same period, including 
Christian Aid’s 2008 report ‘Death and Taxes: the Toll of Tax 
Dodging’ and its follow-up 2009 report ‘False Profits: Robbing 
the Poor to Keep the Rich Tax-free’.6 The first suggested that 
corporate tax losses to the developing world might be as much 
as $160 billion a year, which was somewhat more than the 
combined aid budgets of the whole rich world. The second 
suggested that, between 2005 and 2007, the total capital flow 
from bilateral trade mispricing into the EU and the United 
States from non-EU countries was more than $1.1 trillion.
Both reports attracted criticism for their use of the work 
of US-based professor of financial management Simon Pak, 
which was based upon price variations in world trade data. 
There is now doubt as to whether the data Pak used was suf-
ficiently robust to support the conclusions drawn from it. The 
estimate on corporate taxation losses was also suggested to 
be outside the plausible range, partly because it was based 
on estimates of trade mispricing that were questioned mainly 
by researchers at the Oxford Centre for Business Taxation, 
working on behalf of the UK’s Department for International 
Development.7 But my own peer-reviewed work, paid for 
by the World Bank, did suggest that the estimated sum was 
within the plausible range based upon auditing techniques.8 It 
was certainly also consistent with the OECD’s prevailing view 
of the period.
The intervention into this issue from the academic team at 
Oxford sparked furious debate, not least because it was asked 
why the UK’s Department for International Development was 
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willing to fund critics of the idea that tax havens caused harm, 
but not those trying to assess the scale of the problem. In addi-
tion, their suggestions were controversial at the time. The first 
of these was that the methodologies used needed improve-
ment; but they failed to recognise that all of them were what 
could fairly be called experimental, in an area where no work 
had been undertaken before. They also criticised data sources, 
which in retrospect has been shown to be fair comment. But, 
perhaps most importantly, they did not suggest significant 
alternative methodologies or indicate how further research 
might be undertaken, and it remains the case that, on this 
most important of policy issues, academic engagement has, to 
date, been far too limited. 
One direction of travel in response to this controversy has 
been to put the scale of offshore tax losses in their context. 
For example, in 2011 I estimated the total cost of tax evasion 
in the world as a whole at $3.1 trillion, or about 5 per cent of 
world GDP at the time.9 My work was based on peer-reviewed 
data published by the World Bank on the size of the world’s 
shadow economies. It did not for a moment suggest that all 
the money estimated to be lost could be recovered. What it 
showed was that offshore was only one, and by no means the 
largest, potential cause of tax loss in the world.
Another recent focus has been on more robust processes of 
estimation. In 2012 the Tax Justice Network published ‘The 
Price of Offshore Revisited’.10 The research for it was under-
taken by James Henry, a former chief economist of McKinsey 
& Co. This work has been an ongoing development based 
on wealth data from banks, wealth managers and consulting 
firms, as well as the IMF, World Bank, United Nations and 
Bank for International Settlements. The aim was not to rely on 
one method of estimating offshore wealth or the sums lost as a 
consequence, but instead to prepare a range of estimates, and 
publish them as such. In the process, this work laid aside the 
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previous estimates of trade mispricing as the basis for estimat-
ing the loss to developing countries, because of the criticism to 
which they had been subjected. The resulting estimates were 
based on four approaches:
 
• a model of country-by-country unrecorded capital flows 
based on official data and the mismatches in them (which 
are commonplace, and often large);
• a cumulative offshore wealth model that tracked the 
growth of funds over time; 
• an offshore investor portfolio model, based on cross-
border asset data; and
• direct estimates of offshore assets under management for 
the world’s top fifty global private banks.
It should be stressed that, in every case, the data used is incom-
plete, and more than one explanation of its effects is possible. 
Not all the data is consistent, either: wealth managers do not 
always agree with each other, for example. But certain trends 
are apparent:
 
• unrecorded capital flows suggest that funds accumulate 
offshore;
• this trend is supported by the trends in accumulated off-
shore wealth over time;
• asset portfolio models suggest that there must be off-
shore wealth that is unrecorded, but is nonetheless real;
• the sums held under the management of the world’s top 
fifty global private banks have grown considerably. 
On this last point, the report noted (page 32),
In December 2010 by our estimate the world’s top 50 global 
private banks alone had $12.06 trillion of private cross-border 
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financial wealth under management. This compared with 2005 
when our estimate is that the top 50 managed US$5.4 trillion, 
an average annual growth rate for the industry of nearly 16% 
despite the world economyy’s ups and downs. Nor are these 
all the client assets that these institutions handle. There are 
also bank deposits, which are usually included under managed 
assets, as well as assets under custody and administration, 
including brokerage assets. Depending on the year, these addi-
tional assets typically add at least 25% to the total. Allowing 
for this as well as for underreporting and other data problems 
these figures are consistent with our overall $21 trillion–$32 
trillion estimate for global offshore financial assets as of 2010.11
The last two figures represent the range of offshore wealth 
that the Tax Justice Network estimated to exist in 2010. 
The range was deliberately wide: the data could not support 
greater accuracy. The lower estimate is usually used. The 
report estimated annual loss of revenue at between $190 
billion and $280 billion, roughly twice the amount of OECD 
country-development assistance provided to developing coun-
tries around the world. This estimate excluded all losses to 
inheritance, capital gains and other taxes.
Tellingly, the report estimated that at least one-third of all 
private financial wealth in the world, and nearly half of all 
the offshore wealth, was owned by the world’s richest 91,000 
people in 2010, who between them represented just 0.001 per 
cent of the world’s population that year. The next 51 per cent 
of all wealth was owned by the next 8.4 million people, who 
represented just 0.14 per cent of the world population.
This estimate by the Tax Justice Network was not the only 
new data presented on this subject in recent years. Oxfam pre-
pared another estimate in 2013, suggesting that $18.5 trillion 
of assets were located in tax havens12with a potential cost in 
terms of lost tax revenues of $156 billion a year. The relative 
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similarity to the Tax Justice Network estimate is appar-
ent, although the method of calculation was vastly simpler. 
Oxfam estimated that 19.5 per cent of total global deposits 
were held in tax havens by people not resident in those places 
and extrapolated on this basis. The methodology has its weak-
nesses, although based on credible data: its significance is that 
it is another estimate that fits a trend of the reported losses 
being of similar orders of magnitude. 
The two most striking alternative estimates are those of 
Gabriel Zucman and the IMF. Zucman, a French economist, 
first published his estimates of the cost of tax havens in 2013, 
and repeated them in the English edition of his book, The 
Hidden Wealth of Nations, in 2015.13 There are problems with 
Zucman’s work, however. Strikingly, at no point does he say 
what jurisdictions he considers tax havens, and he often over-
states the importance of Switzerland. But, most importantly, 
his data only considers bank deposits and readily marketed 
financial securities as offshore wealth, and this approach is 
bound to underestimate the scale of offshore tax abuse. 
Zucman admits to ignoring real estate, the control of 
private companies, and titles to art and intellectual property, 
as well as other tangible assets, all of which are widely owned 
offshore. In addition, his estimates ignore the fact that much 
of the capital offshore may itself have come from tax-evaded 
sources. Moreover, he makes an estimate of the loss to off-
shore caused by the tax-avoiding activities of US companies 
and then fails to use it in his overall total. All this means that 
his estimates of offshore funds and the tax lost to them cannot 
help but be too low. 
Despite these criticisms, Zucman still comes up with esti-
mates of offshore wealth that, while conservative, are at 
the same time substantial. He offers the estimates given in 
Table 5.1.14
Zucman’s estimate of the assets held in tax havens is much 
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lower than those of the Tax Justice Network and Oxfam, 
despite which his estimate of lost tax revenues exceeds that 
Oxfam’s (although this is because he includes lost taxes on 
inheritance and wealth that Oxfam exclude), and is at the 
lower end of the range suggested by the Tax Justice Network. 
It is also notable that Zucman’s estimate of the cost to the 
UK of tax haven activity suggested that $284 billion (£172 
billion) was held offshore in 2014, with a tax cost of £4.8 
billion.15 My own estimate of the UK tax gap for 2014, pub-
lished by the UK trade union PCS, suggested that the total 
cost to the UK of offshore tax activity may not have exceeded 
£4.3 billion in 2012, a figure that may have grown by 2014 
because of rising markets and inflation, but is very close to 
what Zucman suggests.16
What is clear is that there is not yet any consensus on the 
scale of assets held offshore. Nor might there ever be, since 
what territories and assets should and should not be included 
is always open to dispute. Nevertheless, there is a growing 
consensus that the cost of offshore tax abuse might be at least 
Table 5.1: Offshore Wealth and Tax Evasion: Regional Estimates 
2014
 
 
Offshore 
wealth US$bn
Share of 
financial 
wealth held 
offshore %
 
 
Tax revenue 
loss US$bn
Europe 2,600 10  78
United States 1,200  4  35
Asia 1,300  4  34
Latin America 700 22  21
Africa 500 30  14
Canada 300  9   6
Russia 200 52   1
Gulf countries 800 57   0
Total 7,600  8 190
Source: gabriel-zucman.eu/files/Zucman2015MissingWealth.xlsx.
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$200 billion a year, or thereabouts – although with a much 
smaller part of this sum directly attributable to developing 
countries than some past estimates have suggested, partly 
because asset-based estimates (as more recent calculations all 
are) exclude from consideration the cost of transfer mispricing 
and relocated corporate tax abuses.
These exclusions make the estimated cost of base erosion 
and profits shifting (BEPS – the technical name given to most 
international corporate tax avoidance) a matter of some sig-
nificance. There has still been remarkably little effort made to 
research this issue. One estimate of this comes from a 2015 IMF 
working paper on the impact of BEPS on developing countries, 
by Ernesto Crivelli, Ruud De Mooij and Michael Keen.17 This 
paper looked at the ‘spillover effects’ of BEPS, which it defined 
in two ways, termed base and strategic spillover. 
Base spillover is the impact of one country’s tax policy on 
the tax bases of other countries, whether through changes in 
the real location of activities such as investment, or simply 
through changes in where profits are recorded (as occurs in 
tax havens). In contrast, strategic rate spillovers relate to the 
impact on a country’s policy choices of tax changes abroad – 
or, in other words, the impact of tax competition. 
The paper has been revised significantly since it was first 
published, but, as Alex Cobham of the Tax Justice Network 
has suggested, the likely impact for developing countries that 
the paper still implies is a loss of at least $200 billion a year 
(although the earlier version implied $600 billion a year).18 
The OECD has also offered estimates: it has suggested that 
in 2014 the losses to BEPS might have been between $100 
billion and $240 billion. This figure is in addition to the 
costs resulting from assets located in tax havens noted previ-
ously, from the likes of Gabriel Zucman and the Tax Justice 
Network. 
We can safely conclude that it is likely that, on top of a 
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loss of at least $200 billion because of assets being located in 
tax havens, it is likely that at least $200 billion – and maybe 
more – of corporate tax revenues are lost because of tax com-
petition and its implications. Thus, the problem is significant, 
lying within or above the range that the NGO researchers 
who first raised the subject suggested.
The Implications of Tax Lost to Tax Havens
It is important to place these losses in an appropriate context. 
For developed countries, losses (to the UK, for example) of 
up to £5 billion from hidden wealth, plus a similar potential 
sum resulting from the transfer of the profits of corporations 
to tax havens (which together represent maybe 1.5 per cent of 
the total tax take), are significant, but affordable. For such a 
country, it could be said that these revenues might either be 
made good from other taxes or, as I have argued,19 by running 
bigger deficits and printing more debt to pay for it. There are 
several reasons, however, why this argument is not universally 
applicable.
The first is that, though a country like the UK might enjoy 
this option, not all do. As the IMF paper noted above sug-
gested, the impact on many developing countries may, as a 
proportion of their total tax collected, be much higher than 
in developed countries, because developing countries gener-
ally rely much more heavily than developed countries on the 
corporate tax revenues that can be shifted into tax havens. 
Whereas it is unusual for corporate tax revenues to exceed 
10 per cent in a developed country (they are less than 7 per 
cent in the UK), it is commonplace for them to form up to 20 
per cent of the revenues of developing countries, and so they 
are much more vulnerable to these losses. This is one reason 
why the whole BEPS initiative was supposed to be for their 
benefit, even if doubts remain as to whether the promise has 
been fulfilled.20 
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What is more, while it is true that most developed countries 
can issue debt with ease, or have other taxes they can raise 
to compensate for any losses to tax havens – and as a result 
suffer little absolute loss in terms of direct economic outcomes 
– this is not true for developing countries. They do not have 
any of these options: their bonds are expensive even if there 
is a market for them, while alternative tax bases are often not 
available. This is precisely why NGOs and campaign groups 
have always highlighted the cost of tax havens to develop-
ing countries. For them, the cost is real and in all likelihood 
remains currently at a level similar to the funds they secure in 
development aid. The cost of tax haven abuse for such coun-
tries and their populations is thus indisputable, and in human 
terms far too large for the world to tolerate.
That argument, however, only considers the pure economic 
cost of this issue. The real costs are very much larger, as it 
includes the continuing aid dependency of developing coun-
tries. This dependency removes their autonomy, leaving them 
exposed to the political will of other countries. At the same 
time, it denies their elected representatives some of the real 
choices that would be available if such aid funding could be 
eliminated and be replaced by taxes. The cost of tax havens 
to these places is thus seen in the degradation of both their 
democratic processes and their identity as nation-states. 
In a fragile world, therefore, the well-being of far too many 
countries is prejudiced in this way, and the knock-on effects 
are palpable: dependent states cannot take the risk to develop 
the potential of their populations. Large parts of the world’s 
population are being denied opportunity as a consequence, 
and all because of the activities of a relatively small number 
of accountants, lawyers, bankers and wealth managers in tax 
haven states. 
The real cost of that activity is seen in the unnecessary 
deaths of children in infancy; in the denial of a proper 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   116 18/10/2016   16:09:37
The Cost of Tax Havens
117
education to children, and especially girls; and in the inability 
of countries without the necessary infrastructure to develop 
their economies as they should. The cost to the long-term 
wealth of these nations is incalculable.
But it should not be imagined that these costs arise only in 
developing countries. The IMF may have identified spillover 
costs in terms of tax revenues lost, but the spillover effects are 
in fact very much broader than that. There is, for example, a 
massive cost related to loss of trust. 
Around the world it is now widely understood that many 
people feel alienated from what are described as economic 
and social elites. What may have begun as a discussion among 
activists of a world divided between the 1 per cent and the 
99 per cent has now generated a common perception: there 
is a new understanding that the world is split not into classes, 
but rather between a tiny minority that enjoys most of the 
benefits of globalisation, and everyone else. This perception 
has largely been fuelled by a very clear-eyed, and accurate 
understanding that those elites have been using tax havens to 
hide their wealth, while the companies that they control have 
been using them to avoid tax. If there is a political movement 
towards the extremes as a consequence – as represented, for 
example, by the rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders in 
the United States, the UK vote to leave the European Union, 
and the growth of far-right parties in a number of European 
countries – then the role of tax havens in disguising the activi-
ties of elites has had a significant role to play. The fact that 
many of the politicians who have exploited these situations 
have explicitly embraced anti–tax haven positions provides 
some indication of the power of this narrative.
The most telling cost of taxing abuse, however, is one that 
is little mentioned. This is the cost of secrecy itself, which is 
fundamentally what tax havens are all about. Such secrecy is 
used for the purposes of deception. Some of that deception 
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may be legitimate, but some uses of secrecy may hide illegality. 
In practice, though, the difference is largely immaterial: what 
matters is that, when businesses use this power to deceive, 
they are abusing markets. It does not matter whether the busi-
ness in question is one of the largest in the world or, in effect, 
a one-person enterprise that is trying to hide its activities from 
competitors, tax authorities, a spouse or others. In every case, 
the impact is remarkably similar.
Firstly, if markets are to be efficient in the way that econo-
mists have described – and as those who suggest they provide 
optimal solutions profess to believe they operate – then there 
must be the highest-quality information available to all market 
participants so that they can act rationally, allocating resources 
to the person who is best able to use them to maximise return, 
and who exposes the provider of capital to the lowest risk in 
that process. Very obviously, tax havens undermine these prin-
ciples. They are in fact designed to deny market participants 
the information they need to act rationally, allocate resources 
efficiently, and minimise risk. 
The consequence is obvious: if risk is increased, then the 
required rate of return within marketplaces also increases. 
This means that the number of projects that can be invested in 
is reduced, so that the amount of capital committed is dimin-
ished. As a consequence, productivity declines, and along with 
it growth, output, wages and profits. This is the only logical 
consequence any economists can draw from tax haven activ-
ity: this uncomfortable fact may also explain why so many 
economists simply refuse to examine the subject. But it can 
safely be said that, as a result, tax havens harm growth; those 
among the 99 per cent of the population who think they have 
lost out as a result of tax haven activity are absolutely right: 
they have.
That impact, however, is both direct and indirect. The 
market imperfections resulting directly from tax havens have 
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a real economic cost, but so do the indirect ones. Because 
tax havens diminish trust in business, and trust has always 
been the basis on which commercial contracts really work, 
the knock-on effects are almost impossible to calculate, but 
very real. The whole basis on which the mixed economies that 
operate in almost every state in the world are meant to work 
is threatened by the loss of confidence created by the opacity 
that spills over from tax haven activity. 
The perverse fact is that those market ideologues who have 
promoted tax haven use as a mechanism to challenge the state 
have instead created one of the biggest threats to the market 
itself. This was the inevitable consequence promoting the 
use of secrecy in the marketplace: they should have known 
that this would undermine the very essence of capitalism, but 
appeared not to do so. Unless the use of tax haven secrecy 
can be curtailed now, the reality is that all markets are at risk. 
Thus, beating tax havens is not just about the collection of 
tax; it is about saving capitalism from itself.
But that will require strong government, and it is not just 
in developing countries that tax havens threaten the existence 
of the kind of government that we need. In July 2016 the 
Financial Times ran an editorial saying that ‘business leaders 
have greater responsibilities than obeying the law’.21 They 
were right to do so – and it should be noted that the comment 
was made in the context of the use of tax havens. 
Again, that was appropriate, we should understand why. 
The article in question did not say that businesses must 
comply with the spirit as well as the letter of the law, but that 
was its implication. From this it follows that businesses must 
be tax compliant – which, as I have argued, means that a tax-
payer seeks to pay the right amount of tax (but no more), in 
the right place and at the right time, where ‘right’ means that 
the economic substance of the transactions undertaken coin-
cides with the place and form in which they are reported for 
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taxation purposes. Tax compliance and the use of tax haven 
secrecy are mutually incompatible. 
When people see large companies and wealthy people using 
tax havens to avoid the tax obligations imposed upon them 
by the governments of the places where they really earn their 
income, they are more willing to believe that an example has 
been set that they might follow. The consequence of this is that 
they too might try to avoid their obligations to pay tax. They 
may not necessarily do so using tax havens: they may not be 
able to afford the fees that tax haven accountants, lawyers, 
bankers and wealth managers charge. But this will not deter 
them. In many cases, they will evade rather than avoid tax, 
believing that this is in any case what happens in tax havens, 
because of the secrecy that they provide. 
The consequences are real: in the UK, for example, the gov-
ernment admits that it loses at least 7 per cent of tax revenues 
to tax avoidance and tax evasion, at an annual cost of at least 
£34 billion.22 I have argued that the real losses may be sub-
stantially higher, and may amount to £120 billion a year.23 
The reason for this difference does not matter at this point 
in the argument; the reality is that there is a significant loss, 
in which the abuse of tax havens plays a real part – while it 
plays an even bigger part in influencing those who think it is 
acceptable to emulate the behaviour of legitimate tax haven 
users to try to avoid and evade their tax obligations, however 
that goal is achieved.
Tax havens undermine developing countries, free markets, 
economic growth, government revenues and the general sta-
bility of the societies in which we live by eroding the trust on 
which we are all mutually dependent. And this is not acci-
dental, but by design. The secrecy they supply is deliberately 
intended to deny information to those who have a good reason 
to know it. Deceit is at the core of their activities, and, because 
of their influence, is now undermining our societies. That cost 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   120 18/10/2016   16:09:37
The Cost of Tax Havens
121
cannot be quantified, but justifies the action still required to 
close down tax haven activity – even if, at least in developed 
countries, the measurable impact in terms of revenue lost to 
tax havens is smaller than most people believe.
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chapter 6
Tackling Tax Havens
As I noted in Chapter 1, before 1997 there was no real 
demand for change in tax havens. In that year the OECD and 
EU both demanded such change, beginning a process that has 
continued, subject since then to significant oscillations in both 
political whim and economic circumstances. 
The OECD initiative was in many ways the more important 
of the two.1 It identified tax havens as places characterised by 
the following:
 
a) No or only nominal taxes. 
b) Lack of effective exchange of information [because] 
businesses and individuals can benefit from strict secrecy 
rules and other protections against scrutiny by tax authori-
ties.
c) A lack of transparency in the operation of … legislative, 
legal or administrative provisions
d) No substantial activities [in the tax haven that] would 
suggest that a jurisdiction may be attempting to attract 
investment or transactions that are purely tax driven.
The difficulty was not so much with these definitions, but with 
the title of the report, which said that it was intended to address 
‘harmful tax competition’. This created two difficulties. The 
first was that it suggested that there might be the possibil-
ity of benign tax competition, although no one seemed able 
to suggest what that might look like in practice. This meant 
that the whole approach was fraught with uncertainty over its 
intent from the outset. Second, in 2001 President George W. 
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Bush’s administration decided that it did not accept that any 
such thing as harmful tax competition existed, and as a result 
withdrew support from the OECD process except with regard 
to its anti–money laundering measures, which were boosted 
in the wake of 9/11. 
The international move against tax havens looked as if it 
had been brought to an end by this decision, although the 
money laundering reforms that were pursued turned out to be 
significant. They resulted in supposedly standard procedures 
worldwide requiring that providers of financial services prop-
erly identify the beneficial owners of the accounts that they 
maintained – and, just as importantly, the supposed sources 
of funds held within them. These procedures are now the 
basis for many of the measures that have been proposed to 
tackle tax haven secrecy. But this was not their intention when 
they were introduced: the rule of unintended consequences 
definitely applies in the realm of anti–tax haven initiatives. 
Thankfully, Bush administration’s decision did not bring all 
reform to an end. In 1997 the EU had also indicated that it felt 
harmful tax practices needed to be addressed, when it issued 
its EU Code of Conduct on Business Taxation (see Chapter 1).2 
Importantly, it followed this up in 2005 by acting in isolation to 
create the first, albeit limited, automatic information-exchange 
system from tax havens. In retrospect, this arrangement seems 
deeply unambitious, since it only exchanged information on 
interest (not any other source of investment income) earned by 
individuals (not companies or trusts) from the places where it 
was earned to the countries where they really lived. But since 
it provided opt-outs that many tax havens, like Luxembourg, 
Austria and the UK’s Crown Dependencies, took advantage of 
for some time, which meant that information did not need to 
be exchanged so long as nominal tax was paid on the interest 
earned at the time it was credited to a bank account, the whole 
arrangement was incredibly easy for anyone serious about 
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hiding their identity to avoid. It was assisted by the fact that 
simply by putting a bank account into the name of a company 
the information sharing arrangements no longer applied. The 
suggestion that a barn door had been left open for avoiders to 
use was hard to resist. Nevertheless, the important fact was 
that it proved information exchange was desirable, achievable, 
and potentially effective in fighting tax abuse, and this meant 
that it had a long-term significance way beyond its immediate 
effectiveness.
The 2008 global financial crisis created a renewed demand 
for further tax haven reform. Gordon Brown and other world 
leaders sought to hand the blame for a US-made crisis on to 
tax havens, and demanded action against their chosen culprit, 
whose culpability was now conveniently endorsed by the new 
Obama regime in the United States. The following year, the 
OECD responded. What it delivered fitted with the precedent 
established by this date: it was weak, it was avoidable, and it 
had little discernible impact. 
That was because it focused in the first instance on the cre-
ation of a list of supposedly non-compliant nations. These 
were those that had not signed twelve OECD approved tax 
information exchange agreements. Within days of the scheme 
being announced, most of the world’s tax havens had been 
taken off the supposed blacklist, partly as a result of the ease 
with which they could sign such agreements with each other. 
It was very hard to take this process seriously as a result. 
Nor was the second OECD process adopted at the time 
much better. It revived a forum that reviewed the progress of 
states in putting in place the necessary arrangements for tax 
information exchange to take place, including those required 
by the new tax information exchange agreements noted 
above. This initiative was also flawed. Firstly, this was because 
it focused on process rather than outcome – whether the 
paperwork gave rise to meaningful information exchange was 
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not the prime issue of concern for some time; rather, simply 
having the right mechanisms was. Secondly, the involvement 
of many tax havens in the process (Jersey had a prominent 
role) meant that many smelled a rat. In effect, what the scheme 
permitted was the claim that tax havens had made for several 
years – namely, that they were very well regulated, when in 
truth almost nothing was happening to effectively tackle tax 
abuse. Mechanisms such as this one from the OECD, whether 
wittingly or otherwise, provided tax havens with far too many 
opportunities to claim that they had complied with all that 
was being asked of them when almost nothing was really 
happening to tackle the underlying core issue of preventing 
tax abuse.
It was the United States that first signalled its disquiet with 
such an approach. Driven by the obvious assistance that Swiss 
banks had provided to many US citizens who wanted to evade 
tax, it had introduced its Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance 
Act (FATCA) in 2010. However, this was yet another flawed 
proposal (see Chapter 1). While FATCA imposes considerable 
penalties on banks operating in other jurisdictions around the 
world that fail to supply data to the US tax authorities on the 
income of US citizens arising in those places, the arrangement 
is entirely non-reciprocal. The US gives these countries no 
data in exchange for what it receives – despite the fact that US 
companies incorporated in states like Delaware but trading 
outside the United States can offer considerable attractions 
for those seeking corporate secrecy and relief from all tax 
(whether legally or illegally) on their operations. 
The result was that, by 2012, it was apparent that the 
OECD initiatives launched in 2009 had failed, and another 
process of reform was needed. As had been the case in 2009, 
the OECD pursued this objective in two parts. Its Base Erosion 
and Profits Shifting project was targeted at multinational cor-
porations. The project title referred to corporations’ ability 
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to shift their profits from high-tax locations into tax havens, 
thereby undermining the tax base the former locations. This 
project sought to address this issue in no less than fifteen sub-
parts, all negotiated during the period between 2013 to 2015.
The second initiative was focused on creating an effec-
tive automatic exchange of tax data between nations states, 
including those that are tax havens. More than one hundred 
countries have now signed what is called the Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters, and the 
half-hearted EU information exchange scheme of 2005 should 
now be replaced by something much more effective. But this 
is conditional upon the tax havens, in particular, having avail-
able the data they are supposed to exchange when the scheme 
comes into effect by 2018. Whether this will prove to be the 
case, no-one really knows.
The trouble with these schemes is that, like all previous 
reforms, they have failure built into them from the start. For 
example, included in this new raft of initiatives is a proposal 
that the largest multinational corporations should supply 
country-by-country reporting data (see below, pp. ***–***); 
but what is specifically required is that the data in question be 
kept absolutely secret. Likewise, retrieval of much of the data 
to be subject to automatic information exchange is depen-
dent upon jurisdictions knowing the beneficial ownership 
of companies located in their territory and having access to 
their accounts; but without this data being placed on public 
record, no one will know whether this data either exists or 
can be exchanged. The result is a set of hollow promises. 
Transparency will be achieved, we are told – but in secret. This 
paradox appears to be lost on those proposing such arrange-
ments. As a result, demand for further change has already 
been expressed.
What is clear as a result is that anti–tax haven initiatives now 
appear to follow a pattern of obfuscation in the first instance, 
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followed by a frenetic period of activity by international agen-
cies that results in them issuing a series of recommendations 
for action by individual counties (including tax havens), after 
which foot-dragging and half-measures from the countries 
tasked with adopting the proposals hampers any real prog-
ress. This process usually begins with a growing awareness of 
risk, which now very often comes to light as a result of politi-
cal activism, which in turn generates less-than-wholehearted 
political will in favour of change. Demands for such change 
are then passed to an international agency (the OECD, the EU, 
or whatever) that is instructed to produce proposals, most of 
which when finally presented are so compromised by the nego-
tiation involved that they very rarely meet the expectations of 
those who originally demanded action. These proposals are 
then half-heartedly implemented – before the demand resur-
faces for political reforms to tackle the problem that remains 
unaddressed, and a new wave of reform is initiated.
At the end of 2016, this reform process is at an implemen-
tation stage: the OECD’s latest proposals have been passed 
to countries to be adopted. However, once it becomes clear 
many of the 2015 initiatives will not work as expected, or 
there is another financial crisis (and both are possible, maybe 
simultaneously), the demand will almost inevitably arise for 
further reforms. In response, the OECD will declare the last 
(2015) round of recommendations a success, but say that they 
is now in need of amplification, and the process of change will 
begin again. 
That is precisely why it makes sense to start considering 
now what the next round of changes must be. I predict that 
these debates on reform will come in three broad forms. The 
first will include proposals for more regulatory change; the 
second group will impact on those I call the secrecy provid-
ers – the accountants, lawyers, bankers and wealth mangers 
who populate tax havens; and, lastly, there will be a focus on 
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procedural changes required in the future if the outcomes of 
these processes are to be monitored effectively, since they are 
currently assessed inadequately.
The tax justice movement has always sought to offer solutions 
to the problems it has highlighted. This has been the basis for 
its success. The country-by-country reporting changes already 
implemented, and the demands for automatic information 
exchange from tax havens and for data to be made available 
publicly from both companies and trusts, all originated within 
the tax justice movement. What are required now are devel-
opments on these issues and on new fronts that will ensure 
that, when politicians are next looking for an answer to the 
tax haven problem (as they surely will be), there are ready 
solutions for them to apply. What follows are the particular 
solutions I would propose. 
Public Country-by-Country Reporting
The data to be supplied by the world’s major companies to their 
head office tax authorities under OECD guidance on country-
by-country reporting is somewhat less than I proposed when 
I first suggested this system of accounting in 2003.3 They will 
need to supply just seven pieces of data for each jurisdiction 
in which they trade. The first set of data relates to their sales: 
information from the sales made from each jurisdiction in 
which they trade will have to be supplied, split into two parts. 
The first will consist of the sales made to genuine customers, 
and the second will include sales made to other companies 
in the multinational group of companies of which they are a 
member. Adding these two together, of course, yields the total 
sales for the country in question.
The next category of data is on profits earned before tax, 
and tax paid in each country. The tax figure is to be supplied 
in two ways. One figure to be disclosed is the tax the company 
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estimates to be due on its declared profit; the other is the tax 
actually paid in the year, which will in many cases be based on 
the profit of the previous year. This provides an easy way of 
checking whether or not the previous year’s tax estimate was 
broadly correct.
After this tax data is supplied, two further pieces of infor-
mation are required, both of which give some indication of 
the scale of the company’s operations in a jurisdiction. The 
first is the number of people employed during the period, and 
the second is the total value of the investment the company 
has made in the jurisdiction split between share capital and 
retained profits. 
This is the bare minimum of data required for the process 
to be described as country-by-country reporting. It would, 
for example, be helpful to include data on intra-group pur-
chases as well as sales, payroll costs as well as the number of 
employees (which would then have allowed average pay by 
country to be calculated), and data on finance income and 
costs. These last two would help with the monitoring of inter-
est receipts and payments, which are commonly used to shift 
profits for tax-avoidance purposes; but the reality is that the 
OECD has decided that this data is not required, whether 
appropriately or not. What is clear is that, because of the 2015 
OECD recommendations on base erosion and profits shifting, 
the vast majority of the major multinational corporations in 
the world will now have to prepare this data for their tax 
authorities to use. 
Country-by-country reporting data is entirely new informa-
tion: companies have not until now been required to provide 
an overview of precisely what they do in any one territory 
either to their tax authorities or in their published accounts. 
Country-by-country reporting data provides that missing 
information. I should stress, however, that this is not informa-
tion on the basis of which the corporation, or its component 
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entities, will then be taxed. Country-by-country reporting 
does not itself change tax rules. It is explicitly intended by 
the OECD that, at present, all multinational corporations 
should still be taxed on an individual subsidiary-by-subsid-
iary basis. What this data instead does is give the clearest 
possible indication of where a multinational corporation 
might really make its income, declare its profits, and pay its 
taxes. The usefulness of the data is in revealing whether the 
reported profits really align with the likely sums earned in 
each location, and thus whether tax shifting is likely to have 
taken place. 
Country-by-country reporting achieves this by providing 
data that is intended to reflect where the substance of the trade 
of a company really takes place. It is not possible to make 
profit without making sales to real customers, and you must 
always engage the services of real people and actual capital 
assets to ensure that those customers’ needs are met. Country-
by-country reporting data is meant to deliver just enough data 
to indicate where those sales take place, and where people are 
employed and assets held. This data can then reveal whether 
profit-shifting to abuse tax systems is likely to have taken 
place, which requires some fairly elementary maths. A tax 
authority that wants to work out whether it is receiving its 
fair share of the total profit that a multinational company has 
made, as compared to the sums declared in its jurisdiction, 
need only apply a formula to the total profit of the multina-
tional corporation. This formula might reasonably be made 
up of three parts. The first would be the proportion between 
third-party sales within a country and total sales. The second 
would be the ratio of in-country employees to total employ-
ees. And the last would be the ratio of local assets employed 
to total assets employed. 
In Table 6.1, the data with a grey background is the 
country-by-country reporting data supplied by the company – 
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excluding that on tax paid, which is only really useful when 
comparing one year with another.
The group is made up of three companies (A, B and C) in 
three countries (X, Y and Z). Countries X and Y have reason-
able tax rates. Country Z is clearly a tax haven. Company C 
in the tax haven only makes sales to the other two companies: 
it would be nice to know which, but we are not given that 
data. What we do know is that its sales will be matched by 
purchases in companies A and B. As a result, its sales are can-
celled out by the matching purchases in the group company 
accounts, and those group accounts consequently only report 
sales of £900 million. This is a level of sales high enough to 
require the group to supply country-by-country reporting data 
to its parent company’s tax authority, who must then share it 
with the other countries involved. Thus, if the parent company 
was A in country X, it would have to share it with countries Y 
and Z (although Z may not be interested, as it does not charge 
corporation tax).
As is clear from the data, both employment and investment 
in assets are also heavily biased towards companies A and B, 
but the rather small number of employees in company C in 
the tax haven seem to be extraordinarily profitable. This may 
seem artificial or fabricated, but data as absurd as this has 
been found in IT companies, with Ireland playing the role of 
country Z.
The three percentages – of third-party sales to total third 
party sales, employees to total employees, and local assets to 
total assets – are then calculated and averaged. This is where 
things get interesting: this average percentage is then multi-
plied by total reported group profits to suggest an expected 
profit figure for the country in question, based on the reported 
likely level of real economic activity undertaken there. This 
expected profit for the jurisdiction is then compared to what 
has been declared there. In this example, this suggests that 
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Table 6.1: [Title TK]
 
 
Country
Company 
A 
X
Company 
B 
Y
Company 
C 
Z
Group
Country tax rate 30% 
£’m
20% 
£’m
0% 
£’m
 
£’m
Third party sales 500.0 400.0 0.0 900.0
Intra-group sales 0.0 0.0 100.0 1000.0
Total sales 500.0 400.0 100.0 1000.0
Number of 
employees (actual)
8000 9000 50 17050
Profit before tax 10.0 20.0 80.0 110.0
Tax due 3.0 4.0 0.0 7.0
Total assets 
invested
200.0 250.0 5.0 455.0
Percentage of third 
party sales
55.6% 44.4% 0.0% 100.0%
Percentage of 
people employed
46.9% 52.8% 0.3% 100.0%
Percentage of assets 
invested
44.0% 54.9% 1.1% 100.0%
Average of the 
above three 
percentages
48.8% 50.7% 0.5% 100.0%
Expected profit that 
should arise in the 
country
53.7 55.8 0.5 110.0
Difference between 
expected profit 
and profit actually 
reported:
43.7 35.8 -79.5 0.0
Expected tax 
consequence
13.1 7.2 0.0 20.3
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profits of £34.7 million have been shifted out of country X 
and £35.8 million out of country Y, all of which turned up in 
country Z. If this data is a true indication of the profit shifted 
then, country X has lost £13.1 million in tax and country Y 
£7.2 million. Country Z has, of course, gained nothing except 
the tax paid by the fifty employees who would otherwise 
probably not be located there. The important point is that 
both countries X and Y now have some pretty strong evidence 
to confront the multinational corporation with that suggests 
that it has been avoiding tax. This evidence can be prepared 
quickly and persuasively from this data. That is the whole 
point of country-by-country reporting.
It is important to note that this works in practice. In 2013 
the European Union required that a more restricted version 
of this data by published by banks based in Europe. A little 
over an hour after Barclays published its first ever report on 
this basis, I had completed an analysis of the information it 
had supplied that revealed some startling facts.4 For example, 
Barclays’s 54,595 employees in the UK managed between 
them, according to Barclays data, to generate a loss of £1,339 
million – or about £24,500 each. On the other hand, the 
mysteriously productive fourteen employees Barclays had in 
Luxembourg generated a profit of £1,380 million: a stagger-
ing £98.6 million of profit per head. And Luxembourg was 
not the only tax haven in which Barclays’ employees appeared 
so much more productive than in the UK: in Jersey, they 
generated profits of £2.8 million each. 
It does not take much effort to realise that this kind of 
data suggests that companies have questions to answer about 
their tax affairs. Barclays did not provide those answers in 
2014, but in subsequent years the country disparities in per-
formance displayed in their data have declined; something 
has clearly been learned as a result of providing such glar-
ingly strange data, which implied that Barclays made profits 
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in tax havens but major losses in its biggest commercial centre 
of trading. In its most recent report of this type, Barclays 
has included narrative reports to try to explain some of the 
anomalies; but still, in 2015, each employee in the UK made 
a profit for the company of just over £26,500, while those 
in Luxembourg made £9.6 million each, and those in Jersey 
almost £260,000 each. The evidence is very clear that country- 
by-country reporting data raises many questions that need 
answering in corporate accounts, can reveal that tax shift-
ing to low-tax jurisdictions is taking place, and may help tax 
authorities. 
But, in that case, it is absurd that, while the OECD is now 
demanding that country-by-country reporting data be pro-
duced for tax authorities, it is simultaneously saying that it 
must only go to the tax authority of the reporting compa-
ny’s head office jurisdiction – leaving all other countries to 
wait upon it to share that data, if it is so inclined – while also 
demanding that maximum security be applied to this data to 
prevent it from entering the public domain (with the excep-
tion of EU banks and a few other cases, where different rules 
now apply). 
What is now clear to many investors and other interested 
parties – including politicians, regulators, and communities 
with an interest in the activities of major companies in par-
ticular locations – is that, if this data is so valuable to tax 
authorities, then it is also vital to the other users of a com-
pany’s accounts. These other users of accounts are saying, as a 
result, that country-by-country reporting information should 
be available in audited form at the same time as the company 
places its other accounting data on public record. 
The most obvious reason to do this is in order to expose the 
tax risk inherent in a company to its investors: after all, if tax 
authorities have this information and might use it to challenge 
a company’s tax affairs at potential cost to its shareholders, 
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then those investors should be given the chance to assess that 
risk in the same way as the tax authority so that they can then 
decide on that basis whether they want to be a part of the 
company, or not. Failure on the part of a company to supply 
this data to its members when it will now be in its own pos-
session seems to reflect a glaring gap in corporate governance 
and reporting standards.
Another reason for demanding this data is that it will bring 
pressure to bear on companies to clean up their acts. They 
have used tax havens until now because it has been possi-
ble to do so in secret. Once that use is exposed, behaviour is 
likely to change: companies do not want to look like cheats. 
The change in the data at Barclays offers some indication of 
this: the profits they have reported in tax havens have fallen 
since the introduction of limited country-by-country report-
ing for banks in the EU. It is very likely that this trend would 
be replicated by other companies. As a result, tax risk for 
investors would fall – producing, among other things, more 
secure pension funds – and tax haven usage would fall – gen-
erating increased tax payments in the countries where tax is 
really due, consequently providing a benefit for entire national 
communities. 
Moreover, country-by-country reporting would provide 
something that is sorely lacking at present in the behaviour 
of multinational corporations – namely, summarised data 
on what activities each corporation’s business consists of, 
and what it contributes to each country in which it oper-
ates. Existing accounting data makes it almost impossible 
to establish this information, which would be invaluable for 
politicians, regulators, civil society, journalists, trade unions 
and others who want to assess the real risks of engaging with 
a company.
Data on tax risk is not the only thing country-by-coun-
try reporting exposes. It also reveals shifting sales patterns, 
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and thus market trends, changing patterns in employment 
at the company, regional variations in reported profit, and 
the vulnerability to closure of activities in specific locations. 
In addition, the commitment that a company has really 
made to a market may be assessed based on the sums it has 
invested.
All of this data, of course, is useful to tax authorities – but 
its uses extend way beyond than that. It is accounting data 
that lets customers, suppliers (including employees), govern-
ments and communities assess the risk that they run in dealing 
with a multinational corporation in a specific location. This is 
information wholly unavailable to most of them at present. 
The result of publishing country-by-country data, then will 
not just be better accountability for tax purposes, but also 
better corporate accountability in general. No wonder some 
multinational companies are working so hard to make sure 
that country-by-country reporting data will not be publicly 
reported: it would expose their internal workings in a way 
that has never been done before.
It is not too bold a claim, therefore, to say that country-
by-country reporting is about holding globalised companies 
to account locally. This is important: it is increasingly clear 
that people in widely dispersed and differing economies 
feel alienated from the benefits of economic growth, which 
seemingly accrue only to an elite who happen to own and 
control the world’s largest corporations. Making those com-
panies accountable is an essential part of holding that elite 
to account, and of rebuilding an association between these 
companies and the communities that host them. Such account-
ability will also strengthen the sovereignty of the nation-state 
for tax and accounting purposes. As globalisation seeks to 
skew rewards towards a minority, the state is the only avail-
able mechanism for ensuring that rewards from trade are 
redistributed towards those who have either earned or require 
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them – whether they are employees of the companies in 
question, or those for whom the state must provide, such as 
the pensioners who once worked for such companies. 
Failure to make such information publicly available threat-
ens the social and economic fabric of many countries. It is time 
for the companies in question to realise that the elites that are 
being rejected are not just those who occupy the political field 
(although that is happening), but also those within commerce 
– and to do something about it. I do not say that country-by-
country reporting is a complete solution to this process, but it 
provides the data that might initiate a dialogue, and gives us 
the information to hold companies to account. 
Registers of Beneficial Ownership 
of Companies and Trusts
In 2005 I suggested that full registers of the beneficial owner-
ship of limited companies and trusts were vital if the secrecy 
undermining markets and tax revenues was to be beaten.5 At 
the time, such a statement was unusual: most people treated 
the suggestion as incomprehensible. In July 2016, however, 
the European Commission published a proposal for the estab-
lishment of precisely such registers.6 While this was a step 
forward, it is not as yet as robust as it needs to be, and loop-
holes remain. It should be understood that, as important as 
the disclosure of the beneficial ownership of all companies and 
trusts may be, such transparency will not by itself be enough 
to ensure that tax haven secrecy is cracked for good. 
This can only really be achieved if the following data is 
readily available in a set of published accounts for all compa-
nies, without exception, whatever their size:
• company name
• company number
• place of incorporation (registered address)
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• location(s) where the company trades, if this differs from 
the place of incorporation, as it very often does
• names of directors
• the nature of the trade it conducts
• names of owners of any stake in the company exceeding 
10 per cent 
• what other companies it controls, and how
as well as:
• an income statement (profit and-loss-account), which 
can be consolidated with its subsidiaries if appropriate, as 
could other financial data in that case
• a balance sheet (statement of affairs)
• a cash-flow statement
• a statement on taxes due for the current period, taxes 
due in future periods, and tax paid
• a note on accounting policies
• an explanation of rewards paid to directors
• details of payments to other staff and the total number 
of such staff
• notes explaining other data in the income statement and 
balance sheet
• country-by-country reporting data, if the company 
trades in more than one jurisdiction.
For trusts, some variation is required, and in this case it might 
be appropriate to exempt smaller trusts that do not control 
trading entities, such as limited companies, from the disclosure 
requirements. The remaining trusts might need to disclose:
• the name of the trust
• the trust deed that governs the trust’s management, plus 
any side letters of instruction to trustees
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• the place where the trust is considered resident
• a usual business address at which the trustees can be 
contacted
• names of the trustees are, and where they are resident
• names of all those who have benefited from more than 
10 per cent of the trust’s income or gains in the last five 
years.
as well as
• an income statement
• a statement of affairs (balance sheet), plus supporting 
notes to ensure that the nature of the assets and liabilities 
of the trust can be understood
• a statement on taxes due for the current period, taxes 
due in future periods, and any tax paid
• details of all payments to beneficiaries during the last 
period that exceed either 10 per cent of the trust’s income 
and gains for the period or 10 per cent of the total pay-
ments made.
In both cases, this information is vital. For example, it is essen-
tial to know who the real, warm-blooded people who own 
and direct companies are, so that the risk of engaging with 
their companies can be properly appraised, and to ensure 
that those really responsible for ensuring that the company 
complies with its legal obligations (such as paying tax) can 
be identified. The only exceptions would be in cases where 
there is a genuinely diverse ownership – and most companies 
for which that is true will be quoted on stock exchanges. We 
need this data if we are to be sure who ultimately controls a 
company, who appoints its management, and who might save 
tax or secure some other advantage as a consequence of that 
company’s use. 
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Without such data, responsibility for the architecture of 
the offshore world cannot be established. That would mean 
that no one could be made accountable for what happens in 
the secrecy spaces I have described, and that would render all 
other efforts to secure accountability meaningless. That is why 
registers of beneficial ownership are so important.
But this information is not enough by itself. Knowing who 
is accountable for what happens in the secrecy space without 
knowing what is actually going on within it would render the 
effort expended to secure beneficial ownership data largely 
irrelevant. The availability of the accounts of all companies 
operating in tax havens – and all other locations – is therefore 
the next category of data we must demand in order to crack 
open tax havens. The case of the ownership of the British 
Home Stores group of companies in the UK by offshore com-
panies that we know to be associated with Lady Christina 
Green offers an instructive example. While we know that the 
group in question (which failed in 2016 less than a year after 
being sold, with the loss of 11,000 jobs) was owned for the 
benefit of Lady Christina and her family, we do not know how 
that was arranged, what the financing arrangements between 
offshore companies used for the purpose and British Home 
Stores really were, how the benefits of ownership were dis-
tributed, or whether any tax was paid as a result – because 
none of the accounts for the relevant companies are avail-
able.7 Knowing the ultimate beneficial ownership is therefore 
not enough: when things go wrong (as they have in the case 
of British Home Stores), there is a need to ‘follow the money’ 
to understand what has happened. This is not possible unless 
accounts are available. 
It is also essential to be specific about the data that such 
accounts must supply, so as to avoid any doubt about what 
is being asked for. The bare minimum level of disclosure that 
is currently tolerated for what are called small companies in 
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most EU states is simply not adequate for these purposes. 
This is because bare-minimum disclosure does not require 
any profit-and-loss account data to be included; as a result, 
no information on tax due is made available either. We have 
somehow reached a position in which information on the 
payment of tax – which even the Financial Times expects that 
a company should make available in exchange for the extraor-
dinary privilege of limited liability that it is granted by society 
– is not disclosed on public record by more than 90 per cent 
of companies in the European Union.8
This point is of particular concern in the United States. In 
a state like Delaware (which, because of its lax rules, is now 
home to more than a million corporations but only 945,000 
people),9 incorporation is commonplace precisely because 
the accounts of private companies are never required to be 
published, and the details of the directors and owners of cor-
porations can also be easily hidden. Wyoming and Nevada 
compete with Delaware to provide this service. The result is 
that there may be 2 million corporations formed in the United 
States each year about which its authorities effectively hold 
no data. As Jason Sharman of Griffiths University, Australia, 
who has spent much time studying this issue, has noted: 
‘Foreigners looking to evade tax in America are usually 
safe because of its secrecy.’10 Unsurprisingly, the Tax Justice 
Network has named the United States as one of the top tax 
havens in the world. 
Establishing legal requirements relating to disclosure will 
not, however, mean that the law in question will necessarily 
be complied with: law-breakers are to be found everywhere 
– especially, it seems, among the world’s users of limited- 
liability corporations. This means that it is vital that mecha-
nisms exist to identify who should be complying with the law 
on disclosing beneficial ownership data and accounts, in case 
those responsible should fail to do so.
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Logically, such discovery mechanisms should extend to all 
companies: after all, any company not complying with a legal 
requirement represents a potential threat to the integrity of 
the reporting system as a whole. Pragmatically, however, the 
goal is to make sure that tax is paid. Companies that genuinely 
do not trade therefore have to be accepted as being of little 
concern, as they will not have any tax owing. The number 
of such companies may be high; it is entirely possible that 
there are at least a million non-trading companies in the UK at 
any time. All attention should thus be focused on identifying 
which companies really do trade. These are the companies in 
which non-compliance with disclosure on beneficial owner-
ship and accounts may be linked to real tax loss. 
Thankfully, identifying these companies is possible. This is 
because the vast majority of the world’s banking is undertaken 
by only a few hundred banks, all of which are ultimately reg-
istered in major onshore financial centres.11 Moreover, almost 
every trading company in the world will make use of the ser-
vices of one or more of these banks. It should therefore be 
made a condition of the grant of a banking licence to a head 
office of any bank that each of its subsidiaries and associates 
(and the net should be cast very wide) annually reconfirm the 
identity of the ultimate beneficial ownership of all the compa-
nies to which it supplies services, wherever in the world they 
might be. This should apply wherever they are incorporated, 
and wherever they trade. 
It should also be required that the data in question be sup-
plied simultaneously to three parties: the company regulator 
of the country where the entity was incorporated; the tax 
authority of the place where the company trades (if differ-
ent); and the tax authority of the place where the majority 
or largest part of the beneficial ownership of the company is 
resident for tax purposes. If there is joint ownership, both tax 
authorities need to be advised.
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In addition to basic data on the identity and location of 
the corporation, as well as on those who own and manage it 
(which every bank must have in order to comply with anti–
money laundering regulations), the information supplied 
would specify the numbers of the bank accounts that were 
maintained for the company, and the total sum deposited in 
and paid out of such accounts (excluding internal account 
transfers) in a year. Since, as a matter of fact, banks must have 
all this data the cost of assembling this information should be 
small. In addition, the data should be very accurate: company 
numbers, and passport or social security numbers for indi-
viduals, are all that is likely to be required to ensure a very 
high success rate.
There will, of course, be those who object. I have already 
dealt with the issue of privacy, as opposed to secrecy, in the 
case of limited companies, and have shown that this is not a 
valid reason for objection. Only the question of human rights 
is a real cause for concern; but, unless there are clear signs 
that the human rights of those whose data might be supplied 
may be prejudiced in a recipient state (which is an issue that 
should probably be decided on a country and not an individ-
ual basis, resulting in a ‘blacklist’ of those states who could 
not be trusted), then the relevant data should be submit-
ted to that state. The net outcome would be extraordinarily 
beneficial. 
First, that is because secrecy would be shattered within 
most of the tax haven world, since most offshore transactions 
are undertaken through limited companies and trusts whose 
affairs would now be opened to scrutiny. Second, as a result, 
either voluntary compliance rates would increase significantly, 
or the use of offshore companies would plummet. Third, and 
most importantly, tax authorities and company regulators 
would have reliable data on which companies were trading 
in their jurisdictions. This would mean that both could then 
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enforce an obligation on such entities to file their accounts 
and tax returns, and to make payment.
Lastly, in order to ensure that those responsible for filing 
data really do fulfil their obligations, there must be con-
sequences for those who fail. In the first instance, the tax 
authority in the country where trade was taking place or ben-
eficial ownership was located should be able, if accounts or 
tax returns are not filed, to make request of a company’s bank 
(whose identity will, of course, now be known to them) for the 
bank statements for the period in question. The tax authority 
in question should then be permitted to estimate the tax due. 
And if the company does not then pay that tax the individ-
ual owners and directors responsible for managing it should 
be made personally liable to do so. The time has come when 
abuse of the privilege of limited liability should no longer be 
tolerated. The limited liability of the beneficial owners of com-
panies that do not comply with their legal obligations should 
be revoked: those who abuse offshore should assume personal 
responsibility for doing so. 
It is perfectly possible to draft legislation that will achieve 
this goal. In fact, I did so in the UK in 2013, for the late Michael 
Meacher MP, who presented it to the UK House of Commons 
as a private member’s bill. It was talked out by government-
supporting MPs who argued that it was unacceptable, as it 
would increase UK tax yield. Extraordinarily, the fact that the 
new revenue might come from those who were evading their 
responsibilities did not appear to be an issue for these MPs. 
At some point, public sentiment on this issue will change. 
Regulation in this form will then be needed, and should be 
promoted internationally. 
Reforming Corporation Tax
The next change needed in order to tackle international tax 
abuse is the reform of corporation tax. Some argue that the 
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only acceptable reform to corporation tax is to abolish it 
completely, but I cannot agree. Companies are distinct and 
separate entities from their members with their own legal 
identities and claims to income and assets. Why these claims 
should go untaxed when those of real, warm-blooded human 
beings are subject to tax is very hard to understand, unless 
the aim is to reduce the tax liabilities of companies’ wealthy 
owners. Exempting companies from tax would simply allow 
wealth to accumulate in them untaxed, forever: a better tax 
wheeze would be hard to imagine. Companies must therefore 
be taxed to stop a most basic form of abuse.
There are two other reasons for taxing companies. One 
is that it is efficient to do so: in many cases it is much easier 
to tax a company than all of its shareholders, even if you 
could locate them. This has the second advantage of ensuring 
that at least some tax is paid in the place where the company 
trades, rather than in the tax haven where its shares may be 
registered. 
Corporate taxation is therefore a necessity. That makes it 
very unfortunate that corporation tax is currently based on 
the fantasy that each individual company that is a member 
of a group of companies is entirely independent of any other 
company that might own it and must thus be taxed as a wholly 
independent entity. This, of course, makes no sense at all. As 
a matter of fact, much abuse happens because companies are 
brought together into group structures that are deliberately 
intended to reduce their tax bills. A corporation tax system 
that puts tax authorities on the back foot from the outset by 
pretending that this is not the case really does not help their 
cause. 
It is also unfortunate that, for all the effort expended on 
initiatives such as the OECD’s BEPS project, this fundamental 
problem remains in place. In effect, BEPS is a sticking plaster 
on an open wound that will not heal: so long as the corporate 
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tax system pretends that groups of companies do not exist, 
nothing can be done to tax them effectively. 
In the Internet era, we can no longer pretend that the far-
flung subsidiary companies of multinational corporations are 
really independent entities. This might have been plausible in 
the steamship age of the 1920s, but not now. The reality is 
that multinational corporations really are single entities, split 
into parts for operational convenience alone, and the eco-
nomic substance of the entity as a whole must now be taxed. 
To put it another way, we should tax groups as single entities.
Technically, this can be done. We already have group 
accounts, because they are considered the only true and fair 
representation of what a group of companies really does: or, to 
put it another way, the accounting profession already accepts 
that groups of companies really are, in effect, single entities. 
And now we have country-by-country reporting, though so 
far only for tax purposes. Combining these factors suggests 
two possible corporation tax reforms, the first of which is 
unitary taxation. 
Under unitary taxation, a group of companies is treated 
as one single company for the purposes of taxation, however 
many individual companies it comprises. So, for example, 
in the case study on country-by-country reporting discussed 
earlier in this chapter, the three separate companies that made 
up the group would be treated as if they were one single entity. 
In the real world, this might also mean a group of companies 
like Shell, operating in more than seventy countries and with 
93,000 employees, which is likely to have many hundreds of 
subsidiaries, will also be treated as if it is just one company.
Unfortunately, while this is the basis for group account-
ing, there are many good reasons why the profits recorded in 
those group accounts may not form a suitable basis for a tax 
charge. No one should be surprised by this; my own research 
has shown that there is not at present a single country in 
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the world that charges a company to tax based on the profit 
figure it declares in its accounts. Without exception, as far as 
I can discover, all jurisdictions think that there is good reason 
to make an adjustment to that profit figure when it comes 
to tax. This is not the place to explore the technicalities of 
those adjustments, but it should be noted that they have three 
essential goals. First, they seek to standardise the claim for 
expenses made in some cases, such as expenditure on new 
plant and equipment. Second, they disallow expenditure for 
tax purposes that the company can legitimately incur, but 
which tax authorities do not regard as a reasonable offset 
against taxable income. Third, in this somewhat abbreviated 
list, adjustments are made to prevent tax cheating. So, for 
example, if a company is found to be artificially transferring 
its profits to a tax haven, then tax authorities reserve the right 
to adjust its declared profits to prevent the tax consequences 
of that abuse. There is no doubt that, when it comes to unitary 
taxation, adjustments of the first two kinds would be required 
– but the great advantage is that there would be no reason for 
the last type of adjustment, because all profit shifting takes 
place within a group, and by treating it as a single entity, such 
games would be rendered ineffective.
Unitary taxation does assume that a set of rules could be 
advanced in which company profits are adjusted for tax pur-
poses. No one should underestimate the scale of negotiations 
required to achieve this goal, but it should still be easier to 
achieve, and much easier to understand, than the OECD’s 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting process, which was finalized 
in 2015. Once this tax-adjusted profit is established, what 
unitary taxation does is apportion the total resulting sum to 
all the individual countries in which the company trades on 
the basis of a formula. 
It is no accident that the most commonly suggested formula 
for this purpose is the one I explained earlier in this chapter, in 
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discussing country-by-country reporting. I am able to say this 
with confidence because I designed the first version of country- 
by-country reporting and intended it to supply the data 
required for use in this unitary apportionment formula. The 
manner in which the OECD has adopted it may be simpler 
than I first proposed, but it is still intended to achieve this goal. 
In other words, if the group of companies in that example 
was to be taxed on a unitary basis, then country X would 
be apportioned £53.7 million of the group’s profits, which it 
would then be able to tax; country Y would be apportioned 
£55.8 million, and country Z (the tax haven) would be appor-
tioned just £0.5 million of the profits. Crucially, though, the 
rate they would then apply to those apportioned profits would 
be entirely up to them. Many countries, including the UK, 
have objected to the idea of unitary taxation (which has been 
proposed for use within the European Union) on the grounds 
that it undermines their tax sovereignty, when in fact the exact 
opposite is the case: unitary taxation helps bring tax compe-
tition to an end, allowing countries once again to determine 
their own tax rates.
The debate on corporation tax reform should also consider 
another possible option: Alternative Minimum Corporation 
Tax (AMCT). Unitary taxation would bring an end most 
corporate tax abuses in tax havens, but if that is not yet 
possible (and it is not hard to predict that there will be objec-
tions to a unitary approach), then AMCT might be a step on 
the way to achieving a better corporation tax system in the 
meantime.
The simple goal of AMCT is to ensure that a minimum rate 
of corporation tax is paid on the declared profits of a multi-
national corporation. This could be done relatively easily. If, 
for the time being, it is agreed that the profits declared in the 
consolidated group accounts of such a company are a true and 
fair reflection of its performance (and that is what its auditors 
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do say in almost every case, after all), then the AMCT due 
should be that figure multiplied by the AMCT rate.
The AMCT recognises two fundamental facts. First, like 
unitary taxation, it is based on the obvious fact that the 
world’s multinational corporations are, in effect, single entities. 
Second, AMCT reflects the fact that, just as the corporation 
is seamless when it crosses boundaries, so too are the benefits 
the corporation obtains from incorporation, limited liability, 
the rule of law, the upholding of contracts and private prop-
erty rights, the maintenance of regulation that ensures people 
can have confidence to trade with it in safety, and much else 
besides. 
This implies that, while no entity but a nation-state can 
impose taxes, the obligation to pay those taxes exceeds the 
obligation to any state in particular: just as there are universal 
rights, so too are there universal obligations that transcend 
borders, and the duty of a multinational corporation to pay 
tax is one of them. AMCT imposes a tax charge that recog-
nises this fact.
How, then, might such a tax work? A global minimum cor-
poration tax rate would be set at a level below the corporation 
tax rate in most countries. That is because the AMCT is not 
designed to replace local corporation taxes in those countries 
that think such taxes are desirable, but instead to supplement 
and support them. The AMCT rate would then be applied to 
the agreed global profits of the company subject to the charge. 
The most obvious jurisdiction to impose this would be that in 
which the parent company of the group was located, but if it 
refused to do so (because, for example, it was located in a tax 
haven), then another state could indicate that it intended to 
take on the responsibility for doing so.
The sum collected from the AMCT would then, in the 
first instance, be distributed to the jurisdictions where the 
group subject to the charge trades: this would be shown by 
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their country-by-country reporting. The obvious formula 
for apportionment would be the one already outlined in the 
country-by-country reporting example in this chapter, but it 
would have to be adjusted if any part of the charge would as a 
result be allocated to a state that had a tax rate lower than the 
AMCT rate. In that case, the state in question would only get 
the sum due at their prevailing tax rate on the profits in ques-
tion. In places like Cayman, this would of course mean that 
nothing at all would be allocated, as they have no corpora-
tion tax at present. Those sums unpaid to these low-tax states 
would then be put back into the pot available for distribution 
to states that do charge taxes on profits at rates higher than the 
AMCT charge, and they would receive a secondary distribu-
tion as a result. In this way, the rights of those states that want 
to impose taxes would be reinforced, while the places that 
promote tax competition would find their efforts undermined 
without their decision to charge no tax being challenged. 
To put it another way, the sovereign right of those states that 
do not wish to charge corporation tax would be respected, but 
the obligation of companies to pay tax on all their profits, 
in consideration of the benefits that they obtain from the 
countries that are likely to supply them, would be upheld by 
requiring that a minimum contribution be paid by them, irre-
spective of where they might record their profits.
The results of this reform are clear. Firstly, the incentive 
to use tax havens would be dramatically reduced. Secondly, 
the incentive to engage in tax competition would also be 
reduced. Lastly, profits would be more likely to be reported 
where they really arose – though in some extreme cases (such 
as the United States, because of its high headline tax rate) the 
problem might not go away entirely. For this reason, AMCT 
might be best seen as a step on the path towards unitary taxa-
tion, rather than a solution by itself.
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Tackling the Tax Haven Suppliers
The solutions I have presented so far are aimed at eliminat-
ing large parts of the tax haven problem. They would, at the 
same time, make global capital accountable, and so improve 
the quality of markets and the rate of worldwide investment 
by lowering the cost of capital, and therefore see productivity 
and growth increase around the globe. Unfortunately, this is 
not going to happen overnight. 
One reason for this is the massive opposition to change that 
has come from within the accountancy, legal, banking and 
wealth management professions. Their well-being has been 
challenged by progress in the battle against tax abuse because 
there can be little doubt that they have made significant profit 
from their exploitation of the world’s tax havens. It is now 
time to challenge their activities.
I have already noted that banking licenses for head-office 
operations should be made conditional upon much more 
extensive information exchange on the services supplied by 
any subsidiary or branch, wherever it might be. That auto-
matic information exchange should not just be international: 
it is also essential that domestic tax abuse be confronted. If 
there was agreement on this issue within the G7 countries, 
then most of the world’s banks would automatically be 
covered by this regulation.
Accountancy and audit are the next-easiest targets. Just 
four firms dominate this market – PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
Deloitte, EY and KPMG; in fact, if another handful of firms 
were also included, the vast majority of the accountants and 
auditors servicing most of the world’s major users of tax 
havens could be brought under an entirely different regula-
tory environment. In essence, the new approach required is 
simple, and is not entirely dissimilar to that directed at banks. 
It is built upon the fact that all these firms already require 
regulation.
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At present, all these firms legally disaggregate themselves 
into separate entities in the various jurisdictions in the world 
that they work in, despite representing themselves as if they 
are a single entity when it suits them to do so. The time has 
come for this disaggregation to be called out as the charade 
that it very obviously is, if the marketing of these firms is to 
be believed. This is a case in which economic and marketing 
substance must take precedence over the legal form that they 
choose to use. The authorities in the G7 states must therefore 
agree that these firms’ licenses to operate should be wholly 
dependent upon four things. 
Firstly, they must be willing to cooperate with public 
country-by-country reporting. They have not done so to date, 
and in some cases have been major opponents of its intro-
duction. This is unacceptable in the current environment. The 
auditors at the core of these firms are all variously licenced 
in ways that require them to advance the public interest, and 
country-by-country reporting is now clearly understood to 
do that. They have no right to put their clients’ demands for 
secrecy above their professional obligations to the public, and 
must be reminded of that fact.
Secondly, they must be willing to disclose such tax-avoid-
ance arrangements as they have put in place in tax havens, 
which have impact on other jurisdictions. Precedents for such 
disclosure arrangements on tax avoidance-schemes exist in 
countries like the UK, but so far have had only a domestic 
impact. This must change immediately, and an international 
dimension must be added to such disclosure regimes.
Thirdly, they must agree to new codes of conduct that will 
explicitly require all their member firms only to undertake tax 
planning activities that are within the spirit of the law of all 
the jurisdictions that might be impacted by them. There should 
be specific provision made in such codes that any person who 
breaches this obligation will be subject to professional sanction, 
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including the loss of their qualification, and that they and their 
firm will also be subject to fines if they do not comply. 
Finally, these firms should be required as a condition of 
their licenses to bring pressure to bear upon their professional 
institutes within all the jurisdictions in which they operate to 
replicate these requirements in the codes of professional ethics 
applying to all professional accountants in those places. In 
combination, these changes might create real change in the 
behaviour of this profession.
The reform of law firms involved in tax haven activities might 
be a little more difficult, partly because there is no interna-
tional network of lawyers that readily overlaps between tax 
havens and the major domestic legal practices in the world. As 
a result, a variety of approaches is needed. 
There has been a steady move within thinking on taxation 
in recent years towards what are now called ‘general anti-
avoidance principles’ in taxation law. What these say is that if 
lawyer inserts a clause into a contract that has the sole or main 
purpose of avoiding tax, then that clause should be ignored 
for the purpose of calculating any tax liability that is owed by 
the taxpayer who tried to take advantage of it. Such clauses 
might by themselves have the effect of potentially dissuading 
both lawyers and their clients from inserting such clauses into 
contracts; but what would really change behaviour would be 
the attachment of penalty clauses to such provisions. Such 
clauses might suggest that, if a change has to be made to a 
tax liability as a result of the use of a general anti-avoidance 
provision, then a penalty of up to 100 per cent of the tax 
that the taxpayer sought to avoid would be payable both by 
the taxpayer and by each of the firms of professional advisers 
who had played a part in implementing any such scheme. To 
ensure that such threats of penalty are really effective, the sum 
due must be the personal liability of any lawyer, accountant, 
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banker or wealth manager who might be involved, if the busi-
ness by which they were employed when offering advice did 
not make payment of the penalty due on their behalf.
In the summer of 2016, the UK suggested such a penalty 
regime for abuses of domestic UK tax law.12 The idea needs to 
be extended internationally, and states must agree to cooperate 
with each other in imposing the resulting penalties on all those 
responsible for paying them: international tax cooperation 
must now be extended to cover this issue if the rule of law is to 
be upheld, as every country should wish it to be. In this way, 
the arrangements could be extended to cover the activities of 
so-called wealth managers, who are often based in tax havens, 
and who play a key role in creating abusive tax arrangements. 
This is not to say that all tax abuse will end if these changes 
are made, but there is unambiguous evidence that the 2009 
changes in tax haven information exchange rules, while inef-
fective in themselves, did create a change in behaviour among 
many users of tax havens. The same outcome would be likely 
if properly designed general anti-avoidance principles were 
put into widespread use. 
Political Will
Throwing a spanner into the works of all the professions 
linked to tax havens is a crucial step but, it has to be said that 
there is one final change that is necessary if tax havens are to 
be beaten, and it involves the creation of political will among 
the governments that are currently suffering a loss of revenue 
to these places. Since political will is somewhat hard to define, 
in the rest of this chapter I suggest some possible means for 
doing so. 
Beating tax haven (and other tax) abuse is a laudable goal 
in itself, but we will only know if it has worked if more tax 
is collected as a result. To demonstrate this requires that a 
country measure its tax gap over time, which very few 
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countries do at present. The tax gap is the difference between 
the tax that would be paid in a country if its laws were com-
plied with by all resident taxpayers in the way that its tax 
authority deems correct, and the sum that is actually paid. 
The UK is just about the only country in the world to 
undertake such an exercise annually – and it does so very 
badly indeed.13 For example, some 32 per cent of the data 
it publishes is described as ‘illustrative estimates’ – in other 
words, made up figures without any evidential support. But 
at least the UK tries, even if the result should not be afforded 
much credibility. Only the European Union makes anything 
like a similar effort, and then only in relation to VAT, while 
other countries, such as the United States and Sweden, which 
have attempted this exercise, have not updated their working 
methods for some time (since 2010 in the case of the United 
States, and since 2012 in Sweden). 
Some other countries, including Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and most recently Canada, have examined their tax gaps, but 
the vast majority of countries do not appear to have done 
so. The belief that finance ministers are serious about closing 
their tax gaps, whether caused by domestic tax abuse or by 
tax havens, is not credible when they will not even take the 
steps necessary to estimate their scale. Anyone concerned with 
tax haven abuse has to make the monitoring of tax gaps one 
of their central demands. 
The next step is to ensure that the world’s tax authorities 
have the resources they need to tackle the problem of tax 
havens. In some countries, there are concerted efforts being 
made to shrink the size of tax administrations. For example, 
the United States shrunk the size of its Internal Revenue 
Service by 13,000 employees between 2010 and 2014, repre-
senting a loss of 13 per cent of its staff.14 Australia has reduced 
its tax staff by 4,400 in the last three years, and it has been 
widely reported that this has reduced its capacity to tackle 
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multinational corporations. The UK has reduced the number 
of its staff employed on tax work by 35,000 since 2005, rep-
resenting a reduction of some 38 per cent, and more cuts are 
now expected.15 While such cuts continue, there is little hope 
of eliminating tax abuse. The folly of cutting staffing levels 
within tax authorities when tax is still due must, apparently, 
be pointed out repeatedly. 
Of course, it can be argued that some of these staff reduc-
tions are the result of the impact of computerisation, and this 
is certainly a factor. But there is much more to it than that. 
The culture of ‘productivity’ has undoubtedly been embraced 
by many tax authorities on the assumption that what might be 
good for the private sector necessarily works just as well for 
the state. This, unfortunately, is a misconceived philosophy. 
If tax havens are to be beaten, it will be necessary to hold 
governments to account for the hypocrisy that appears to be 
inherent in almost all anti–tax haven initiatives that have so 
far been proposed, by organisations like the OECD. The latest 
example of this hypocrisy became apparent in July 2016, 
when the OECD published its new criteria for what are to be 
considered ‘cooperative’ tax regimes on automatic informa-
tion exchange. These criteria are important – they may define 
whether or not sanctions will be imposed by the European 
Union and other states on certain jurisdictions. 
The OECD proposed that, in order to avoid blacklisting, 
any state must meet two of the following three criteria:
1. The country receives a rating of ‘largely compliant’ 
or better from the OECD’s Global Forum, as regards the 
‘exchange of information on request’ standard of transpar-
ency.
2. The country commits to adopting automatic informa-
tion exchange (the so-called Common Reporting Standard, 
CRS), and to beginning exchanges by 2018 at the latest.
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3. The country has signed the Multilateral Convention on 
Mutual Administrative Assistance in Tax Matters (MCMAA), 
a framework for all kinds of information exchange, or has 
what the OECD considers a sufficiently broad exchange 
network providing for the exchange of information on 
request, as well as for automatic exchange of information.
As the Tax Justice Network pointed out in an immediate 
response to the proposals,16 if they are read at face value, the 
United States clearly fails to meet these criteria, as do Israel 
and Turkey, along with a relatively short list of rather more 
familiar culprits. 
In the case of the United States, this is because it has not 
ratified the MCMAA referred to in the third criterion. In addi-
tion, it is only ‘largely compliant’ with the first criterion, as 
a result of a political fix: there are US legal entities (single-
member LLCs without US-sourced income) for which there 
is no ownership information whatsoever in the United States, 
which is unacceptable in a ‘largely compliant’ state, despite 
which the United States has been granted that status. 
And that is not the end of the problem in the case of the 
United States, because it has also blatantly refused to comply 
with the commitment to engage in automatic information 
exchange required by the seconded criterion. It demands vast 
amounts of data from other countries under the terms of its 
Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act of 2010, but stead-
fastly refuses to supply any in exchange; and yet the United 
States is apparently considered compliant, because it is named 
in a footnote in the relevant OECD document, and on the 
basis of this fudge is deemed to comply when it obviously does 
not. If the effort to beat tax haven abuse is to be credible, it 
must not resort to this level of manipulation. Such hypocrisy 
has to be identified for what it is, and ended, if tax haven 
abuse is to be beaten. 
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The aim of pursuing these goals is unambiguous: to remind 
politicians, tax authorities and other agencies that the goal 
of defeating tax haven abuse is not just about passing well-
intentioned laws, but always to make sure that these laws 
were applied. If tax gaps are monitored by well-resourced 
tax authorities, which really understand what tax is for and 
co operate in open and transparent ways, then we might 
really beat tax haven abuse, and build a better society as a 
consequence.
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chapter 7
The Post–Tax Haven World
It is hard to imagine a post–tax haven world. For anyone who 
has only lived in the era of neoliberalism and globalisation that 
has existed since the 1980s, tax havens have been a continuing 
and pervasive presence impacting on almost everything large 
business has done, and much of what government could do. 
To consider a world without tax havens is to imagine a place 
that few have really experienced. But it is necessary to make 
the effort if the continuing struggle of beating tax haven abuse 
is to be vindicated. 
No one, of course, can be completely confident about their 
predictions for the future, and I am no exception. It is therefore 
appropriate to note the basis on which I make my suggestions. 
In the introduction to this book, I said that tax havens have 
had three goals: to undermine the rule of law, to prevent dem-
ocratically elected governments from delivering the policies 
that their electorates might expect, and to increase the con-
centration of both income and wealth. Each of these goals has 
been achieved behind a veil of secrecy that has been expressly 
designed to prevent what is happening from becoming appar-
ent, and to deny the data necessary in order for governments 
and markets to make informed decisions. 
In a world without tax havens, therefore, I do assume that 
the rule of law will be improved, democracies will better 
reflect the will of their electorates, and income and wealth 
inequality will fall. This will be possible because transparency 
will increase, and with it the quality of decision-making by 
governments, regulators, investors, businesses, consumers, 
employees and civil society will improve.
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I am not saying that transparency is a panacea: it is not. 
There are occasions when we all know that privacy is impor-
tant, and I explicitly recognise that fact in this book. But 
informed decision-making requires data. When and how to 
deal with corporations and other entities created by law is 
one such decision, especially if those entities already have the 
economic odds stacked in their favour because they enjoy 
limited liability. There are other cases in which this is also true. 
Knowing, for example, that a candidate for political office 
has made use of tax havens would seem to be important: the 
prime minister of Iceland had to resign in 2016 following rev-
elations in the Panama Papers that his family had made use of 
such facilities. The politician may not benefit from transpar-
ency in such a case, so it is not a universal good: the gain to 
the electorate at large outweighs, I think, the cost to the tax 
abuser in such cases. 
This is the basis for my reasoning, coupled with two 
further assumptions. The first is that democracy is, as Winston 
Churchill had it, ‘the worst form of Government except [for] 
all those other forms that have been tried from time to time’.1 
Second, I assume that society will want to continue to orga-
nise itself in what is best described as a mixed economy, in 
which government and private businesses cooperate, some-
times in an uneasy tension, to meet the needs of people living 
in a community. This necessarily means that effective, open, 
fair and efficient markets are beneficial. I am aware, of course, 
that some think there are better ways of organising economies, 
but, rather like democracy, though mixed economies may 
have their faults, they seem to be better than all other alter-
natives currently available. This makes the effort to improve 
them worthwhile. 
Markets would be fundamentally different without the 
existence of tax havens. This is because markets would 
operate in the way that those who argue they are socially 
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desirable suggest is necessary. This will be a result of the 
massive increase in transparency that the ending of tax haven 
practices will deliver. 
Among smaller companies, the publication of beneficial 
ownership data and significantly enhanced accounting infor-
mation will reduce the risk to many in undertaking trade in 
this sector. Businesses should survive for longer, make more 
money, and prosper for longer as a result. Transparency will 
not guarantee success to any business, but it will reduce the 
risk that another business will bring it down by defaulting on 
its debt. It will also reduce the chance, that another business 
will be able to afford to undercut it because it does not pay its 
taxes, and that other businesses can grow faster because they 
use tax-free, illicitly obtained funds to invest. Level playing 
fields are meant to provide the foundation of fair markets: 
abolishing tax havens will help deliver them. 
At the other end of the market, the introduction of country- 
by-country reporting for multinational corporations, which 
many now think is inevitable, will see a huge increase in 
transparency among publicly quoted companies. This report-
ing will revolutionise the way in which major multinational 
corporations work: a policy of artificially relocating profits 
to tax havens will be readily apparent as a result of such 
reporting, and, as a result, few will take the risk of doing 
so. Shareholders already tell me they will not tolerate such 
policies if they become aware of them.2 Nor will the public, 
when it comes to consumer-facing companies.3 The reaction 
of Starbucks to its poor tax publicity, which led it to make 
additional voluntary tax payments in the UK, may have been 
extreme, but indicates the power consumers have on this issue 
in some markets. The ramifications of this phenomenon are 
significant and wide-ranging.
In the first instance, there may well be a period during which 
some multinational corporations appear to pay more tax. 
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That will be because those companies will be going through a 
process of adjustment in which past abuses are being ironed 
out of their tax structuring. They may see a fall in their stock 
market value as a consequence. On the other hand, those com-
panies that require no such tax risk correction are likely to see 
a corresponding increase in value: they will represent a lower-
risk investment for some time to come. Awareness that tax 
abuse correlates with risk will remain a market phenomenon, 
until the point when all companies have reacted to country-
by-country reporting.
While that adjustment process is going on, some other busi-
nesses will see a significant change in the demand for their 
services: as the demand for tax haven transactions falls, so too 
will the tax haven activities of the big four accountancy firms 
decline considerably. It is very likely that they will pull out of 
many such locations as a result. For the big four, the immedi-
ate benefits will be apparent: the young graduates on whom 
they are dependent for a continuing supply of new talent will 
once more be able to consider these firms as a career option to 
which some element of shame is no longer attached. 
Just as important, though, will be the increase in trust in 
these firms and the opinions that they offer, with resulting 
benefits to their clients. When confidence in big businesses 
and those who manage and advise them is at an all-time 
low because of the overwhelming evidence that so many of 
them have been seeking to free-ride on the tax system, at the 
expense of the majority in any society the importance of this 
change in the relationships of trust that underpin markets 
cannot be overstated. Trust is the bedrock of any society, as it 
is of markets themselves. The fact that trust has been systemi-
cally undermined by tax haven activity for at least thirty-five 
years has led to a corrosive atmosphere in which many now 
doubt that the business community is fit to play its part in a 
mixed economy. Given that mixed economies have been the 
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foundation of prosperity since the Second World War, this is a 
matter of some concern. 
The benefits that might arise from an increase in trust would 
be very hard to measure. Some might be relatively tangible: 
the development of more successful partnerships between the 
public and private sectors is one potential outcome. When so 
many of these arrangements have in the past been associated 
with some form of tax abuse, this would be welcome. The days 
when most of the premises used by the UK’s HMRC are owned 
by an offshore company should be consigned to the past.4 
Other returns to increased trust might arise solely within the 
business community, whose members will also have a greater 
ability to appraise who they wish to partner with. When finan-
cial stability is a key factor in many business relationships and 
tax risk can jeopardise it, it is important to know that a cor-
porate partner has low tax risk built into its structure. There 
will, of course, be some losers, who will not win contracts 
because their arrangements do not stand up to scrutiny; but in 
the longer term, there are likely to be significant gains. 
Investment markets will also change as a consequence. This 
will be partly because the data made available by country-by-
country reporting will permit better analysis of the geopolitical 
and commercial risks inherent in the chosen structures of 
multinational corporations, meaning that some might appear 
more attractive than at present and others less so, whether 
or not they have been abusing tax regulations. The ability to 
appraise this risk, and the fact that tax abuse in these compa-
nies should have been reduced, will then mean that investment 
might then be undertaken on the basis of which company is 
best able to actually make a return on capital whilst meeting 
market needs, rather than from undertaking high-risk tax 
or market arbitrage activity that is hidden behind a veil of 
secrecy. In other words, there is a real chance that markets 
will focus on such priorities as making a return from meeting 
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consumer need, rather than a company’s ability to abuse tax 
regulations.
This shift will have real economic consequences. Since the 
risk of investing will be reduced by enhanced transparency, 
the overall rate of return that will be required by financial 
markets will fall. In the short term, this might increase the 
value of shares, which should appeal to pension funds. In the 
longer term, the lower cost of capital will be reflected in the 
price that companies have to pay for the funds they use, and 
this will mean that more of the investments they wish to make 
should be affordable. In turn, this should lead to more funds 
being invested in productive activities. If that is the case, there 
should be an increase in labour productivity as a consequence, 
and this should flow into an increase in wages, and therefore 
in GDP. If such consequences resulted from increased trans-
parency, it would deliver an almost universal gain.
Beating tax havens will allow markets to work as they 
should. The fight against tax havens is thus part of the chal-
lenge of saving capitalism from itself.
Government Without Tax Havens
The post–tax haven world will also see a change in the rela-
tionship between governments, businesses, and taxpayers. 
Firstly, this will be because all forms of tax abuse will be 
much harder to undertake without tax havens. Perhaps as 
importantly, the increased transparency that will result from 
the abolition of tax havens will mean that there should be an 
increased prospect of trust in tax systems as a whole because 
the chances of tax cheating will have diminished, and it is fre-
quently said by those who cheat that they do so because they 
think others have got away with abuse. This will affect three 
groups of stakeholders. 
For individuals, the new disclosure regimes governing tax 
havens are likely to mean that tax authorities will have an 
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increased confidence in the data that they are supplied with 
by taxpayers. Evidence from the United States has shown that, 
when a taxpayer knows that the government is supplied with 
data on a source of income that they earn by an independent 
third party, the likelihood that they will declare that income 
increases significantly.5 Two things are likely to happen as a 
result. First, taxpayers will spend less time trying to hide their 
income; and second, tax authorities will spend less time audit-
ing taxpayers’ affairs, because they will have less reason to do 
so. Consequently, both parties are likely to win. 
This will have further consequences. Since tax compliance 
is likely to increase if tax haven abuse is defeated, a govern-
ment’s ability to use tax rates and allowances to achieve social 
and fiscal goals will also increase, because the targeting of 
reliefs, allowances and incentives will improve. The result will 
be that a government will have more effective control over 
the macro-economy, as well as an enhanced ability to focus 
resources on those in need, knowing that, if this involves 
redistribution, those who are expected to pay will be more 
likely to do so. 
The ramifications will also spread beyond the domestic 
economy. Closing down tax havens will, for example, remove 
a lot of tax competition (though not all of it), and will as a 
result reduce the downward trend in corporation tax rates. 
This will raise government revenues and redress the balance 
between individual and corporate taxpayers, and thus have a 
favourable impact on income and wealth distribution. 
On the subject of wealth, the impact is likely to be signifi-
cant. Precisely because wealth would no longer be able to flee 
to a tax haven at the first hint of a tax demand, the yield 
from all wealth-related taxation would be likely to increase 
considerably in a post–tax haven world. This is not because 
the design of such taxes will necessarily change that much, 
but because, for the first time, it will be possible to secure the 
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data needed to assess such taxes either as a result of automatic 
information-exchange systems operated with tax havens, or 
simply because wealth will no longer go to such places.
When the effects of these changes are combined, the 
increased tax yields that will result in some areas – such as 
wealth, corporate and business taxes – might mean lower 
taxes for a great many other people. This is likely to be of 
greatest benefit to those on lower incomes. The economic mul-
tiplier effect of abolishing tax havens – that is, the relationship 
between the cost of the tax cut that their abolition may permit 
and the resulting sum injected into the economy by way of 
additional spending – is likely to be quite high, because savings 
rates are relatively low for those on lower incomes.
But there will be other consequences, such as reduced 
demand for government services from those on lower incomes. 
This virtuous cycle of growth might be created at the expense 
of those in higher income and wealth brackets, and of larger 
companies, but widely accepted research has shown that even 
they might benefit from reductions in overall levels of inequal-
ity, through the growth that it will generate.6 It can be quite 
plausibly argued that all parties will win from this process.
The situation of developing countries in a post–tax haven 
world deserves special mention. As I have noted, no one can 
say with certainty how much has been lost to tax havens by 
developing countries, because the secrecy that tax havens 
supply obscures the data that is needed to assess the true scale 
of the loss. What is clear, however, is that these nations have 
suffered disproportionately compared to other states. This 
is, firstly, because they are much more dependent on highly 
mobile corporate tax revenues for their overall income than 
most developed countries. But, secondly, since wealth concen-
tration in these countries is so high, the scale of loss from the 
activities of relatively few citizens who might abuse tax havens 
to hide their income and wealth has been colossal. The result is 
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that, while we can be sure that these countries will not recover 
all that they have lost, they do stand to gain considerably. 
Depending upon the scale of success, it is possible to predict 
that these countries might cease to be aid-dependent if the tax 
haven era is brought to an end. For the first time, the dichot-
omy between developed and developing countries, with all 
the values with which those terms are laden, might become 
irrelevant. The implication of dependency would be removed. 
Political independence deriving from economic autonomy may 
become achievable for many formerly developing nations. 
The psychological, social and economic impacts of this are 
incalculable. 
The prospect of creating tax systems that are both truly 
effective and democratically accountable, alongside the pos-
sibility of having a system in place that reduces corruption, is 
very real indeed. If these processes speed the flow of resources 
towards necessary projects within such states, the prospect of 
economic transformation is high. And all of that will become 
possible because the top-down corruption that tax havens 
have fed, which has given rise to abuse throughout public and 
commercial life in far too many countries, will have been cut 
off at its roots. The opportunity for corrupt funds to remain 
forever hidden will be eliminated if tax haven activity is shat-
tered by a new era of transparency. In short, in many countries 
the end of the tax haven era might deliver hope where it has 
been hard to find.
Tax Havens in the Post–Tax Haven Era
There remains the questions of what will happen to the finance 
industry in tax havens in a post–tax haven world, and where 
that might leave the places that have made this activity funda-
mental to their economies. 
The reality is that there may be no more than a few hundred 
thousand people working in tax haven activities around the 
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world. Jersey, for example, is a place that seems dependent 
upon the financial industry. The island claimed that some 23 
per cent of all its employees, or 13,010 people, worked in this 
sector in December 2015. Many of these people were not from 
the local population: indeed, most of the representatives of 
Jersey’s finance industry appear to be UK expatriates, and the 
same trend can be found in many other tax havens. If the tax 
haven activity of places like Jersey were to close down, it can 
be assumed that many of these people would leave for good. 
Tax haven enthusiasts in Jersey have long told those who 
have objected to their practices that ‘there is a boat in the 
morning’, with the clear implication that if the objector does 
not like what is happening, then are free to leave. The ending 
of tax haven activity might simply change who catches the 
boat: it will be the accountants, lawyers, bankers and wealth 
managers will be looking to work elsewhere. So the financial 
services industry in many tax havens will not collapse, but 
simply vaporise. Many working within it at the time will dis-
cover that ‘elsewhere’ might, after all, have a very real meaning 
for them when they leave in pursuit of it.
What is unlikely is that they will find jobs in the financial 
services sector of those states that have exploited tax havens. 
For example, even though the City of London and the UK’s 
tax havens may have been inextricably linked for more than 
half a century, it is very unlikely that there will be work in the 
UK for most of those leaving those tax havens. This is because 
the City of London will very probably itself shrink as result 
of tax haven activity coming to an end. This decline can be 
initially explained in purely economic terms. Whatever claims 
tax havens might have made, they have never added value to 
the world economy: rebooking transactions that really take 
place elsewhere could never have done that. 
As a result, the only way in which the tax haven industry 
has ever been able to sustain itself has been by capturing part 
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of the proceeds that its clients have secured for their own per-
sonal gain by avoiding tax and other regulations through the 
use of secrecy jurisdictions. If those clients are no longer able 
to secure such savings, and their wealth shrinks, as I predict 
it will, then the financial services sector will no longer be able 
to free-ride on the back of the abuse it enables it clients to 
partake in. The inevitable result will be that this sector’s activ-
ities in places like London and New York will shrink.
In some cases, this might mean that whole financial market 
sectors may close. For all practical purposes, for example, the 
entire hedge fund industry is recorded as taking place offshore, 
even if it is largely managed from London and New York. 
Whether it can survive with onshore regulation and onshore 
taxation is a moot point: what is certain is that the financial 
services world will look very different once tax haven activity 
has been shut down – and it will be all the better for it, since 
its focus will be upon the efficient allocation of capital, not on 
speculation.
That process of allocating capital will involve fewer people. 
Closing tax haven activity will therefore have consequences 
in many countries that have preferred not to think of them-
selves as tax havens, including the UK, the United States, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand (where there is a thriving trust 
industry), and elsewhere. But this development will be ben-
eficial. The Tax Justice Network has described the impact of 
tax haven–linked activities on these economies as a ‘finance 
curse’. This means that tax haven–linked activity has frozen 
out other more productive activity either by overpaying those 
who could be more usefully engaged elsewhere or by so alter-
ing their exchange rates that industrial and service activities 
located in these places have had real difficulty competing in 
international markets. 
If the activities of the finance industry in these places were 
curtailed, there would be three consequences. In the first 
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instance, there would be far fewer people working in the 
sector, and they might not be as well paid. The rest would have 
to go looking for work elsewhere, and might, even if paid less, 
add more value to the economy as a whole. The impact of this 
trend will become particularly notable when fewer graduates 
who might have real potential to offer in productive employ-
ment are sucked into the financial services sector. 
The next impact will be that there will be less hot money 
flowing into these countries, and this will have an impact 
upon their exchange rates; other economic activity in these 
countries will, as a consequence, become more attractive. The 
opportunity available to those formerly in the financial ser-
vices sector to secure gainful employment, albeit not at the 
salaries they once enjoyed, will therefore increase. 
Lastly, there is no reason to assume that these changes will 
result in a fall in GDP in countries like the UK, which will be 
impacted in these ways, or that they will suffer a significant 
decline in their tax revenues, or a loss in their ability to provide 
fundamental public services. In fact, the exact opposite might 
prove to be the case when the distortions that tax haven–linked 
activity have created are eliminated from their economies.
But the situation for those left in tax havens after the 
finance industry has evaporated may be different. It cannot 
be pretended that life in such places will be as easy as it has 
been in the past. This is simply to recognise the fact that, 
throughout history, when an industry has come to the end of 
its useful life, whether for economic or moral reasons (think 
of slavery), a period of disruption follows in which the places 
that have been dependent upon it adjust to their new eco-
nomic circumstances. This will be inevitable in many of the 
smaller jurisdictions that have relied on tax haven activity to 
build and even grow local employment. There is no realistic 
prospect of such places enjoying a sudden rush of new admin-
istrative jobs likely to replace those that are lost. 
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No amount of emotional blackmail from tax haven loca-
tions claiming that they are the victims of the process of 
ending tax haven activity should be succumbed to – partly 
because it is simply not true. It is, after all, the tax havens 
that have been imposing economic harm on other states for 
decades. Moreover, such appeals would be little different 
from a proven criminal appealing from the dock that they 
cannot possibly be given a prison sentence because who, in 
that case, will cook supper for their children that evening. No 
judge would consider such an appeal to be reasonable, and 
nor should we permit tax havens to continue their activities 
simply because they might eventually have a lower overall 
income as a result. 
What this will inevitably mean is that some of those local 
people who have stayed in places like Jersey because of the 
employment opportunities that the finance industry has 
offered will have no choice but to do what so many from 
small economies have had to do throughout history, which 
is to seek their fortunes elsewhere. It must be stressed that 
there is nothing unusual or oppressive about this: the same 
pattern of economic relocation is to be seen within many 
countries when a large source of local employment has ceased 
to be competitive for either technical or economic reasons. It 
is generally accepted that this is a fact of economic life: the 
impact of the change can be cushioned temporarily, but must 
be accepted in the longer term.
That said, there are measures that the states that will benefit 
from the closure of tax haven activity can take that will make 
sense both to speed this process and to lessen the international 
stress arising from it. Offering financial support to the govern-
ments of smaller tax havens as they plan the necessary changes 
to their economy is one such measure; many will be short of 
revenue while this change takes place. Providing direct aid 
to new industries may also be appropriate. Some tax havens 
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that have developed excellent communications infrastructure 
could, for example, be hosts of new universities. If they are 
located in attractive places – as many are – that might add 
to their marketing appeal. Alternatively, assistance for those 
wishing to relocate with, for example, favourable visa terms 
may also be appropriate, and help to ease social distress.
Direct support for those who stay may also be required. 
For example, it is highly likely that property prices in many 
tax havens will fall considerably as a result of the end of their 
activity in the financial services sector. This will be the inevita-
ble consequence of a population exodus, but will leave many 
local people who stay behind with mortgages that consider-
ably exceed the value of their properties. The governments 
of former tax havens must not hesitate in acting to support 
their local populations in these cases (hard as this might be 
for many of them, after what will often have been a lifetime 
of favouring the financial services sector). This could be done, 
for example, by making it illegal for any bank to make a claim 
on a mortgage that exceeds the market value of a property in 
those tax havens impacted in this way. I make this suggestion 
simply to show that the majority of such problems can be 
solved. The same will be true of what might well prove the 
biggest problem of all – namely, ensuring that the pensions of 
former tax haven civil servants, on whose agreement any tran-
sition will be dependent, will be paid. There is no way around 
this other than for the G7 and EU to settle these contracts: it 
will be worth their while to do so.
All this being said, whatever happens, the future economic 
prospects of the world’s better-known tax havens will look 
very different after the transition to a post–tax haven era from 
how they look today. The most telling sign that this change 
might already be in progress came in the summer of 2016, 
with reports that maybe 75 per cent of deposits at a bank in 
Belize had been withdrawn because of the prospect of new 
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automatic information-exchange arrangements being imposed 
in that jurisdiction.7 It matters little whether automatic infor-
mation exchange will work: the fact that people think it might 
is already changing behaviour. Many large companies have 
told me the same thing: they are simplifying their corporate 
structures precisely because they do not want to face the risk 
of criticism if country-by-country reporting does go public, 
and are consequently closing down tax haven subsidiaries as 
fast as they can. 
The inescapable fact is that the tax haven world is in inexo-
rable decline as a consequence of these changes in behaviour. 
It is still in need of a good shove, based on the recommenda-
tions included in this book, for closure to finally happen, but 
happen it will. The only variable left to consider is how long 
it will be before mass dissatisfaction among electorates forces 
politicians to act as a necessary condition of retaining their 
grip on power. 
My suggestion is that, in the face of political populism on 
both the left and the right that has enthusiastically embraced 
anti–tax haven sentiment as a key part of its core offering, 
many more mainstream politicians will smell the coffee, and 
jump with ever-increasing fervour on the pro-transparency 
and anti–tax haven political bandwagon. The process that 
Gordon Brown began in April 2009, when he announced 
at the London G20 Summit that the beginning of the end of 
tax havens was underway, will eventually prove to be ines-
capable, and all mainstream politicians will realise that they 
have to deliver on this issue if they are to meet the reasonable 
demands of their populations for greater economic justice as 
a condition for continuing political support.
Wise tax haven politicians will read the runes and realise 
that those who move first will suffer the least harm. Based on 
past experience, the Isle of Man, which has always had astute 
political antennae on such issues, may well be a place to watch 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   175 18/10/2016   16:09:39
176
dirty secrets
for signs that this is happening; but it is already apparent that 
sentiment is changing. My own discussions with tax haven 
politicians suggest that they realise they are already living on 
borrowed time. 
This chapter has outlined a plan for change to tackle tax 
havens. It has also suggested that, if those politicians who 
have long been sympathetic to tax havens really value democ-
racy, vibrant mixed economies and effective markets, they will 
support this process of change. Social pressure will require no 
less, and I am optimistic that it will happen. The alternatives 
are too uncomfortable to contemplate. And that, in itself, is a 
basis for optimism. 
Society in the Post–Tax Haven Era
Finally, what of the social impacts of the post–tax haven era? 
Since they were first used in the middle ages, trusts have 
always been a deliberate weapon for preserving the interests of 
a few while subverting the objectives of society at large; their 
aim has always been to concentrate the ownership of wealth. 
Tax havens simply gave the world’s trust administrators a 
new and unforeseen opportunity to extend the scope of their 
activities, but their purpose never changed. The consequence 
is all too apparent: as successive data reporting suggests that 
the wealthiest have become wealthier while those on average 
or lower rates of pay have struggled to see any increase in 
their well-being for a very long time, societal stresses have 
increased. An awareness that tax havens have contributed to 
this increasing wealth divide is growing. In a post–tax haven 
world there will be an inevitable move to counter this growing 
disparity in economic outcomes. 
Tax reform will offer one way of tackling this issue. This 
will come partly from equalising the tax rates charged on 
earned and unearned income, which are at present heavily 
biased against those who work. This situation has arisen 
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because governments have been persuaded, or have persuaded 
themselves, that if they are not generous on the taxation of 
capital it will simply move somewhere else – which usually 
means to a tax haven. It might still do so in a post–tax haven 
world, but automatic information exchange will mean that 
tax authorities will still be able to track it, and thus keep it 
within their tax net if its owner is in fact resident in their juris-
diction. It is only the tax abuse, largely orchestrated from tax 
havens, and permitting this disparity in tax rates, that has so 
heavily biased the tax system in favour of the wealthy.
According to the same logic, tax rates on capital gains may 
also become aligned with those on income: economically, 
there is no justification at all for any disparity between the 
two, but such differentials have been commonplace because of 
a fear that capital might flee to tax havens if they did not exist.
Another potential development might be the emergence of 
real wealth taxes. These might be charged as a proportionate 
sum on declared wealth (with substantial penalties, including 
forfeiture of assets at their under-declared value to encour-
age proper compliance), or they might be in the form of new 
taxes on gifts, whether upon death or during lifetime. In either 
case, the chance of capital fleeing to avoid such taxes will be 
dramatically reduced in the post–tax haven world. 
The introduction of land-value taxation may also feature 
in this new environment, because the tracking of land owner-
ship will be easier when the opacity of offshore ownership 
can be removed from the list of problems any such tax faces 
at present.
The appropriate balance of these potential new and 
changed taxes will be for each jurisdiction to decide upon, 
but it is highly likely that wealth, as the only tax base that is 
currently growing steadily, will be increasingly made subject 
to tax. The first reason to do this will be to tackle inequal-
ity and its consequences. A second will be to correct for the 
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past under-taxation of wealth. Finally, the wealthy have by far 
the largest stock of private property rights, and they should 
make an appropriate contribution to the state for all it does to 
protect those rights. They do not do so at present. 
The post–tax haven world should thus be a place of increas-
ing economic equality. This is not the place to reiterate all the 
social, health, economic, educational and other opportuni-
ties that increasing equality is known to give rise to, because 
others have done that. Nor is this the place to point out all 
the benefits that reduced tension in society might deliver. But 
saving democracy seems to be one of the most significant of 
these, and is worth exploring. 
As awareness has grown of the apparent impotence of gov-
ernments in the face of wealth-accumulation assisted by the 
opacity afforded by tax havens, the faith of many people in 
the democratic process, in parliaments and in government 
appears to have declined, and populism of the left and right 
has flourished as a consequence. Faith in the power of the 
ballot box has also dissipated – and with good reason. A per-
sistent assault on the power of governments to levy taxes has 
been systematically waged from the world’s tax havens since 
the early 1980s. This attack has been consciously coordinated, 
and has had some success. The cost is now plain to see: the 
process of democratic government on which Western capital-
ism is based has been systematically undermined. Bizarrely, 
this has been done by those purporting to promote a particu-
lar form of market activity. 
It is not just the power to tax that has been undermined; 
as we have seen, trust is also being eroded. But so too is the 
rule of law. Secrecy jurisdictions have deliberately challenged 
the rule of law in a profoundly aggressive fashion: their aim 
has been to prevent other states from imposing their chosen 
regulations, including those on tax. While libertarians like to 
claim that all taxation is theft, they forget that it is in fact 
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a property right like any other, created by the same parlia-
mentary legal process that invariably supports all private 
property rights, and enforced through the same courts to 
which a citizen may resort if they think their own claims to 
their property have been violated. The extra-territorial chal-
lenge from a tax haven to the right of a state to uphold its 
own law is thus not an action to defend liberty, but is instead 
akin to a challenge to the right of that state to self-determi-
nation. Aggression of this sort has not uncommonly been 
described as war, and that term is appropriate in this case. 
It is tax war, and not tax competition, in which tax havens 
are engaged. 
Such war has consequences: trust has been eroded in the 
system of representation and the structure of society as we 
know it as a result of the actions of tax havens. When popu-
list politicians in various states hint that extra-parliamentary 
action may be required to rein in the activities of multinational 
corporations that abuse tax regimes, they are implicitly sug-
gesting that the power of the state has been so eroded by the 
ability of these companies to float free of regulation through 
their use of tax havens that the democratic process and the 
laws it creates may no longer be enough to curtail their activi-
ties. If democracy is to survive, therefore, tax havens must be 
brought to an end.
It is my hope that I have set out some ways in which this 
might be achieved. Many of these proposed steps can be 
undertaken by individual nations acting in isolation – that is 
even possible for unitary taxation, for example. But there is 
no doubt that international cooperation between those states 
that want to proclaim the right of the state to govern global 
capital would be helpful, not just to the state bureaucracies 
involved, but to their entire populations – including even the 
wealthiest among them, whose well-being, if not their measur-
able wealth, would increase as a consequence. 
Dirty Secrets 18-10-16c.indd   179 18/10/2016   16:09:39
180
dirty secrets
I have suggested many of the outcomes that I think such 
a process might give rise to. If it also resulted in increased 
engagement with and faith in the democratic process, that 
might be the most important victory of all. Tax havens have 
challenged the freedoms of us all. Clear evidence that faith in 
democratic processes had been restored would be the surest 
indication that their stranglehold on the modern nation-state 
had been broken.
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Appendix 2
The current criteria for assessment used by the Tax Justice 
Network Financial Secrecy Index
Knowledge of the beneficial ownership 
of entities using the location
1. Is there banking secrecy? 
2. Are trusts and foundation details available for scrutiny 
on a pubic register at low cost? 
3. Is the beneficial ownership of companies known to the 
jurisdiction?
Corporate transparency
4. Is information on the ownership of companies available 
on a public register that anyone might inspect at low cost?
5. Are the accounts of all companies available on a public 
register the can be inspected at low cost?
6. Does the jurisdiction require that companies include 
country-by-country reporting in their accounts?
Tax and financial regulation
7. Are all people making payments of interest and divi-
dends to non-resident people required to report this to the 
jurisdictions tax authority? 
8. Does the jurisdictions tax authority have a unit dedi-
cated to reviewing the affairs of high-net-worth individuals, 
and does it use standardised systems ensuring that infor-
mation they receive regarding a taxpayer’s affairs are 
automatically matched to the right file? This is, in effect, a 
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measure of the tax authorities likely efficiency in tackling 
tax abuse.
9. Are the worldwide income and capital gains of tax resi-
dent people and companies in the jurisdiction subject to 
taxation within it? This is important because if they are not 
then tax abuse is much easier to arrange. 
10. Does the jurisdiction prevent the use of entities likely to 
be of use for serious tax avoidance?
International standards and cooperation
11. Does the jurisdiction have an effective anti–money 
laundering regime?
12. Is the jurisdiction committed to full automatic infor-
mation exchange with other countries to ensure that those 
places receive the data they need to check that their own 
tax resident people are appropriately charged tax arising 
from the income earned in the jurisdiction supplying the 
data? 
13. Does the jurisdiction have sufficient double tax agree-
ments with other countries so that most other places will 
have the ability to ask the jurisdiction for further infor-
mation relating to the income or gains of one of their tax 
resident people arising in the jurisdiction?
14. Has the jurisdiction signed up to international agree-
ments to beat tax abuse, organised crime and money 
laundering?
15. Does the jurisdiction actually cooperate on money 
laundering issues? 
A full explanation is available on the Tax Justice Network 
Financial Secrecy Index website.
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 Appendix 3
The Tax Justice Network Financial Secrecy Index Rankings, 
2015
RANK Jurisdiction FSI Value
Secrecy 
Score
Global Scale 
Weight
 1 Switzerland  1,466.1 73  5.625
 2 Hong Kong  1,259.4 72  3.842
 3 United States  1,254.8 60 19.603
 4 Singapore  1,147.1 69  4.280
 5 Cayman Islands  1,013.2 65  4.857
 6 Luxembourg     817.0 55 11.630
 7 Lebanon     760.2 79  0.377
 8 Germany     701.9 56  6.026
 9 Bahrain     471.4 74  0.164
10 United Arab 
Emirates: Dubai
    440.8 77  0.085
11 Macao     420.2 70  0.188
12 Japan     418.4 58  1.062
13 Panama     415.7 72  0.132
14 Marshall Islands     405.6 79  0.053
15 United Kingdom     380.2 41 17.394
16 Jersey     354.0 65  0.216
17 Guernsey     339.4 64  0.231
18 Malaysia (Labuan)     338.7 75  0.050
19 Turkey     320.9 64  0.182
20 China     312.2 54  0.743
21 British Virgin Islands     307.7 60  0.281
22 Barbados     298.3 78  0.024
23 Mauritius     297.0 72  0.049
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24 Austria  295.3 54 0.692
25 Bahamas  273.1 79 0.017
26 Brazil  263.7 52 0.678
27 Malta  260.9 50 0.990
28 Uruguay  255.6 71 0.037
29 Canada  251.8 46 1.785
30 Russia  243.3 54 0.397
31 France  241.9 43 3.104
32 Isle of Man  228.6 64 0.068
33 Liberia  218.2 83 0.006
34 Bermuda  217.7 66 0.042
35 Cyprus  213.9 50 0.518
36 Liechtenstein  202.4 76 0.010
37 Ireland  187.4 40 2.313
38 Belgium  181.2 41 1.863
39 Guatemala  177.2 76 0.007
40 Israel  173.8 53 0.166
41 Netherlands  168.4 48 0.322
42 Chile  166.7 54 0.120
43 Saudi Arabia  163.9 61 0.037
44 Australia  148.1 43 0.586
45 India  148.0 39 1.487
46 Philippines  146.1 63 0.020
47 Vanuatu  142.8 87 0.001
48 Ghana  139.2 67 0.010
49 Korea  124.3 44 0.302
50 US Virgin Islands  118.2 69 0.004
51 Samoa  117.5 86 0.001
52 Mexico  117.1 45 0.211
53 Norway  110.7 38 0.731
54 New Zealand  109.4 46 0.129
55 Gibraltar  109.3 67 0.005
56 Sweden  100.9 36 1.006
57 Aruba   99.5 68 0.003
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58 Italy  98.7 35 1.218
59 Latvia  92.8 45 0.113
60 Belize  92.5 79 0.001
61 South Africa  90.9 42 0.203
62 Botswana  90.6 71 0.002
63 Anguilla  89.4 69 0.002
64 St Vincent & the 
Grenadines
 79.7 78 0.000
65 Antigua & Barbuda  79.6 81 0.000
66 Spain  77.5 33 1.090
67 Costa Rica  74.9 55 0.010
68 Turks & Caicos 
Islands
 72.5 71 0.001
69 St Kitts and Nevis  68.4 78 0.000
70 Curacao  67.8 68 0.001
71 Iceland  67.1 46 0.035
72 Seychelles  60.8 71 0.000
73 Slovakia  60.1 50 0.011
74 Macedonia  59.5 66 0.001
75 Poland  57.2 36 0.172
76 Monaco  53.7 74 0.000
77 Estonia  52.9 44 0.023
78 Portugal (Madeira)  52.5 39 0.063
79 St Lucia  51.7 83 0.000
80 Brunei Darussalam  47.4 83 0.000
81 Czech Republic  44.2 35 0.105
82 Grenada  42.2 76 0.000
83 Denmark  38.2 31 0.219
84 Hungary  37.3 36 0.052
85 Greece  37.2 36 0.046
86 San Marino  33.3 70 0.000
87 Andorra  27.3 77 0.000
88 Slovenia  22.5 34 0.019
89 Dominica  21.3 76 0.000
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90 Finland  19.4 31 0.025
91 Cook Islands  17.8 76 0.000
92 Montserrat  10.9 67 0.000
Dark grey: UK Overseas Territories (OTs) and Crown Dependencies (CDs)
Light grey: British Commonwealth territories
See p. *** for further information.
Financial Secrecy Index Rankings, 2009–2015
2009 
Ranking
2011 
Ranking
2013 
Ranking
2015 
Ranking
Pre 2007 
List 
Ranking
US (Delaware) 1 5 6 3 61
Luxembourg 2 3 2 6 26
Switzerland 3 1 1 1 19
Cayman 
Islands
4 2 4 5 3
United 
Kingdom
5 13 20 15 48
Ireland 6 25
Bermuda 7 11 14 2
Singapore 8 6 5 4 17
Belgium 9 15 –
Hong Kong 10 4 3 2 16
Jersey 11 7 9 5
Austria 12 17 18 –
Guernsey 13 15 17 4
Bahrain 14 10 13 9 32
Netherlands 15 55
British Virgin 
Islands
16 11 9
Portugal 
(Madeira)
17 54
Cyprus 18 20 10
Panama 19 14 11 13 7
Israel 20 52
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Japan 8 10 12 –
Germany 9 8 8 69
Marshall 
Islands
16 14 34
United Arab 
Emirates 
(Dubai)
18 16 10 50
Bahamas 19 1
Lebanon 7 7 –
Malaysia 
(Labuan)
12 18 45
Canada 17 –
Mauritius 19 35
Macau 11 44
Jersey 17 5
Turkey 19 –
China 20 –
Source: Prepared by the author based on Financial Secrecy Index listings 
and data previously noted in this chapter.
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taxjustice.net.
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 3. R. Palan, R. Murphy and C. Chavagneux, Tax Havens: How 
Globalization Really Works (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
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 4. See ‘Tax Havens and Their Use by US Taxpayers’, report pre-
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